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THE EMERGENCE OF JURISDICTIONAL
RESEQUENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Scott C. Idlemant
The Supreme Court recently held that federal courts may address personaljurisdiction,and dismiss a lawsuitfor its absence, withoutfirst or ever
verifying their subject-matterjurisdiction. The Court's ruling effectively invites lower courts to sidestep subject-matterjurisdictionalissues and dispose
of lawsuits on any non-merits threshold ground that is functionally
equivalent to, but more easily resolved than, the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction. In this Article, ProfessorIdleman examines the genealogy, components, legitimacy, andfuture applicationof this emerging doctrine of resequencing, as well as the extent to which it accords with the Court's
professedly restrained approachtofederalpower. ProfessorIdleman contends
that the doctrine represents an unsettling departurefrom both precedent and
jurisdictionaltheory, includingprinciples of inherentjudicialpower. Moreover, the doctrine's elements and scope are neither carefully delineated nor
grounded in a coherent theory ofjudicial power, a reality that has already
spawned several lower court conflicts. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the
Article attempts to assess the potential resequencibility of various threshold
issues, most notably personaljurisdiction,Eleventh Amendment immunity,
andfederal sovereign immunity. Professor Idleman concludes that despite
the potential appeal of the resequencing doctrine, its jurisprudentialflaws
overshadow its practicalbenefits.
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INTRODUCTION

As the nation's third century unfolds, American constitutionalism
finds itself in the midst of a structural counterrevolution, waged
largely by a Supreme Court that is at once institutionally conservative
yet doctrinally activist.' At the forefront of this constitutional resurgence are foundational concepts such as the limited and enumerated
nature of congressional power and the reserved powers of the several
states.2 So resolute is the Court's commitment to structuralism that
even the judiciary's own powers, as exemplified by recent standing
and sovereign immunity decisions, have been circumscribed if not
1 See, e.g., Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,
892-93 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring), aj'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 66 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1373, 1379-81 (1998) ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court is again
policing textually-provided-for structural jurisdictional lines in a way that has not occurred
in this country since before 1937. This constitutional development is nothing less than a
quiet revolution.").
2 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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curtailed. 3 That, at least, is what the more conspicuous cases might
lead one to believe. In fact, closer scrutiny reveals that the Court's
commitment is not so thoroughgoing after all, and that its efforts to
constrain federal power-particularly judicial power-have been less
than exhaustive, if not less than principled, especially in areas of per4
ceived public insignificance.
Illustrative in this regard is the recently announced doctrine of
'Jurisdictional resequencing": the power of a court, when confronted
both by a challenge to subject-matterjurisdiction and by some alternative threshold issue, to address the alternative issue first (hence "resequencing"), to dispose of the litigation on that basis, and thus to
sidestep entirely the subject-matter jurisdiction question. In its 1999
decision, Ruhrgas AG v. MarathonOil Co., the Supreme Court explicitly
countenanced the resequencing of personal jurisdiction prior to, and
in lieu of, subject-matter jurisdiction. 5 Since that time, lower courts
have gone so far as to suggest that the option of resequencing prior to
subject-matter jurisdiction may extend to any threshold question as
6
long as it does not implicate the merits.
These developments are striking to say the least. Not only does
resequencing represent a marked departure from precedent-one
scholar charitably described it as "somewhat of a surprise" 7-it introduces substantial instability into an otherwise settled region ofjuris3

In regard to standing doctrine, see Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment, 523

U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); and Riley v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Hospital, 196 F.3d 514, 532 (5th Cir. 1999) (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (remarking that "the Supreme Court's recent structuralist approach to jurisdiction heralds a
new era in the evolution of the standing doctrine"), rev'd en banc on other grounds, 252 F.3d
749 (5th Cir. 2001). In regard to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garret4 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000); College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondatyEducation Expense Board,
527 U.S. 666 (1999); F/oridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4 At the same time, the Court's enforcement of certain principles, such as the separation of powers, has effectively expanded federal judicial power-as illustrated by recent cases
involving the power ofjudicial review. Compare, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437 (stating that
"Congress may not legislatively supersede [the Supreme Court's] decisions interpreting
and applying the Constitution"), and City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-29, 535-36 ("When the
political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them .... and contrary
expectations must be disappointed."), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 & n.10
(1966) (implying that Congress may have the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret constitutional guarantees more expansively, though not more restrictively, than they are interpreted by the judiciary).
5 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999). The Court described the
practice as the "sequencing of jurisdictional issues." Id at 584.
6
SeeYoung v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 00-3713, 2000 WL 1611115, at *1 (7th
Cir. Oct. 25, 2000); Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
7
Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 258, 259
(2000). "Since 1804, when the Supreme Court decided Capron v. Van Noorden, federal
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dictional law. This is particularly true if these lower courts are
correct-and nothing in Ruhrgas suggests the contrary-that courts
may resequence threshold inquiries other than personal jurisdiction
prior to subject-matter jurisdiction. 8 More fundamentally, the emergence of resequencing casts serious doubt upon the structuralist commitment to limited federal power, not merely because it effectively
expands the authority of courts, but also because it has arisen without
meaningful discussion of whether it actually conforms to the legitimating principles of judicial power.
To date, the lower federal courts have expressed both uncertainty
and disagreement over the proper interpretation of the resequencing
doctrine, and given its recent vintage, there has been only limited academic commentary on either its validity or its implications.9 The principal purpose of this Article is to fill this void by systematically
assessing the resequencing doctrine from its initial articulation by the
Supreme Court to its gradual emergence and evolution through lower
court decisions. To this end, the Article is divided into three parts.
Part I describes the nature of the doctrine, including both its immediate genealogy and its basic components. Part II evaluates the doctrine's legitimacy, examining its relation to precedent and prior
judicial practice, to principles ofjurisdictional theory, to the nature of
federal judicial power, and to matters of methodological integrity. Finally, Part III explores the potential future application of the doctrine, with particular emphasis on personal jurisdiction, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and federal sovereign immunity. Part III also
explores the possible convergence of the resequencing doctrine with
the recently articulated and theoretically related prohibition on socalled hypothetical jurisdiction.
The conclusions that emerge from this assessment are not entirely positive. Two of these conclusions are particularly disconcerting. First, the Article reveals that the jurisdictional resequencing
doctrine is substantially illegitimate in relation to virtually all measures
of doctrinal validity, including precedential fidelity, theoretical congruence, jurisdictional conformity, and methodological adherence.
The doctrine does have some elements of legitimacy, of course, and it
is not without its own virtues, especially the potential forjudicial economy. 10 In the final analysis, however, the doctrine manifests little
more than a desire for expediency, obtained at the expense of actual
legitimacy. Second, the undertheorized and analytically undeveloped
courts have generally assumed that unless a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it
cannot
8
9
10

determine any other issue in a case." Id. (footnote omitted).
See Galvan, 199 F.3d at 463.
See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 266-75.
See id.at 269.
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nature of the doctrine renders its future application uncertain,
thereby inviting unpredictability, inconsistency, and even abuse. Not
only does this state of affairs effectively subvert the judicial effort to
implement the structural limits of federal power, it also calls into question the very integrity and intentions of that effort.
I
THE NATURE OF THE DocriNE

This first Part provides an overview of the doctrine's immediate
genealogy and apparent analytical parameters, both for their own sake
and as a prelude to assessing the doctrine's legitimacy and potential
reach in Parts II and III. The genealogical examination primarily focuses on two recent Supreme Court decisions: Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a
Better Environment," which generally disallowed the practice of addressing the merits prior to subject-matter jurisdiction, and Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,' 2 which nevertheless allowed the practice of
3
addressing personal jurisdiction prior to subject-matter jurisdiction.'
The parametric examination, by comparison, will largely shift to the
Ruhrgas decision and to the lower court cases construing it, although
the overlapping significance of Steel Co. will necessarily be revisited in
Part III.
A. The Doctrine's Proximate Genealogy
In Steel Co., a 1998 decision, the Court ostensibly pronounced the
death of hypothetical jurisdiction. 14 This practice, which by the 1990s
every federal circuit court had utilized,' 5 allowed courts to adjudicate
a dispute and render a judgment on the merits without first verifying
that subject-matter jurisdiction, particularly Article III jurisdiction, actually existed. Most often, the practice was employed when a court
was faced with a difficult jurisdictional question but could simultaneously perceive that the party asserting jurisdiction would lose on the
merits. 16 As a matter ofjudicial economy and restraint, therefore, the
court would bypass the jurisdictional question (essentially hypothesiz11

523 U.S. 83 (1998).
12 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
13 Regarding the genealogical link between Steel Co. and Ruhrgas, see id. at 577 (noting that "Steel Co. is the backdrop for the issue now before us"); and Rick Knight, Recent
Developments in Federal Litigation, FED. LAW., Oct. 1999, at 45, 46-47 (similar).
14 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-102; see also Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden ofProving
JurisdictionUnder the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L.
RE-v. 2859, 2876-79 (1999) (examining Steel Co.'s repudiation of hypothetical jurisdiction);
Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 260-66 (same). See generally Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of
HypotheticalJurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REv. 235 (1999) (examining hypothetical jurisdiction in greater depth).
15 Idleman, supra note 14, at 237 & n.5.
16 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-94 (collecting cases).
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ing jurisdiction), proceed to address the merits of the dispute, and
17
then dispose of the case on that basis.
The Court's repudiation of the practice was correct for several
reasons, of which the Court itself articulated two. First, the practice
necessarily "carries the courts beyond the bounds of authorized judicial action"1 8 because judgments issued in the absence of an Article III
case or controversy are advisory 19 and federal courts have long been
prohibited from rendering advisory opinions.2 0 Second, the practice
"offends fundamental principles of separation of powers" 2' because
"[t]he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of
22
powers."
17

18
19
20

See id.
Id. at 94.
Id at 101.
See, e.g., Pennell v. City of SanJose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,

96 (1968). In addition, "the doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutionally based principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" because it "relieves a plaintiff of the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction." Colella & Bain,
supra note 14, at 2876.
21
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94.
22
Itl.
at 101; see also Colella & Bain, supra note 14, at 2876 & n.62 (explaining that an
exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction offends both formalist and functionalist notions of the
separation of powers). To the Court's rationales one could add precedent, institutional
integrity, judicial accountability, and logical consistency. The Court's own cases, for example, had clearly provided that "jurisdiction cannot be assumed on mere hypothesis," City of
New Orleans v. Benjamin, 153 U.S. 411, 424 (1894), and that "[a] court lacks discretion to
consider the merits of a case over which it is withoutjurisdiction," Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981). See also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) ("Our agreement with the Federal Circuit's conclusion
that it lacked jurisdiction, compels us to disapprove of its decision to reach the merits
anyway .. ");
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) ("Withoutjurisdiction
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the
fact and dismissing the cause."). One can also make a strong argument that the federal
judiciary's integrity and legitimacy, especially when holding that the other federal
branches have exceeded their powers, is undermined when it ignores the limits on its own
power. See United States Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72,
77 (1988); Idleman, supra note 14, at 282. Likewise, there is an argument from accountability. Explaining why "[t]he first thing a federal judge should do . . .is ... to see that

federal jurisdiction is properly alleged,"Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has remarked:
Because federal judges are not subject to direct check by any other branch
of government-because the only restraint on our exercise of power is selfrestraint-we must make every reasonable effort to confine ourselves to the
exercise of those powers that the Constitution and Congress have given us.
Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986). Finally, there
is an argument purely from logical consistency or symmetry. It is well-established that a
federal court's power to decide the merits of a claim does not arise simply because the
claim is legally or morally compelling. See Christianson,486 U.S. at 818; Utah v. Babbitt, 137
F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998). Surely it would be a strange jurisdictional doctrine that
would allow such power to arise precisely because the claim is not legally or morally
compelling.
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Yet the Steel Co. decision was not seamless. The opinion did not
clearly delineate the extent of the repudiation, including whether a
court can bypass certain non-Article III jurisdictional inquiries, such
as statutory or prudential standing, en route to the merits. 23 In addition, two of the five Justices in the majority were not willing to prescribe a categorical rule against hypothetical jurisdiction, suggesting
instead that its invocation should remain a matter of judgment 24 and
leading some lower courts to conclude that Steel Co. produced only a
plurality opinion. 25 Lastly, the Court, though conceding that its own
cases had "diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question," 26 nevertheless declined to
tidy up the field, thereby leaving several related doctrines intact and
27
several derivative yet significant questions unresolved.
Among the questions left open was whether an Article III court
could address a non-merits issue, other than a core subject-matter jurisdictional issue, without first verifying its subject-matter jurisdiction.
Issues of this sort might include alternative forms ofjurisdiction (such
as personal or in rem jurisdiction) as well as a variety of semi- or quasijurisdictional matters (such as Eleventh Amendment immunity or administrative exhaustion).28 The difficulty with such issues is precisely
23
Compare Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101 (justifying the repudiation in part by noting the
importance of both "[tihe statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction"), andJones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999) (same),
and United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1999)
(applying Steel Co. to nonconstitutional jurisdiction issues), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274
(2000), and Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 268 (7th Cir.
1998) (same), and McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 158 F.3d 1294, 1298-1300
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (same), and Virginia v. Reno, 117 F. Supp. 2d 46, 51-53 (D.D.C. 2000)
(same), affd mem., 531 U.S. 1062 (2001), with Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d
804, 816 n.1l (2d Cir. 2000) (limiting Steel Co. to constitutional jurisdiction issues), and
United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 74 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (same), and Cablevision of
Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 100 n.9 (1st Cir. 1999) (same),
and Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 1998) (implying the same), and
Broad v. DKP Corp., No. 97 Civ. 2029 (LAP), 1998 WL 516113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19,
1998) (same), aft'd, No. 98-9271, 1999 WL 447632 (2d Cir. June 16, 1999).
24 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.); see
Whitehead v. Grand Duchy of Lux., No. 97-2703, 1998 WL 957463, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 11,
1998) (noting this "caveat" ofJustices O'Connor and Kennedy); Knight, supra note 13, at
46 (similar).
25 See, e.g., Cablevision of Boston, 184 F.3d at 100 n.9; cf United States ex reL Foulds v.
Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 287 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999) ("It is not entirely clear ... that
th[e] [relevant] portion of the Supreme Court's opinion [in Steel Co.] attracted five
votes."), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000).
26 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
27 See United States v. Bell, Nos. 97-5676, 97-5726, 1999 WL 220119, at *4 n.10 (6th
Cir. Apr. 7, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 839 (1999); Whitehead, 1998 WL 957463, at *3;
Idleman, supra note 14, at 321-32, 336-37.
28 E.g., Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (expressing
uncertainty as to a forum-selection clause dismissal without verifying subject-matter
jurisdiction).
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their intermediate nature. On the one hand, they are not inherently
related to the merits, so reaching them prior to addressing subjectmatter jurisdiction would not appear to offend Steel Co. insofar as the
merits are left unadjudged. On the other hand, many of them are not
wholly or paradigmatically jurisdictional, let alone constitutive of Article III, so that reaching them under such circumstances would still be
wielding judicial authority neither in the presence of verified subjectmatter jurisdiction nor in an effort to verify such jurisdiction.
Not long after Steel Co., it became evident that personal jurisdiction-especially its reachability prior to subject-matter jurisdictionposed essentially this type of question. On the one hand, personal
jurisdiction is not ordinarily tied to the merits. 2 9 On the other hand, it
is not a species of subject-matter jurisdiction, nor is it obviously as fundamental as subject-matter jurisdiction. As a result, many courts were
uncertain whether subject-matter jurisdiction had to be determined
first. In 1996, two years before Steel Co., a Second Circuit panel had
held that courts could address personal jurisdiction prior to reaching
subject-matter jurisdiction. 30 Less than four months after Steel Co.,
however, the en banc Fifth Circuit held nine-to-seven that subject-matter jurisdiction had to be addressed first.3 1 Accordingly, by the end of

that same year, the Court granted review in Ruhrgas3 2 to decide
"' [w] hether a federal district court is absolutely barred in all circumstances from dismissing a removed case for lack of personal jurisdic33
tion without first deciding its subject-matter jurisdiction.'
Speaking unanimously through Justice Ginsburg, the Court held
that federal district courts are not in fact categorically barred from
addressing personal jurisdiction, and dismissing for its absence, without initially addressing their subject-matter jurisdiction. "Customarily," the Court noted, "a federal court first resolves doubts about its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, but there are circumstances in
which a district court appropriately accords priority to a personal jurisdiction inquiry. '34 These circumstances include, at the very least,
"[w] here .. .a district court has before it a straightforward personal
jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the
alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel
29
See Val Leasing, Inc. v. Hutson, 674 F. Supp. 53, 55 (D. Mass. 1987).
30 Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996); see also In re
Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[D]ismissal for want of personal
jurisdiction is independent of the merits and does not require subject-matter
jurisdiction.").
31
Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev'd,
526 U.S. 574 (1999).
32 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 525 U.S. 1039 (1998) (granting certiorari).
33 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (quoting petition for
certiorari).
34

Id.
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question. '35 In such a situation, "the court does not abuse its discretion by turning directly to personaljurisdiction. 36 This rule is equally
applicable, moreover, whether the dispute is filed originally in federal
37
court or, as in Ruhrgas, a party has removed it from state court.
The Court's analysis was divided into several components. At the
outset, it rejected the Fifth Circuit's effort to distinguish subject-matter from personal jurisdiction for purposes of resequencing. Though
agreeing that "[t]he character of the two jurisdictional bedrocks unquestionably differs" 3 8-subject-matter jurisdiction being a nonwaivable delimitation of federal power, personal jurisdiction a waivable
guarantee of individual liberty39-the Court disaffirmed the notion
"that subject-matter jurisdiction is ever and always the more 'fundamental.' 40 Two points were offered to support this premise. Citing
its own precedent, the Court first noted that "[p] ersonal jurisdiction,
too, is 'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district ... court,'
without which the court is 'powerless to proceed to an adjudication."' 4 1 Second, it noted that in some instances, and indeed in Ruhrgas, subject-matter jurisdiction may "rest[ ] on statutory
interpretation, not constitutional command" while personal jurisdic'
tion may rest "on the constitutional safeguard of due process. "42
Next, the Court cited three of its own precedents for the proposition that "[i]t is hardly novel for a federal court to choose among
43
threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits."
The Court invoked Moor v. County of Alameda4 4 for the rule that "district courts do not overstep Article III limits when they decline jurisdiction of state-law claims on discretionary grounds without
determining whether those claims fall within their pendent jurisdiction. '45 The Court invoked Ellis v. Dyson4 6 for the rule that district
courts likewise may "abstain under Younger v. Harriswithout deciding
whether the parties present a case or controversy. '47 Finally, the
Id. at 588.
Id.
37 See id. at 585-87.
38
Id. at 583.
39
See id. at 583-84.
40
Id. at 584.
41 Id (omission in original) (quoting Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299
U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
42
Id. In Ruhrgas, the subject-matter jurisdictional issue implicated the complete diversity requirement, which is a construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, not a mandate of Article
III, § 2. See id. at 584.
43 Id. at 585.
44 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
45
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Moor, 411 U.S. at 715-16).
46 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
47
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citation omitted) (citing Ellis, 421 U.S. at 433-34) (referring to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
35
36
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Court cited Arizonansfor Official English v. Arizona 48 for the rule that a
court may "pretermit[ ] [a] challenge to . .. standing and [instead]
dismiss[ ] on mootness grounds. ' 49 Accordingly, because personal jurisdiction is simply another threshold matter and (here, at least) does
not implicate the merits, a dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction
is not an "'assumption of law-declaring power that violates the separa50
tion of powers principles.'
Nor, held the Court, should dismissals for lack of personal jurisdiction be categorically less permissible in the removal context, even
though such dismissals might subsequently bind state courts and
thereby raise federalism concerns. 51 For one thing, "[i]ssue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation... may also attend a federal
court's subject-matter determination," 52 such as a ruling that permissible damages under state law would not satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction 5 or a ruling on state law
within the context of supplemental jurisdiction. 54 For another thing,
concerns about preclusion or other aspects of "[a] State's dignitary
interest"55 can and should influence a court's discretionary selection
between Rules 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
If personal jurisdiction raises "difficult questions of [state] law," and
subject-matter jurisdiction is resolved "as eas[ily]" as personal jurisdiction, a district court will ordinarily conclude that "federalism
concerns tip the scales in favor of initially ruling on the motion to
remand." In other cases, however, the district court may find that
56
concerns of judicial economy and restraint are overriding.
Finally, the Court rejected the hypothesis "that state-court defendants
will abuse the federal system with opportunistic removals" by

"manufactur[ing] . . .convoluted federal subject-matter theories de-

signed to wrench cases from state court."5 7 Federal courts, in the Justices' view, must be presumed both to comprehend and to enforce
congressionally prescribed rules for removal, while parties will be de48

520 U.S. 43 (1997).

49

51

Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 66-67).
Id, at 584-85 (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
See id. at 585-87.

52

Id at 585.

50

See id. at 585-86.
See id, at 586. Another example, not cited by the Court, would be a ruling on
damages recoverable under state law as part of a removal-based jurisdictional analysis pursuant to a federal statute having its own amount-in-controversy requirement. See, e.g., Boyd
v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294, 1298-1300 (1lth Cir. 1999).
55
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 586.
56
Id. at 586 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Allen v. Ferguson,
791 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1986)).
57 Id at 587.
53
54
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terred by the risk of "'a swift and nonreviewable remand order, attended by the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been
58
improperly invoked."'
Ultimately, the Court adopted a discretionary rule for the resequencing of threshold issues, subject to appellate review for abuse of
discretion. Where subject-matter jurisdiction "involve[s] no arduous
inquiry ....

both expedition and sensitivity to state courts' coequal

stature should impel the federal court to dispose of that issue first."59
"Where,

. .

. however, a district court has before it a straightforward

personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state
law, and the alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel question, the court does not abuse its discretion by
60
turning directly to personal jurisdiction."
B.

The Doctrine's Analytical Parameters

Although Ruhrgas may appear to articulate a narrow, single-inquiry analysis-namely, whether personal jurisdiction can precede
subject-matter jurisdiction in a particular case-there is no reason to
believe that Ruhrgas's relevance is confined to the specific issue of personal jurisdiction. Absent such a limitation, Ruhrgas actually suggests
a much broader analysis which courts might apply to a variety of
threshold issues, a prospect that Part III examines more closely.
This analysis consists of two inquiries. The first is whether a
court, for purposes of resequencing, may consider a given threshold
issue equivalent to subject-matter or personaljurisdiction. If not, then
the analysis is at an end: the court simply may not address the issue
prior to these core jurisdictional questions. If the threshold issue can
be considered equivalent, however, then a second inquiry examines
whether the court should in fact resequence the issue and address it
prior to subject-matter or personal jurisdiction in light of the specific
legal and factual circumstances of the case.
1.

The Question of Equivalence

For purposes of illustration, consider a situation in which a defendant presents a district court with two preliminary grounds for dismissal-an alleged want of Article III jurisdiction and an assertion of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Following Ruhrgas, the district court
58 &L (citation omitted) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 77-78
(1996)).
59
Id. at 587-88.
60 Id. at 588. Although the Court seemed to approve of the district court's action in
the Ruhrgascase itself, it remanded the abuse of discretion issue to the Fifth Circuit. Id at
588 n.8. The en banc Fifth Circuit then returned the matter to the original three-judge
panel which in turn ultimately affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
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has two options. It can simply address the Article III issue at the outset, in which case neither Ruhrgas nor Steel Co. is implicated. Assume
further, however, that the court perceives some reason to sidestep the
Article III issue, such as complexity or novelty. In that circumstance,
the court may also have the option of addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue at the outset, thereby potentially avoiding the Article III
issue altogether.
The first of Ruhrgas's two inquiries determines the availability of
this latter option. The crux of this inquiry is equivalence, which (in
contrast to the discretionary second inquiry) appears to pose a purely
legal question subject to de novo appellate review. 6 1 Thus in the
above hypothetical, the question would be whether Eleventh Amendment immunity, like personal jurisdiction, is sufficiently equivalent to
Article III jurisdiction that the court could ever address the former
prior to the latter.
The composition of this equivalence inquiry presumably consists
of the two elements that Ruhrgas itself invokes to establish the equivalence and thus resequencibility of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. These elements, once again, are first, that "[p]ersonal
jurisdiction, too, is 'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district... court,' without which the court is 'powerless to proceed to an
adjudication"; 62 and second, that personal jurisdiction can have a
constitutional dimension-"the constitutional safeguard of due process"63-while subject-matter jurisdiction may in some cases actually
"rest[ ] on statutory interpretation, not constitutional command."64
In other words, the Court concluded that personal jurisdiction is
equivalent to subject-matter jurisdiction because it is an essential and
constitutionalaspect of federal judicial power.
a. Essentiality
Of these two elements, essentiality appears to be the more vital.
There is, after all, an intuitive correctness to the Court's suggestion
that if any inquiry is to precede subject-matter jurisdiction, the object
of that inquiry should at the very least be a prerequisite to the exercise
of judicial power.
61
This view is congruent with the position, articulated infra in Part II.C, that resequencing is predicated on inherentjudicial power. While the exercise of inherent power is
generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, see infra note 277 and accompanying text, a
"District Court's conclusions about the scope of its inherent powers is a question of law
that is reviewed de novo," Holland v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 246 F.3d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 2001);
accord Montrose Med. Group Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 780 (3d Cir.
2001).
62
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 (omission in original) (quoting Employers Reinsurance
Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
63 Id.
64

Id.
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In the case of personal jurisdiction, satisfaction of this element is
relatively simple. Like subject-matter jurisdiction, courts have repeatedly characterized personal jurisdiction as an essential element of the
exercise ofjudicial power, 6 5 specifically embodying "the court's power
to exercise control over the parties." 66 Accordingly, "[e ] very court in
rendering ajudgment, tacitly, if not expressly, determines its jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. ' 67 By the same token,
judgments entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction normally
do not bind a person who "is not designated as a party or ...has not
been made a party by service of process" 68 and may even be deemed
69
void.
b.

Constitutionality

The second element is that of constitutionality. As used in an
equivalence inquiry, the notion of "constitutionality" does not denote
its common usage, that is, congruence with the Constitution and authoritative constitutional interpretations. Rather, it is intended to
mean that the threshold issue in question, such as personal jurisdic-

tion, itself possesses a palpable constitutional dimension, and perhaps
also that the subject-matter jurisdictional question, in the case under
consideration, does not possess such a dimension. Thus, in Ruhrgas
the Court found it significant that personal jurisdiction directly involved a constitutional question (due process) while subject-matter jurisdiction, being statutory, did not.70 There is, of course, a great deal
less intuitive correctness to the Court's invocation of this second element, and it is unclear to what extent the holding of Ruhrgas ultimately relied upon its satisfaction. These, however, are matters more
65 See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969);
Exparte Craig, 282 F. 138, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub nom. Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255
(1923); United States ex rel. McIntosh v. Crawford, 47 F. 561, 566 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1891); see
also Bryant, 299 U.S. at 381-82 ("[T]he presence of the defendant in a suit in personam...
is an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district... court as a federal court, and... in
the absence of this element, the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication." (footnote omitted)).
66 Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
67 Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938).
68 Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 110.
69 See, e.g., Cent. Laborers' Pension, Welfare & Annuity Funds v. Griffee, 198 F.3d 642,
644 (7th Cir. 1999); Parsons v. Plotkin (In re Pac. Land Sales, Inc.), 187 B.R. 302, 309
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Life Sav. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir.
1986); see also In re NAACP, Special Contribution Fund, Nos. 87-3366, 87-2673, 1988 WL
61504, at *3 (6th Cir.June 13, 1988) (per curiam). For an explanation of the history of the
voidness rule, see Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608-10 (1990).
70
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999). The subject-matter
jurisdiction issues included questions of fraudulentjoinder, removal under 9 U.S.C. § 205,
and federal common law. Petitioner's Brief at 33-36, Ruhrgas (No. 98-470), available at
1999 WL 23658.
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properly addressed in Part II.D, at which point a full-fledged critique
of both elements, essentiality and constitutionality, is undertaken.
2.

The Question of Resequencing

Once the court has found equivalence, it must then decide
whether it should reach the issue prior to subject-matter or personal
jurisdiction. The second inquiry, in other words, addresses the question of resequencing-a term reflecting the premise, more fully developed in Part II, that the courts ought presumptively to address subjectmatter jurisdiction at the outset. Like the first inquiry, this question
also consists of two elements, a comparison of the issues and a balancing of interests. Unlike the first inquiry, however, this second inquiry
is discretionary, turning on the particular legal and factual circumstances of the case and subject to appellate review for abuse of
71
discretion.
a. Assessing Relative Difficulty
The court's initial task is to compare the relative difficulty of the
issues-the issue of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction on the one
side, and whichever issue it has deemed equivalent (Eleventh Amendment immunity, for example) on the other. 72 In Ruhrgas, the Court
identified two criteria of difficulty-complexity

and novelty73-

though it neither elaborated on their content nor detailed the extent
to which one or both must be present before a discretionary resequencing of issues is appropriate. Without such guidance, at best it is
possible to state only a few general principles.7 4 It does not seem critical, first of all, that the equivalent issue actually has to be easier to
71 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587-88; Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208,
213-14 (5th Cir. 2000). It is not clear, however, whether the empirical determinations
underlying the district court's ultimate resequencing decision are themselves reviewed for
abuse of discretion or, instead, for clear error. See infra note 430 and accompanying text.
72 As a practical matter, it is presumably the relative difficulty of the former issue that
would have initially triggered the Ruhrgas analysis. As a doctrinal matter, however, the
formal process of comparing the issues properly belongs at this stage.
73
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587-88. In actuality, the Court employs several terms to describe the notion that an issue is or is not difficult. See id. (using the terms "arduous," "'not
easily resolved,'" "straightforward," "complex," and "difficult and novel" (quoting Cantor
Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996))). The overall inquiry, however,
is plainly of the relative difficulty or simplicity of the issues.
74 The D.C. Circuit, in a somewhat related context, has proposed a "sample decision
procedure" for calculating the relative burdens imposed by multiple jurisdictional challenges. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under this procedure, a
court "would . . . eyeball each jurisdictional defense and, for each, divide the estimated
burdens of evaluation by the estimated chance of success, and then evaluate the defenses
in increasing order of the corresponding quotient." Id. at 254 & n.5. The court conceded,
however, that "[p]recise calculation will generally be impossible, and which defense should
be decided first is a question ultimately within the discretion of the district court." Id. at
254.
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resolve than the subject-matter or personal jurisdictional issue; equal
difficulty should suffice. That said, the equivalent issue presumably
cannot be more difficult to resolve than the subject-matter or personal
jurisdictional issue, and a resequencing of issues under such circumstances would likely constitute an abuse of discretion, irrespective of
how the remaining resequencing considerations are aligned. 75
Fortunately, there is a discrete body of case law that sheds light
on the notion of relative difficulty. In particular, the now-defunct but
related doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction also employed relative
difficulty as a prerequisite to its invocation, 76 specifically when comparing subject-matterjurisdiction to the merits. 77 To borrow from the
hypothetical jurisdiction cases, accordingly:
it appears as if a "difficult" or "complex" issue [i]s one that possesse [s] some inherent level of intricacy, including factual uncertainty, and that ha[s] not already been decided by the Supreme
Court or by any court, or over which there [i]s a split of authority.
In addition, at least one court held that "jlurisdictional questions
may be considered difficult... if they are of constitutional stature,"
although it is hard to see how that aspect, standing alone, would
78
render an issue difficult or complex.
Finally, and perhaps relatedly, one court expressed concern about addressing ajurisdictional issue that "poses a rather high risk of commit79
ting constitutional error."
To date, only two post-Ruhrgas decisions have meaningfully addressed the task of assessing relative difficulty.80 In one case, "the
75 CompareFaulk v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 n.5 (E.D.
Tex. 1999) (declining to reach "other jurisdictional challenges" prior to subject-matter
jurisdiction because "the subject-matter jurisdictional question is the most easily resolved
jurisdictional question"), with Alpine View, 205 F.3d at 213-14 (affirming a resequencing
decision despite the district court's failure to assess comparative difficulty). The Alpine
View case is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 85-89. See generally Cooter &
Cell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (articulating the standard for abuse of
discretion).
76 See, e.g., Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1998); House the Homeless, Inc. v. Widnall, 94 F.3d 176, 179 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996).
77
Although the hypothetical jurisdiction cases may initially seem an inappropriate
source of authority-they have been abrogated and their focus was only analogous to that
of the Ruhrgasinquiry-they are nevertheless invoked because they remain valid predictors
of the lower courts' likely approach to resequencing. See, e.g., CantorFitzgerald,88 F.3d at
155 (extending the standards developed in the hypothetical jurisdiction context, including
a requirement that there be "a difficult question of subject-matter jurisdiction," to the resequencing context), cited with approval in Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587-88. Additionally, and in
all events, they appear to be the only useful authority available.
78 Idleman, supra note 14, at 255 (omission in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Browning-Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 1990)).
79 Swidlik v. Hardwicke Co., 651 F.2d 852, 856 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981).
80 Interestingly, the Ruhrgaslitigation itself is not one of them. On remand from the
Supreme Court, and in turn from the en banc Fifth Circuit, the original Fifth Circuit panel
appears simply to have assumed the propriety of resequencing, ultimately affirming the
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question of the court's subject matterjurisdiction involve [d], if not an
'arduous inquiry,' certainly a rather complicated one, regarding
'fraudulentjoinder' of a defendant and the more unusual question of
'fraudulent joinder' of a plaintiff,"1 l leading the court to conclude,
per Ruhrgas, that "the 'alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction
raises a difficult and novel question."'' 2 At the same time, the "court
'ha[d] before it a straightforward personal jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law,"' a conclusion reached, at least
in part, on the basis of the "plaintiffs' concession that they ha[d] no
good faith resistance to the motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction."8 3 After further concluding that reaching personal jurisdiction prior to subject-matter jurisdiction would not pose federalism
concerns-which is part of the second question under the discretionary resequencing inquiry-the court ultimately opted for
8 4
resequencing
Although the analysis in this first case could have been more detailed (including why the fraudulent joinder questions were complicated and unusual), it does provide some indication of what types of
questions qualify as comparatively difficult under Ruhrgas. The second case, unfortunately, is less illuminating. Though it, too, involved
a district court opting to address personal jurisdiction before subjectmatter jurisdiction, 5 the court omitted entirely the question of relative difficulty, "instead cit[ing] judicial economy as the primary reason
for considering motions for dismissal due to a lack of personal juris'' 6
diction before addressing the subject-matter jurisdiction motions. 8
Remarkably, however, the Fifth Circuit held that the resequencing decision was not an abuse of discretion 87 -an outcome that can only be
described as an appellate salvage operation. Indeed it was the circuit
court, apparently on its own, which found that personal jurisdiction
"di[id] not raise 'difficult questions of state law"'' 8 (though it made no
comparative findings on subject-matter jurisdiction), and that resedistrict court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 182 F.3d 291, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1999).
81 Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587).
82
Id. (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588).
83
Id.(quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588).
84
Id. at 899-900.
85
See Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 213-14 (5th Cir. 2000).
86
Id. at 214. The district court apparently presented no reasoning of its own, but
rather adopted a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. SeeAlpine View Co. v.
Atlas Copco A.B., 180 F.3d 628, 629 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), vacated mem., 526 U.S.
1128 (1999).
87
See Alpine View, 205 F.3d at 214. Arguably the district court is not as culpable as the
circuit court that found no abuse of discretion, given that the district court, unlike the
circuit court, issued its decision prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ruhrgas.
88 Id- (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 586).
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quencing would intrude only minimally on the state courts (again,
part of the second resequencing question).89 According to the Fifth
Circuit, then, the task of assessing difficulty need not actually be comparative-the simplicity of the equivalent threshold issue may alone
suffice-and even its total omission from the analysis will not necessarily be an abuse of discretion, especially if it can be constructed after
the fact on appellate review. 90
b.

Balancing InstitutionalInterests

Assuming that a court does fully assess the relative difficulty of the
issues and that the assessment favors resequencing, then the final step
is to weigh the availability of resequencing in light of certain institutional interests. In Ruhrgas, the Court identified three such interests:
judicial economy, judicial restraint, and judicial federalism. 9 1 Beyond
their identity and location in the analysis, however, the precise role
and relative weight of these interests are less than clear. In fact, given
the prescribed nature of the analysis (balancing), the number and diversity of interests involved, and the lenient abuse-of-discretion standard of appellate review, predictability and determinacy were
obviously not among the Ruhrgas Court's chief objectives in formulating this task. Perhaps the most useful undertaking at this juncture,
therefore, is simply to discuss briefly the nature and potential relevance of each of the three enumerated institutional interests.
Judicial economy, of course, is the recognition and prudent conservation of the judiciary's limited resources. 92 In the resequencing
context, this interest may cut either way, depending on the breadth of
one's perspective. If the focus remains at the level of individual cases,
then forgoing the difficult jurisdictional question and addressing instead the equivalent issue will likely serve judicial economy. If the focus is broadened to the legal system as a whole, however, such
avoidance may not be economical to the extent that it "merely perpetuates the ...difficulty for the next court"93 and, indeed, for every
court after that. From a system-wide perspective, in other words,
89
90

Id.
Accord Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express

World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 939 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming a resequencing of personal
and subject-matter jurisdiction, citing Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 578, 587-88, but providing no
indication that a relative-difficulty analysis-or any type of analysis for that matter-was
undertaken), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1406 (2001).
91 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 586-88; accord Alpine View, 205 F.3d at 213.
92
See, e.g., Thomas R.W. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 130 F.3d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1997);
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:The Forward-LookingAspects ofInferior CourtDecisionmaking,73 TEx. L. REv. 1, 36-37 (1994).
93 Idleman, supranote 14, at 256. This was one of the characteristics of the doctrine
of hypothetical jurisdiction, the applicability of which, like the Ruhrgas analysis, turned
partly on the presence of a complex or difficult jurisdictional question. See id.
at 256-57.
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resolving difficult jurisdictional issues at the time they are presented,
though potentially inefficient for the court at hand, may ultimately be
the more judicially economical approach. 94 Whether this is true in
any given case generally depends on the source of the difficulty. If it
stems from the particular facts or a unique combination of legal doctrines, then the likelihood of recurrence would be low and avoiding
the issue would probably serve overall judicial economy. If, by contrast, it stems from an extant split of authority or from the lack of
previous consideration of the issue (where, for example, the law is
newly enacted), then avoidance of the issue could very well disserve
overall judicial economy.
The second interest that the Ruhrgas Court identified is judicial
restraint. In general, judicial restraint describes some measure of deliberate self-limitation in light of perceived intrinsic deficiencies (such
as relative institutional incompetence),95 background norms or traditions (such as stare decisis) ,96 or extrinsic structural or substantive
considerations (such as the separation of powers) .97 Within the interpretive context in particular-perhaps the most common focus of debate as to the meaning of judicial restraint-generally it denotes selflimitation in deference to the will of the people or their representatives, whether manifest in text, intent, or understanding. 98 Whatever
the context, judicial restraint essentially defines the interval between
the power that a court is capable of wielding and the power that it
actually attempts to exercise-in short, the conscious decision not to
wield power merely because one can. 99
94

See id. at 283; cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The

Time Chart of theJustices,73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 125 (1959) (contending that, by issuing more
thoroughly reasoned opinions, the Court's "dockets would be freed of large numbers of
cases which now come there only because of the uncertainties which are generated by the
failures of reasoning of previous opinions").
95

See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, TheJurisprudence ofJudicialRestraint:A Return to the Moor-

ings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1981). Frequently this limited competence is expressed
as a matter of constitutional mandate rather than judicial discretion. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112-13 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But, of course, ajudge's
assessment of what the Constitution does or does not mandate can itself be a function of
that judge's preexisting commitment to a relatively restrained judicial role.
96
Compare Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1267,
1317 (1992) (restraint is related to stare decisis), with Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of
Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 INo. L.J. 1, 20 (1983) (restraint is not related to stare decisis).
97
Martin H. Redish, The FederalCourts,JudicialRestraint, and the Importanceof Analyzing
Legal Doctrine 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1378, 1400 (1985) (book review). See generally Posner,

supra note 96, at 11-14 (discussing "'separation of powers judicial self-restraint,' or...
'structural restraint'").
98
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 20 (1985); Wallace, supra note 95, at 8-10, 11-14.
99 Cf Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 569 (1947) (describing, in the context ofjudicial avoidance of constitutional questions, the Court's "reluctance, indeed...
refusal, to undertake the most important and the most delicate of the Court's functions,
notwithstanding conceded jurisdiction, until necessity compels it in the performance of
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The final interest that the Ruhgras Court identified is that ofjudicial federalism. Whether out of constitutional duty or institutional
comity,judicial federalism entails a federal court's respectful consideration of "[a] State's dignitary interest" as embodied both generally in
the state's law and legal system and particularly in its courts.10 0 The
interest in judicial federalism is arguably just a specific manifestation
of judicial restraint, and the two essentially merge when, in the words
of Ruhrgas, a "sensitivity to state courts' coequal stature" 10 1 limits federal court action. These interests may also merge, in the Court's view,
when the relative difficulty of a particular jurisdictional issue is a function of state law. 10 2 According to Ruhrgas, "[i]f personal jurisdiction
raises 'difficult questions of [state] law,' and subject-matter jurisdiction is resolved 'as eas [ily]' as personal jurisdiction, a district court will
ordinarily conclude that 'federalism concerns tip the scales in favor of
initially ruling on the motion to remand." ' 10 3
Although the Ruhrgasresequencing option is potentially available
both to suits filed initially in federal court and to suits filed initially in
state court and removed to federal court, it is obviously in removal
situations, such as Ruhrgas itself, that the federalism interest generally
becomes more prominent. 10 4 In fact, the Court specifically had to
confront the argument that, in a removal situation, the possible
preclusive effect of a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, compared to a state court remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
constitutional duty"); Posner, supra note 96, at 10 (describing the five types of judicial
restraint). As with relative difficulty, the case law from the hypothetical jurisdiction context may be one of the more helpful gauges ofjudicial restraint in the resequencing context, especially asjudicial economy and restraint were the principal rationales for the nowdefunct doctrine. A survey of this case law reveals four asserted principles of restraint: (1)
the avoidance of contingent constitutional questions, see Idleman, supra note 14, at 248 &
n.38; (2) the maintenance of the separation of powers, see id. at 248-49 & n.39; (3) the
prevention of federal intrusion upon the states, see id. at 249 & nn.42-43; and (4) the
confinement ofjudicial decisionmaking to well-defined disputes, see id. at 249 & n.44. Several of these principles, in turn, may likewise prove relevant to resequencing decisions, and
indeed the Ruhrgas Court highlighted the federalism concern, which is addressed below.
By contrast, the principle of avoiding contingent constitutional questions makes little sense
in light of the earlier discussion of equivalence, in which the constitutional nature of an
alternative threshold issue may justify reachingthe issue at the outset.
100 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999). For more comprehensive definitions ofjudicial federalism, see Thomas E. Baker, A CatalogueofJudicialFederalism
in tw United States, 46 S.C. L. REv. 835, 841-46 (1995) [hereinafter Baker, Catalogue]; and
Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future ofJudicialFederalism: "Neitler Out Farnor In Deep", 45
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 705, 790-93 (1995).

101

Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587.

102
103

See id, at 588.

Id. at 586 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Allen v. Ferguson, 791
F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1986)). For an application of these considerations, see Foslip
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Metabolife International, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Iowa
2000).
104
See, e.g., Thompson v. Gillen, 491 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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can be particularly offensive to the relationship and equilibrium of
power between federal and state courts. The Court's answer, as
noted, was essentially two-fold. First, such preclusion is no different
than the preclusion that may attend an adverse ruling on subject-matterjurisdiction when, for example, it turns in part on state law. 10 5 Second, such preclusion is precisely the kind of factor that a district
court, in its discretionary balancing of institutional interests, should
1 06
consider.
II
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DOCTRINE

This Part assesses the resequencing doctrine using the traditional
criteria by which doctrinal legitimacy is measured. These criteria include consistency with precedent, congruence with underlying theory,
conformity to the powers of the institution charged with its invocation, and adherence to methodological norms such as intelligibility,
coherence, and predictability. In general, this critique focuses on the
doctrine's formulation in Ruhrgas, although it also considers subsequent lower court efforts to apply that formulation.
A.

Precedential Fidelity

Fidelity to precedent, embodied in the principle of stare decisis,
entails judicial adherence to authoritative and relevant prior case law
absent some overriding circumstance. 10 7 So formulated, precedential
fidelity can confer a significant if not necessary measure of legitimacy
upon judicial decisions. The appearance of consistency over time and
among parties, and the perception that judges are bound by more
than their immediate preferences, are powerful components of the
judicial process and reinforce other basic rule-of-law concepts that foster public confidence in the legal system as a whole. 10 8 Conversely,
105
See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585-86. Despite what the Court may have suggested, the
fact that rulings on subject-matter jurisdiction may be preclusive says nothing, of course,
about the propriety of resequencing personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal
courts are obligated to determine their subject-matter jurisdiction, and any preclusion resulting from assimilated state law determinations is a necessary collateral consequence of
this obligation. Only if one has already decided beforehand that there is an equivalent
power to determine personal jurisdiction at the outset would one find this comparison

between the preclusive effects of these two jurisdictional rulings relevant, and then only for
confirmation of their similarity.
106 See id. at 586-87.
107
See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991); Michael Sean
Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication:An IrreduciblePluralism of Principles,74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 655, 688, 690-91 (1999).
108 See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton); Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain andJustifyJudicialDeci-
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the misuse of precedent can, if discovered, have exactly the opposite
effect. 10 9 Legal principles may seem less coherent and determinateand their application less consistent and predictable-and judicial decisions become vulnerable to the criticism that courts and judges are
simply fabricating law on an ad hoc basis according to their idiosyn110
cratic senses of propriety.
Without doubt, precedential fidelity poses one of the most serious challenges to the legitimacy of the resequencing doctrine. This is
true in at least three respects. For one thing, prior to Ruhrgas there
was little or no support for such a doctrine, including the cases that
the Court cites as supposed precedent. For another thing, there was
in fact case law to the contrary, which the Court not only failed to
distinguish, but simply omitted altogether. Lastly, at least one element of the Ruhrgas doctrine (the constitutionality aspect of equivalence) rests on a premise that directly contradicts one of the Court's
most established jurisprudential rules."1 '
Perhaps the starkest of these problems is the omission of contrary
precedent. Specifically, the Ruhrgas Court declined to quote or even
to mention Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,' 2 which held that courts
sions Pose a Greater Threati, 44 Am. U. L. REv. 757, 777, 780-81 (1995); Deborah Hellman,
The Importance of Appearing Principled,37 ARiz. L. REV. 1107, 1109-20 (1995).
109
Cf David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor,100 H~Av. L. REv. 731, 737 (1987)
(stating, in the context of a discussion on whether judges must always state their actual
reasons for their decisions, that "lack of judicial candor seldom goes undetected for long,
and its detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the nature ofjudging
and ofjudges"). Precedential infidelity can take several forms. A court can simply omit
relevant but adverse prior cases, thereby obviating the need to distinguish or overrule the
precedent and potentially leading readers to believe that the ruling at hand is consistent,
or at least not inconsistent, with existing case law. See, e.g., RodneyJ. Blackman, Spinning,
Squirreling Shelling Stiletting and Other Strategems of the Supremes, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 507
n.17 (1993). Likewise, a court can distort the holdings or reasoning of otherwise unhelpful or even adverse prior cases, thereby neutralizing the impediments, and even providing support, to an otherwise questionable ruling or position of law. See, e.g., id. at
504-07. See generally David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment
Tradition, 95 YALE LJ. 857 (1986) (suggesting that First Amendment jurisprudence has
been shaped by a history of following strong dissents and deliberate misreadings of precedent). Alternatively, a court can categorize and thus marginalize as dicta select elements of
adverse prior cases, thereby "enabl[ing] courts to avoid the normal requirements of stare
decisis." Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 2004 (1994).
110 See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 109, at 2040; Scott C. Idleman, A PrudentialTheory ofJudicial Candor,73 TEx. L. REv. 1307, 1392-94 (1995);J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason
in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 798 (1989). This is not to deny the role of
intuition in judicial decisionmaking. SeeJOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, JR., JUDGMENT INTUITIVE
14-34 (1938). But without support in precedent or other authority, judicial decisionmaking will appear as nothing but intuition, an appearance that seems difficult to defend. See
generallyJohn Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf"A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973) (criticizing the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), on
the grounds that it appears to be result oriented and insufficiently grounded in
precedent).
111 See supra note 99.
112 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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in certain circumstances may decide venue prior to personal jurisdiction.11 3 In a passage of remarkable relevance, the Leroy Court observed that "neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally
preliminary in the sense that subject-matter jurisdiction is, for both
are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and both may be waived by the parties." 1 4 According to Leroy, in fact, it was precisely because of this rationale-personal
jurisdiction not being so "fundamentally preliminary"-that the court
5
could determine the issue of venue prior to personal jurisdiction."
This omission is particularly troubling given that the passage
16
from Leroy was prominently quoted in the respondents' brief"
(hence the Court cannot plead ignorance).11 7 It was also not merely a
dictum (hence the Court cannot avoid its precedential effect), but
instead was an integral component of the relevant holding of Leroy, as
the sequencing of personal jurisdiction and venue necessarily turned
on their similarly subordinate relationship to subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, it is difficult to avoid the inference that the Court deliberately ignored the passage precisely because of its precedential
significance. Most obviously there is Leroy's declaration that "personal
jurisdiction . . . is [not] fundamentally preliminary in the sense that
subject-matter jurisdiction is."118 Even standing alone, this language

strongly implies that a court ought to decide subject-matter jurisdiction first. Moreover, because the difference is expressed as one of
kind, and not one of degree-the Court did not say that personal jurisdiction is "less" or "not as" fundamentally preliminary-a court presumably should always decide subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset.
Second, there is Leroy's holding that a court can sometimes decide
venue before personal jurisdiction. When combined with the extant
rule that courts cannot resolve motions relating to venue before subject-matterjurisdiction is determined,1 19 this holding appears to cre113
114

Id. at 180.

115

See id.

Id

116 See Respondent's Brief at 20, Ruhrgas (No. 98-470), available at 1999 WL 95400; see
also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2101 n.3 (2001) (chastising a
court of appeals for not citing a certain Supreme Court decision "despite its obvious relevance to the case" and exclaiming that "this oversight is particularly incredible because the
majority's attention was directed to it at every turn").
117 And, in any event, "Article IIIjudges are presumed to know the law." United States
v. Kezerle, 99 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996).
118 Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180.
119 This is clearly the established rule as to the judicial treatment of motions to transfer
venue under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a) (or one of the specialized venue provisions), including presumably a § 1406(a) transfer following a defendant's allegation of improper venue under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 1406(a) (1994); e.g.,
Sanderson v. Spectrum Labs, Inc., No. 00-1872, 2000 WL 1909678, at *1 n.1 (7th Cir. Dec.
29, 2000); Barber v. Simpson, No. 95-4210, 1996 WL 477005, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 23, 1996)
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ate a virtually insurmountable obstacle. For if a court cannot decide
venue before subject-matter jurisdiction, but can decide venue before
personal jurisdiction, then how, as Ruhrgasholds, can a court ever decide personal jurisdiction before subject-matter jurisdiction? The answer according to Leroy is that it cannot. Consider again the syllogism
that Leroy produces: (1) subject-matterjurisdiction must always be decided before venue; (2) in relation to subject-matter jurisdiction,
venue and personal jurisdiction are materially equivalent; (3) therefore, subject-matter jurisdiction must always be decided before personal jurisdiction. In short, Leroy strongly indicates-if not dictatesthat courts may not decide personal jurisdiction before subject-matter
jurisdiction. 120
(per curiam); United States ex reL Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969); Bookout

v. Beck, 354 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1965); Afd. Ship Rigging Co. v. McLellan, 288 F.2d 589,
590-91 (3d Cir. 1961). Consistent with this rule, courts frequently obviate the need to
address the venue issue by first addressing, and ultimately finding a lack of, subject-matter
jurisdiction. E.g., H20 Houseboat Vacations, Inc. v. Hernandez, 103 F.3d 914, 916 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1996).
As for transfers of venue, this rule makes sense not simply because subject-matter jurisdiction is, as Leroy says, fundamentally preliminary, but also because §§ 1404(a) and
1406(a) appear textually to contemplate the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction as a
precondition. As for cases that seemingly contradict the rule, e.g., Tosco Corp. v. Sun Co.,
No. C94-4190 FMS, 1995 WL 165888, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1995); Cone Corp. v. Fla.
Dep't of Transp., 744 F. Supp. 269, 270 (M.D. Fla. 1990); Green v. Creative Equity Corp.
(In re Hoffman Adver. Group, Inc.), 62 B.R. 823, 828-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), they uniformly cite authorities such as Leroy that do not support the notion that venue may precede
subject-matter jurisdiction, but merely that it may precede personal jurisdiction.
As for the judicial treatment of a Rule 12(b) (3) motion to dismiss entirely-e.g., for
failure to satisfy the principal venue provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. V
1999)-the state of the law is less certain, although there is no obvious reason why the
same rule (i.e., that the venue motion cannot be resolved prior to determining subjectmatterjurisdiction) should not apply. The uncertainty likely stems from the rarity today of
viable Rule 12(b) (3) motions. One notable exception is the defensive interposition of a
forum-selection clause that designates a nonfederal forum, insofar as some courts treat
such interpositions as motions for improper venue under Rule 12(b) (3). See Lipcon v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1998); 5A CHARLEs
ALAN WRIGHT
i&

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §

1352 (2d ed. 1990

& Supp. 2001). If enforced, a forum-selection clause designating a nonfederal forum
would logically result in a dismissal rather than a transfer, cf Licensed Practical Nurses,
Technicians & Health Care Workers of N.Y., Inc. v. Ulysses Cruises, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d
393, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (considering the issue in dictum), akin to a dismissal under forum non conveniens.
120 Needless to say, Ruhrgas undermines this syllogism, and the consequences of so
doing may extend beyond the relationship between subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. If personal jurisdiction can now sometimes be decided before subject-matter jurisdiction (as Ruhrgas holds), and venue can sometimes be decided before personal jurisdiction
(as Leroy holds), then why-despite extant case law to the contrary--cannot venue now
sometimes be decided before subject-matter jurisdiction? Ruhrgas itself may attempt to
answer this question by requiring the elements of essentiality and constitutionality. While
venue is arguably essential, see, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Louisville, 512 F.
Supp. 56, 58 (W.D. Mich. 1981), it is generally not considered to be of a constitutional
nature.
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Lower federal court decisions further confirm this reading of Leroy. In one case, for instance, a district court straightforwardly read
Leroy for the rule that "the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is 'fundamentally preliminary' to the issue of personal jurisdiction and, thus,
must be decided first." 121 Another court similarly observed that pursuant to Leroy "[a] court considers challenges to subject matter jurisdiction before determining whether personal jurisdiction exists or
venue is proper." 122 Yet another relied on Leroy for the principle that
"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is 'fundamentally preliminary' to both
the issues of personal jurisdiction and venue." 123 To be sure, when
lower courts have held that personal jurisdiction may be decided
before subject-matter jurisdiction, 124 they, like the Ruhrgas Court, simply did not address the relevant language or holding of Leroy.
What is more, Leroy is not the only Supreme Court case stressing
the fundamentally and uniquely preliminary nature of subject-matter
jurisdiction. In the 1884 case of Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan
Railway Co. v. Swan,125 the Court declared emphatically that subjectmatter jurisdiction is "the first and fundamental question" that the
Court must ask. 126 Likewise, in Warth v. Seldin,1 27 it stated that
"whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or controversy' between
himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III"-that is,
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists-"is the threshold question
in every federal case." 128 Warth did not say that subject-matter jurisdiction is simply one type of threshold question, or the threshold question in some types of cases, but instead that it is the threshold question
in every federal case. t29 Relying on these and related Supreme Court
declarations, lower courts accordingly have echoed the principle that
subject-matter jurisdiction is not merely one of many threshold issues,
but that it must be "[t]he initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal
0

court."13
121

Dominican Energy Ltd. v. Dominican Republic, 903 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (M.D. Fla.

1995) (quoting Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180).
122 Ren-Dan Farms, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 952 F. Supp. 370, 373 (W.D. La. 1997) (citing Leroy, 443 U.S. at 180).
123 Tifa Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, 692 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.NJ. 1988) (quoting Leroy,
443 U.S. at 180).
124
E.g., Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1996); Rose v.
Granite City Police Dep't, 813 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
125 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
126 Id. at 382; accord Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900).
127 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
128
Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
129 Id.;accord Rock Island Millwork Co. v. Hedges-Gough Lumber Co., 337 F.2d 24,
26-27 (8th Cir. 1964).
130
Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added); accord
Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 F.2d 547, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In the words of one
district judge, "[a] Federal Court . . .has a primordial duty, in every case before it, to
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The omission of contrary precedent is not the only way in which
the resequencing doctrine defies precedential fidelity. In addition,
there is little or no affirmative support for the doctrine in the Court's
case law, a fact that could be inferred merely by noting the Fifth Circuit's nine-to-seven Ruhrgas decision and several other lower court
cases holding against the resequencing of personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction. 13' For its part, the Court in Ruhrgas invoked three of its
cases, Moor v. County of Alameda,'3 2 Ellis v. Dyson,'33 and Arizonansfor
Official English v. Arizona,13 4 for the claim that "[i] t is hardly novel for
a federal court to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits." 13 5 In actuality, however, not one of
these cases supports the holding that courts may reach personal jurisdiction before subject-matterjurisdiction, 3 6 and one of them basically
refutes that holding.
The Court first cites Moor for the proposition that "district courts
do not overstep Article III limits when they decline jurisdiction of
state-law claims on discretionary grounds without determining
whether those claims fall within their pendent jurisdiction."'1 7 However true this proposition might be, it does not obviously support the
holding of Ruhrgas. In Moor, after all, subject-matter jurisdiction already existed based on a foundational federal claim, 138 while in Ruhrgas, the issue was essentially a federal court's power in the total
absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction. Moor, in other words,
merely stands for the principle that a court, with its subject-matter
jurisdiction already verified, may decline to extend this subject-matter
jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims without first determining whether it could have done so.'

39

There is no mention of per-

sonaljurisdiction and no indication that subject-matter jurisdiction is
less fundamentally preliminary. Indeed, the Steel Co. Court also cited
Moor, not for the proposition that a court could decide a non-subjectmatter jurisdiction issue prior to subject-matter jurisdiction, but
inquire whether the vital prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied."
Hoeffner v. Univ. of Minn., 948 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (D. Minn. 1996); accord Slycord v.
Chater, 921 F. Supp. 631, 634 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Broadway v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643
F. Supp. 584, 585 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
131
In this regard, see Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 259 (noting that the Court's decision "was somewhat of a surprise" given the general and longstanding assumption that
"unless a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot determine any other
issue").
132 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
133 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
134 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
526 U.S. at 585; see supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
135
136 See Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 267.
137 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Moor, 411 U.S. at 715-16).
138 See Moor, 411 U.S. at 695, 712.
139
Id. at 712-17.
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rather for the principle that a court could decide "a discretionary
[subject-matter] jurisdictional question before a nondiscretionary
[subject-matter] jurisdictional question."'140 In short, Moor is a case
about the power of courts to decide issues within the category of subject-matterjurisdiction, not about the power of courts to bypass that
category altogether and dismiss suits on some alternative basis.
Even more problematic is the Court's reliance on Ellis. Put
bluntly, the Court's rendition of Ellis is simply erroneous. In Ruhrgas,
the Court states that Ellis stands for the principle that a court may
"abstain under Younger... without deciding whether the parties present a case or controversy."'14 1 But this is not correct. Initially, the
district court in Ellis abstained under Youngerwithout verifying subjectmatter jurisdiction.142 As it turned out, however, the Supreme Court
abrogated the basis for abstention in a separate case.' 43 Accordingly,
the Court in Ellis reversed the court of appeals, which had affirmed
the district court, and remanded to the district court.' 44 But it did so
with express instructions to assess the question of subject-matter jurisdiction in light of the Court's "reservations ... as to whether a case or
controversy exists." 145 Indeed, the Court admonished that "[t] he District Court must determine that the litigation meets the threshold requirements of a case or controversy before there can be resolution...
of the potential consideration[ ], in the context of this case, of the
Younger doctrine.'

46

Thus, not only does Ellis fail to support the

Ruhrgas Court's claim, it supports quite the opposite claim-namely,
that a court cannot invoke Younger abstention without first verifying its
subject-matter jurisdiction.
47
The final case that the Court cited, Arizonansfor Official English,
is simply not germane to resequencing. The Court invoked the case
for the rule that a court may "pretermit[ ] [a] challenge to... standing" and instead "dismiss[ ] on mootness grounds."1 48 As with
Moor,'49 this rule is correct but beside the point. Standing and moot-

ness are but two doctrines within the case or controversy requirement
140

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 100 n.3 (1998).

Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (internal citation omitted) (citing Ellis, 421 U.S. at
433-34).
142
Ellis, 421 U.S. at 430.
143
Id. at 431 (stating that the Court granted certiorari in this case because it had
"unanimously reversed the ... decision on which the District Court had relied").
141

144

Id. at 435.

Id. at 434.
Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
147
520 U.S. 43 (1997).
148
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (citing Arizonans for
Official English, 520 U.S. at 66-67).
149
See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
145

146
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of Article 111.150 That a court may choose between them is entirely
unremarkable, for they are both inquiries into the existence of constitutional subject-matter jurisdiction. 151 The rule, accordingly, says
nothing about the sequencing of inquiries apart from subject-matter
jurisdiction, and adds no support whatsoever to the holding of
Ruhrgas152
The Court's invocation of these cases is even more problematic
given the analysis actually employed in Ruhrgas to determine the
equivalence of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Although, as
noted, this analysis turned on the two criteria of essentiality and constitutionality, 153 it is quite clear that neither Moor nor Ellis mentioned,
let alone employed, these criteria in their own analyses. Indeed, the
Ruhrgasanalysis does not even appear logically applicable to the issues
in these cases, and, to the extent it can be applied, does not particularly appear to support their holdings. Moor essentially involved an
issue of subject-matterjurisdiction (pendentjurisdiction over state law
claims), thus rendering nonsensical the comparative inquiry utilized
in Ruhrgas, while Ellis, which dealt with Younger abstention, is equally
inapposite given that Younger abstention is simply not jurisdictional,
1 54
let alone an "essential element" of a court's jurisdiction.
150 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that
"the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III"); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393,
413 n.16 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1210 (2000), and cert. granted,530 U.S. 1213
(2000), and cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1223 (2000), and cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000).
151 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 619-20 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 n.5 (1974) (noting that
there is a "lack of a fixed rule as to the proper sequence ofjudicial analysis of contentions
involving more than one facet of the concept ofjusticiability").
152
That the Court prefaced its reliance on the case with a "cf" signal is presumably a
recognition of this fact. Cf Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 312 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bork, J., joined by Scalia, Starr, Silberman, and Buckley, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) ("As the majority presumably recognized, since it cited [the case in
question] with a cf., the case is probably inapposite."), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987); Ira P.
Robbins, Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: Getting Our Signals Uncrossed, 48 DuKE LJ. 1043 (1999). Yet even this introductory signal does not explain why
the case was cited at all.
153 See supra Part I.B.1.
154 See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text; see also Kingston v. Utah County,
No. 97-4000, 1998 WL 614462, at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 8, 1998) (noting that "abstention is
notjurisdictional"); Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Youngerabstention
is notjurisdictional, but reflects a court's prudential decision not to exercise jurisdiction
which it in fact possesses."); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 163 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1978) (stating that Younger abstention is "nonjurisdictional"), affd, 445 U.S. 308
(1980); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 36 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("Younger
abstention goes to the exercise of equity jurisdiction, not to the jurisdiction of the federal
district court as such to hear the case."). It does, however, reflect a constitutional concern
for federal-state relations. SeeYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Abstention under
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), known as Pullman abstention, also reflects this concern. See Waldron v. McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348, 1351 (7th Cir.
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Finally, the resequencing doctrine formulated in Ruhrgas includes at least one element that directly contradicts one of the Court's
most well-established jurisprudential rules. This is the element of constitutionality: the notion that a Court can deem a threshold issue such
as personal jurisdictional equivalent to subject-matter jurisdiction not
only because it is essential to adjudication, but because it possesses a
constitutional dimension. 155 In other words, a court can reach the
threshold issue first in part because of its constitutional character. It
is, however, "[a] fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial
restraint... that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them,"156 and correspondingly that
courts should resolve matters on nonconstitutional grounds if possible 157 and on the narrower constitutional ground if necessary. 158 By

allowing personal jurisdiction to be addressed first precisely because it
is constitutional in nature, the Court thus defies this established
rule-a rule, incidentally, that itself has important constitutional
dimensions 159 and that some contend should apply with heightened
160
rigor to jurisdictional matters.
Ironically, fidelity to this rule might very well have strengthened
the case for addressing certain personal jurisdiction issues prior to a
1983). See generally Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-17 (1996) (discussing various abstention doctrines).
155
See supra Part I.B.1.
156
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988) (emphasis added); accord Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 & n.11 (1997); Spector Motor
Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944). See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Avoiding ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003 (1994) (examining this doctrine in
depth); Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance
Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REv. 85 (1995) (same).
157
See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Interestingly, it is precisely the constitutional dimension of personal jurisdiction that has led some courts to deviate from the
general rule of Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), and decide venue
before personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Prime Leasing, Inc. v. CMC Lease, Inc., No. 99 C
0449, 1999 WL 965688, at *4 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1999). Leroy itself, for that matter,
addressed venue without addressing personal jurisdiction because "resolution of th[e]
[personal jurisdiction] question would require the Court to decide a question of constitutional law that it has not heretofore decided" and "[a]s a prudential matter it is [the
Court's] practice to avoid the unnecessary decision of novel constitutional questions." Leroy, 443 U.S. at 181.
158 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217 (1995).
159
SeeFlastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). Interestingly, both the First and Seventh
Circuits, post-Steel Co., held that it was proper to bypass Eleventh Amendment immunity
precisely because doing so obviated the need to address a constitutional question. See
Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R-I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 56-57 (1st Cir. 1999);
Kennedy v. Nat'lJuvenile Det. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1159 (2000).
160
See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v.Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322, 1325
(9th Cir. 1983).
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question of Article IIIjurisdiction, such as constitutional standing, for
the very reason that some personal jurisdiction issues have esser (or at
least no greater) a constitutional dimension than certain subject-matter jurisdictional issues. 16' But to countenance the reaching of an is-

sue first precisely because it is constitutional-and because the issue
avoided is not-seems difficult to reconcile with decades of precedent, not to mention the conventional norms of judicial restraint to
which the federal courts are otherwise bound.

This does not appear, moreover, to be the only doctrinal error
that the Ruhrgas Court committed in its defense of resequencing. At
another point, for example, the Court concludes that the resequencing of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction in a removal case does
not unduly offend federalism, even though a personal jurisdiction-based dismissal, in contrast to a subject-matterjurisdiction-based
remand, could preclude further state court action) 62 The reason, according to the Court, is that preclusion may also attend subject-matter
jurisdictional rulings, such as a federal court's determination that the
state law of damages would not permit recovery sufficient to satisfy the
amount-in-controversy requirement. 163 This, however, does not appear to be correct. The Court is correct that a federal determination
on the absence of personal jurisdiction can be preclusive, 6 4 at least
where the federal and state courts' jurisdictional power over the same
defendant is coterminous and the lack of jurisdiction does not result
from defective service of process. 165 But it is not necessarily correct
that a federal determination on the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, particularly when based purely on an interpretation of state law,
would be similarly binding. 166 Because the Court's example involves a
161
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 26-27, Ruhrgas (No. 98-470) (chronicling
Justice Stevens's apparent concern that a prohibition on resequencing would mean that a
court faced with both a subject-matter jurisdictional issue posing a difficult constitutional
question and a personal jurisdictional issue must nevertheless decide the former, notwithstanding the rule against unnecessarily addressing constitutional questions), available at
1999 WL 183813. To be sure, the avoidance of constitutional questions was one of the
rationales that courts invoked when engaging in hypothetical jurisdiction, reasoning (erroneously, as it turns out) that it was a greater act ofjudicial restraint to reach the merits of a
nonconstitutional question without addressing jurisdiction, where the jurisdictional question was constitutional, than to confront the jurisdictional question at the outset. See Idleman, supra note 14, at 248 & nn.38-39, 255 & n.72.
162
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585-87.
163
Id. at 585-86.
164
See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990).
165 Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 292 n.4 (1st Cir.
1999); Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 1978). But see Falcon
v. Transportes Aeros de Coahuila, 169 F.3d 309, 311-13 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
federal court determination that personal jurisdiction was lacking would not bind a state
court on remand).
166 Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). Of
course, federal courts do have the power to make such imbedded state law determinations.
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case removed from state court to federal court, the law of the case
doctrine, and not principles of issue or claim preclusion, would govern the preclusive effect of the federal court's state law determination.
Whether the state courts should, in turn, recognize that determination would therefore be discretionary, not obligatory. 167 Indeed, the
doctrine itself counsels against application where the prior determination was either not subject to appellate review or issued by a coordi168
nate as opposed to a hierarchically superior tribunal.
Needless to say, the Court's example implicates both factors.
First, because the remand would rest on the federal district court's
lack of jurisdiction, a federal appellate court could not review it.169
Second, because they exercise the powers of separate sovereigns,
"state courts and lower federal courts stand in a coordinate, rather
than a hierarchical, relationship,"' 70 and the law of the case doctrine
only imposes an obligation "to honor the rulings of a court that stands
higher in the hierarchical judicial structure."'17 In short, in an attempt to justify resequencing, the Ruhrgas Court appears to have
17 2
stated at best a novel legal theory and at worst a basic legal error.
B.

Theoretical Congruence

There is more to doctrinal legitimacy, of course, than just fidelity
to precedent and prior doctrine. At some level there must also be
congruence with underlying theory, particularly where, as with resequencing, the case law and doctrine are by themselves underdeterminate. Not only is such congruence necessary to ensure, for
their own sake, that judicial decisions are truly grounded in law and
generated by reason, 7 3 but it is also necessary to maintain confidence
74
in the competence and integrity of the Court as an institution.
See, e.g., Pratt Cent. Park Ltd. P'ship v. Dames & Moore, Inc., 60 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir.
1995).
167
See, e.g., United States v. United States Smelting Ref. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186,
198-99 (1950); S. Ry. Co. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 319 (1922); Birgel v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 125
F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1997); Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th
Cir. 1995).
168
United States Smelting, 339 U.S. at 198 (appellate review); Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1227
(hierarchical relationship).
169
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1994); Anusbigian, 72 F.3d at 1255-57.
170
Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100YALE L.J. 853, 853-54 (1991).
171
Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1553 (10th Cir. 1991).
172

See WiLLIAM

W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACMCE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL PRO-

2:1123 (2001) (questioning Ruhrgas'ssuggestion that federal court
determinations should be preclusive on remand to state court and proposing that "[a]
remand decision should not be preclusive because it is neither final nor reviewable" and
that "[t]he state court is free to revisit factual or legal issues determined by the district
court on the remand motion").
173
See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 107, at 688-89.
174
See, e.g., Hart, supra note 94, at 99.
CEDURE BEFORE TRIAL
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With regard to the resequencing doctrine announced in Ruhrgas, this
congruence unfortunately is neither evident from the Court's opinion
nor self-evident from the doctrine's content. In fact, as this subpart
demonstrates, the doctrine is substantially at odds with conventional
jurisdictional theory.
As noted, one of the most critical premises in Ruhrgas is that personal jurisdiction is materially as essentialas subject-matter jurisdiction
to a court's power to decide cases. Yet the Court arrives at this premise-and the conclusion that personal jurisdiction can be decided
first-not by unearthing and comparing the theoretical elements of
each type of jurisdiction, but simply by proclaiming it to be true. 175
The Court acknowledges, as it must, that subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction serve different interests and are governed by different
constraints. Subject-matterjurisdiction requirements are structural in
nature, "serve institutional interests" by "keep[ing] the federal courts
176
within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed,"
are not subject to waiver or consent, and (with one possible exception) must be examined sua sponte by the courts themselves.' 7 7 The
requirements of personal jurisdiction, by contrast, safeguard a nonstructural guarantee of individual liberty, 7 8 can be waived or defaulted by the defendant's action or inaction, 179 and (with one

175 The Latin legalism, of course, is an ipse dixit, "a statement that lacks reasoning to
support its conclusion but, nevertheless, must be taken as true simply because the court
says so." Dorf, supra note 109, at 2022 & n.98. As Professor Hart noted, "ipse dixits are

futile as instruments for the exercise of 'the judicial Power of the United States.' As such,
they settle little or nothing more than the case in hand, and attempted rationalizations of
them serve more often to create than to relieve doubts in other cases." Hart, supra note 94,
at 98-99 (footnote omitted).
176 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).
177 See id. The possible exception is when an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is introduced or noted in the course of an interlocutory appeal, such as under the collateral
order doctrine, but would not have been independently appealable. In such situations, the
appellate court apparently need not address the subject-matter jurisdictional issue, although, if certain conditions are satisfied, it may possibly do so under the doctrine of
pendent appellate jurisdiction. Summit Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334-35
(11th Cir. 1999). In addition, a court's obligation to address at any time a possible lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction does not necessarily create a corollary obligation to address at
any time the possible existence of subject-matterjurisdiction once it is called into question.
Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
964 (1999).
178
Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584. To the extent that one conceptualizes personal jurisdiction as a function of state sovereignty, as the nineteenth century cases in particular appeared to do, the nonstructural label is not entirely accurate. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear,
Note, "Some of the Most EmbarrassingQuestions": ExtraterritorialDivorces and the Problem ofJurisdiction Before Pennoyer, 104 YALE LJ. 1507, 1510 (1995) (concluding that pre-Civil War
cases involving the recognition of out-of-state divorces were "primarily concerned with protecting state territorial sovereignty").
179 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
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exception) may not be examined sua sponte. 180 In the Court's view,
however, such distinctions "do not mean that subject-matter jurisdiction is ever and always the more 'fundamental" ' 8 1 and, in fact, are
entirely immaterial to the categorical question ofjurisdictional triage.
Consider again, however, the starkness of these distinctions between subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. The former is a
nonwaivable, structural limitation on a court's power to act at all; 182
the latter, a waivable, personal liberty interest that merely limits a
court's ability to bind a particular defendant with the otherwise valid
exercise of judicial power.' 8 3 Indeed, personal jurisdiction does not
actually have to exist in any absolute sense: "[u]nlike subject-matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction is not an 'absolute stricture' on a
district court, but is instead a 'personal privilege' that may be waived
by a defendant."'18 4 Thus, while "[a] judge has no power to decide a
case over which he lacks subject-matter jurisdiction ....he can decide
a case though he lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, if the
defendant waives the issue of personal jurisdiction."1' 85 To be sure,
courts regularly describe their relationship to subject-matter jurisdiction in hortatory terms-noting "their nondelegable duty to police
the limits of federal jurisdiction with meticulous care,"'18 6 their "independent, constitutional obligation to protect the jurisdictional limits
of the federal courts," 187 and "the duty of the federal courts to assure
themselves that their jurisdiction is not being exceeded" 18 8-while
characterizing the requirements of personal jurisdiction as "merely
180 The exception is "that a district court must determine whether it has jurisdiction
over the defendant before entering judgment by default against a party who has not appeared in the case." Dennis Garberg & Assocs. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 772
(10th Cir. 1997); accord Tuli v. Republic of Iraq (In re Tuli), 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir.
1999).
181 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
182 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
239 n.18 (1979); Rubin v. Belo Broad. Corp. (In re Rubin), 769 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir.
1985).
183 Driscoll v. New Orleans Steamboat Co., 633 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); accord
Great Prize, S.A. v. Mariner Shipping Party, Ltd., 967 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1992);
Donatelli v. Nat'l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 467 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990).
184 Roscoe v. Hansen, No. 96-2250, 1997 WL 116992, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 17, 1997)
(per curiam) (quoting Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979)).
185 Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added);
accord Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg. Corp., 576 F.2d 697, 699-700 (6th Cir. 1978); Goldstone
v. Payne, 94 F.2d 855, 857 (2d Cir. 1938); Toledo, St. L. & W.R. Co. v. Perenchio, 205 F.
472, 474-75 (7th Cir. 1913).
186 Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1991).
187 Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 933 F. Supp. 246, 249
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
188 Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); accordCeres Gulf v. Cooper,
957 F.2d 1199, 1207 n.16 (5th Cir. 1992); AK Steel Corp. v. Chamberlain, 974 F. Supp.
1120, 1122 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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the [I] personal privileges" of the parties, 18 9 or collectively as "an indi-

vidual right,"'9 0 or as "procedural requirements"'u 9 or "affirmative defenses"' 92 akin to the interposition of a statute of limitations. 19 3 In
turn, one would think that the Court might be interested in why each
type of jurisdiction bears different characteristics and whether these
reasons indicate anything about their respective importance.
Perhaps the most significant consideration in this regard, which
the Ruhrgas Court neither noted nor explored, is the respective consti-

tutional source of each jurisdictional requirement. Subject-matterjurisdiction ultimately derives from Article III, although its affirmation,
particularly in the lower courts, is typically by statute. As such, subjectmatter jurisdiction is properly characterized as an internal limitation
on the existence of federal judicial power and thus the sovereignty of
the federal government. In turn, without subject-matter jurisdiction,
a federal court is entirely without power to adjudicate a dispute, irrespective of the parties' wishes.' 9 4 Personal jurisdiction, by comparison, is essentially the exercise of jurisdiction over a particular
defendant as long as such exercise complies with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 19 5 Personaljurisdiction, accordingly, is best
characterized as an externallimitation on the exercise of federal judicial power, without which a court is simply precluded from binding
the defendant absent some form of consent. Personal jurisdiction, in
other words, "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter
96
of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."'
189

Perenchio, 205 F. at 475; accord Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180

(1979).
190

E.g., Parsons v. Plotkin (In re Pac. Land Sales, Inc.), 187 B.R. 302, 309 (B.A.P. 9th

Cir. 1995).
191

E.g., Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 678 F.2d 992, 1003 & n.15 (11th Cir.

1982). To the extent that a court is merely referring to service of process, which is normally a prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the "procedural requirement"
description is less problematic. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
97, 104 (1987).
192 E.g., Kernan v. Kurz-Hastings, Inc., 175 F.3d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1999); Caribbean
Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1998);Jenkins v.
City of Topeka, 136 F.3d 1274, 1275 (10th Cir. 1998).
193
E.g., Santana v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 686 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1982).
194
E.g, Indus. Addition Ass'n v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 310, 313 (1945); Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R_, 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
195 See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982).
196
d.; see also Dan B. Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle(pt.
1), 53 VA. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (1967) (stating that "[the parties may consent to a court's
jurisdiction over their persons ....and thus validate ajudgment that, but for the consent,
would be void" but that "[t]his is not true if the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, for the sovereign has limited the power of the court to render ajudgment, and the
parties may not confer jurisdiction that has been denied by the sovereign" (footnotes omitted)); Nora Pomerantz, Note, In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987), 61 TEMP. L. REV. 213, 236 (1988) ("The policy
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This distinction is important in at least two respects, one of judicial practice, the other of constitutional theory. First, as a matter of
standard judicial practice, challenges premised on the internal limits
on federal power ought, analytically, to precede challenges premised
on the external limits on the same,' 9 7 assuming that the parties have
presented both and that the court must address at least one. 198 The
more fundamental question, after all, is whether the federal government has the power to act in the first place, not whether its exercise of
this alleged power, if it even exists, happens to transgress an external
limitation. Second, this respective sequencing of internal and external power issues reflects the more basic principle that maintaining the
limited nature of federal authority is, along with federalism and the
separation of powers, more theoretically central to American constitutionalism than the imposition of external limits, such as due process,
on the exercise of federal power otherwise delegated. 199 In the day-tobehind personal jurisdictional requirements is the protection of individual rights. Subject

matter jurisdiction, however, arises out of concern for the appropriate scope of judicial
power, not the protection of specific individual rights." (footnote omitted)). As the Court
recently stated in Millerv. French,530 U.S. 327 (2000), "[i]n contrast to due process, which
principally serves to protect the personal rights of litigants to a full and fair hearing, separation of powers principles are primarily addressed to the structural concerns of protecting
the role of the independent Judiciary within the constitutional design." Id. at 350.
197 Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980) (confronted with a challenge to
a federal minority contracting scheme, and explaining that "[a] t the outset, we must inquire whether the objectives of this legislation are within the power of Congress" and "[i]f
so, we must go on to decide whether the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria . . .
violate [s] the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment"), overruled on other grounds by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235
(1995); Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1995) (confronted with a
challenge to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, addressing first--"[a]s a
threshold matter"-whether Congress has the power to enact the statute, and then
whether the statute's application violates the First and Fifth Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). Courts analyzing challenges to administrative power follow a similar pattern. See, e.g., Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (noting the practice that a claim alleging that an agency exceeded its congressionally delegated rulemaking power should be addressed prior to a claim alleging that a
specific agency regulation violates an external limitation, in this case the Fourth
Amendment).
198 Where a nonconstitutional question is also presented, the court should presumably
examine it first. See Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir.
1988) (faced with the question of whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and whether Congress intended to abrogate this immunity, addressing the
latter first "because resolving that issue may avoid the need to address any more fundamental issues of Congress' constitutional power to abrogate"). But see Charter Oak Fed. Say.
Bank v. Ohio, 666 F. Supp. 1040, 1043 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (faced with the same question,
and concluding that "[t]he first question to be addressed is whether Congress, pursuant to
Article I, section 8, the 'commerce clause,' even has the power to abrogate the states'
eleventh amendment immunity"). This is particularly true if resolving the nonconstitutional question might eliminate the challenge to federal power. See United States v. Five
Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1953).
199 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); Marci A. Hamilton, City of
Boerne v. Flores: A LandmarkforStructuralAnalysis, 39 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 699, 710 (1998);

20011

JURISDICTIONAL RESEQUENCING

day existence of citizens, of course, the latter is no less important and
often may seem to be the Constitution's rdison d'tre. By their office
and tenure, however, judges are obligated to view the Constitution in
its architectural totality, drawing upon the historical events and philosophical understandings that gave rise to it and that have sustained its
integrity over time. 20 0 This is particularly true where, as in Ruhrgas,
the ultimate question is not one of individual liberty as such, but
rather of federal judicial power. And from this architectural perspective, it is clear not only that structural features-such as the principles
of internally limited federal power, the separation of powers, and federalism-are at the core of American constitutionalism, 2 1 but that
the protection of liberty is, in the first instance, very much tied to their
2 02
maintenance.
To be sure, it is primarily the different constitutional sources underlying the two jurisdictional forms that explain the distinctive characteristics of each form, characteristics which the Court itself noted
but inexplicably deemed irrelevant. Subject-matter jurisdiction is not
waivable and must be addressed precisely because it concerns the sovereignty-the baseline of internal power-of the federal governMerrill, supra note 98, at 9, 13. Even the Bill of Rights can be understood as limitations on
federal power imposed largely for structural reasons. See AKmL REED AMAR, THE BiL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 n.8 (2000) (rejecting an argument of the dissent because it "is belied by the entire structure of the Constitution," and
gauging the nature of congressional power in light of the Constitution's "careful enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal
Government are reserved"); cf Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 95 (1900) (explaining that
in order to properly interpret the Constitution, one must take into account "[t]he necessities which gave birth to the Constitution, the controversies which preceded its formation,
and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption"); CI-IAES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCrURE AND RELTIxONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3-32 (1969). For a discussion specifically addressing the judicial role in the enforcement of federalism, see United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577-78 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
201 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933);
Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998); Baker, Catalogue,supra note 100, at
842-44.
202
See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59
(1991); Baker, Catalogue supra note 100, at 843; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., OurBill of Rights, 25
IND. L. REv. 937, 940 (1992); Wallace, supra note 95, at 2-3. Likewise, the Court has
remarked:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit
of the States or state governments as abstract political entities, or even for
the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals.
NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992). See generallyThomas B. McAffee, The
FederalSystem as Bill of Rights: OriginalUnderstandings,Modem Misreadings,43 VILL. L. REv. 17
(1998) (discussing modern interpretations of the Bill of Rights in light of the Founders'
original understandings of its purpose).
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ment.20 3 What cannot be conferred, in other words, is not 'judicial
power" in some generic sense, but rather the sovereignty that subject-

matter jurisdiction specifically represents. In contrast, personal jurisdiction is waivable and need not be addressed precisely because it
does not concern sovereignty and, thus, encompasses a lesser or less

fundamental form of judicial power. 20 4 In short, an objection to personal jurisdiction is waivable and the defendant must raise it because
it is essentially an affirmative defense, a personal privilege, not a structural broadside on the power of the federal tribunal. As the Court
itself has observed:
The distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal metaphysics. It rests instead on
the central principle of a free society that courts have finite bounds
of authority, some of constitutional origin, which exist to protect
20 5
citizens from . . . the excessive use of judicial power.
This relative constitutional importance of subject-matter jurisdiction flows not only from its relation to sovereignty, but also from the
type and magnitude of injury that is occasioned by its transgression.
When a court acts in the absence of personal jurisdiction, without the
defendant's consent or acquiescence, it is primarily the defendant
who is offended, his or her liberty having been deprived without due
process of law. In such cases, the relevant interest is one of individual
203
See, e.g., Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308, 316 (1870). This point is not
contradicted by the Ruhrgas petitioner's argument that "[w]aiver does not apply in the
context of subject-matter jurisdiction because Article III limitations 'serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.'" Petitioner's Brief at 17, Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (No. 98-470) (quoting Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)), available at 1999 'AL 23658. For it
must ultimately be the different interests served by subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, and not the parties' expected behavior itself, that renders the behavior significant. An
inadvertent failure to object to personal jurisdiction is still a waiver, not because parties can
always be expected to protect their interest in not submitting to a court without personal
jurisdiction (they cannot), but because a lack of personal jurisdiction is simply less critical
than a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to a court's exercise of sovereign authority. See
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (explaining that "no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal
court" because subject-matter jurisdiction is "a restriction on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign," but that "[n]one of this is true wvith
respect to personal jurisdiction," the requirement of which "flows not from Art. III, but
from the Due Process Clause" and which "represents a restriction on judicial power not as
a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty").
204
See, e.g., Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1999); Ruggieri v. Gen. Well
Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 528 n.2 (D. Colo. 1982). This, to be sure, is one reason that
the Court has backed away from grounding the requirement of personal jurisdiction in the
constitutional value of federalism. See Compagniedes Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
Of course, personal jurisdiction is not totally unrelated to sovereignty, as the exercise of
the former implies the existence of the latter.
205
United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S.
72, 77 (1988).
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liberty, the violation is largely personal to the defendant, and it is normally the defendant alone who is entitled to vindicate or overlook the
offense. 206 When a court acts without subject-matterjurisdiction, however, it is the people as a whole-the very source of federal sovereignty-that suffers offense. The harm, though possibly the result of
a single judge, is nationwide in scope, for the fundamental charter has
been violated as to all citizens, not simply the defendant. 20 7 In the
words of the Tenth Amendment, when a federal court exercises "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution," it usurps
powers "reserved to the States . . .or to the people." 20 8 True, the
deprivation of due process visited upon a particular defendant may
also indirectly offend the people, but the constitutional system simply
does not accord the same level of gravity to such indirect offenses. 20 9
The differential significance of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction is not simply an abstract point of theory, but is manifest in a
number of judicial and legislative practices. This Article has already
noted the Court's own decision in Leroy as well as several lower court
cases recognizing the fundamentally preliminary nature of subjectmatter jurisdiction in relation to personal jurisdiction.2 10 In addition,
as Part III discusses, several courts both before and after Steel Co. have
held that it is permissible to adjudicate the merits of a suit without
first verifying personal jurisdiction, even though the same practice as
to subject-matter jurisdiction is, following Steel Co., clearly forbidden. 211 As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained, a "district
court [is] not required to resolve the issue of personal jurisdiction
prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
because personal jurisdiction exists to protect the liberty interests of
defendants, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which serves as a limita212
tion on judicial competence."
Williams v. Life Say. & Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
SeeIn rePac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 254-55 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887); Hamilton, supra
note 199, at 709. In the debate over the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, scholars have
labeled this position the "residual rights" thesis. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger,
The "Proper"Scope ofFederalPower: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKa
L.J. 267, 326-27 (1993).
208 U.S. CONsr. amend. X; see Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); Baker, Catalogue, supra note 100, at 844; Bradley S. Clanton, Note, Inherent Powers and Settlement Agreements: Limiting Federal EnforcementJurisdiction,15 Miss. C. L. RFv. 453, 468-69 (1995).
209 Were this not so, such doctrines as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and
the third-party standing exception for First Amendment facial challenges-premised on
the importance of preventing constitutional injury to others not before the court-would
not be so distinctive.
210 See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
211 The courts are in fact divided on this issue. See infra notes 524-25 and accompanying text.
212 Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17,
1998) (per curiam).
206

207
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Other instances of the differential treatment of subject-matter
and personal jurisdiction are readily available. Congress, for example,
confers subject-matterjurisdiction exclusively by statute, but allows the
Court to define personal jurisdiction using its rulemaking authority,2 13 arguably indicating an understanding that subject-matter jurisdiction is the constitutionally more important power. A telling
distinction is also drawn between the two jurisdictional forms within
the doctrine ofjudicial immunity, which shields judges "from civil liability for any normal and routine judicial act" unless the act is undertaken "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction."2 1 4 Although the
immunity requires a colorable showing of subject-matter jurisdiction,
it requires no showing whatsoever of personal jurisdiction. 215 While
the pragmatic rationale for this rule may be the potential difficulty of
verifying the factual basis of personal jurisdiction,2 1 6 the mere fact
that personal jurisdiction is deemed dispensable (in a way that subjectmatter jurisdiction is not) is indicative of its relative perception by the
federal courts.
A final example is from the law governing transfers between federal district courts under §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a).2 17 Although both
provisions require subject-matter jurisdiction, it is generally accepted
that neither the transferor court nor the transferee court need have
personal jurisdiction.2 18 And again, while the rationale of this con213 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (2). Indeed, Rule 82 itself provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." FED. R.
Civ. P. 82; see also Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959) ("A rule of procedure....
however convenient and salutary it may be, is without efficacy to extend the jurisdiction of
a court."). Importantly, "[t]he reference to jurisdiction' in Rule 82 refers only tojurisdiction over the subject matter, not to jurisdiction over the person." Paxton v. S. Pa. Bank, 93
F.R.D. 503, 505 (D. Md. 1982); accord United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.RD. 216,
219 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
214 Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam); accord Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52
(1871).
215 See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); Dykes v.
Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 947-50 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
216 See, e.g., Dykes, 776 F.2d at 949-50.
217 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."); id.
§ 1406(a) ("The district court of a district
in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be
in the interest ofjustice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have
been brought.").
218
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962); Sanderson v. Spectrum Labs,
Inc., No. 00-1872, 2000 WL 1909678, at *1 n.1 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2000) (per curiam);
Naegler v. Nissan Motor Co., 835 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-57 (W.D. Mo. 1993); Bradford Nilsson, Comment, Which Way to the Right Court? The Use of Federal TransferStatutes When a Court
Isa Proper Venue but Lacks PersonalJurisdiction,30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 569, 574, 578, 589-94
(1990).
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struction may not be directly related to the issue of resequencing as
such, what is ultimately important is that personal and subject-matter
jurisdiction are conceptualized differently and that the former, for at
least some purposes, is understood simply to be less essential than the
latter.2 19 In short, personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, from the
perspective of jurisdictional theory, are most assuredly not equivalent
legal requirements, Ruhrgas's assumption to the contrary
notwithstanding.
C. Jurisdictional Conformity
Federal courts, and in turn doctrines of federal jurisdiction, function within a limited realm that is bounded not merely by notions of
precedential fidelity and theoretical congruence, but ultimately by the
very real parameters established by constitutional and statutory command. As a consequence, one cannot truly consider a jurisdictional
doctrine legitimate if its articulation or application would entail the
exercise ofjudicial power beyond that which is constitutionally or statutorily authorized. There must, in other words, be jurisdictional conformity in both the origination and the implementation of the
doctrine. It is, in fact, this criterion ofjurisdictional conformity which
poses the most serious obstacle for the doctrine of resequencing. For
the power at issue-ultimately an inherent power to address a threshold issue, and dismiss on that basis, in the absence of verified subjectmatter jurisdiction-appears largely to be without authority in light of
the present understanding of federal judicial power.
To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to demonstrate and combine no fewer than four antecedent premises: first, that resequencing
is indeed an exercise of power, applied against a background presumption, drawn from precedent and theory, that subject-matter jurisdiction should be addressed at the outset; second, that the power to
resequence is neither an express nor an implied power, neither directly nor indirectly authorized by constitutional or statutory text, and
is therefore an inherent power, a categorization that several of its
characteristics confirm; third, that this power appears specifically to be
an extension of the inherent power of courts to determine their own
219 That said, at least one court has explained the different treatment of personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction within the transfer context by reference to Leroy's teaching that
"'neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamentally preliminary in the sense that
subject-matterjurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges of the defendant, rather than
absolute strictures on the court, and both may be waived.'" Garrel v. NYLCare Health
Plans, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 9077 (BSJ), 1999 WL 459925, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (quoting Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979)). Viewed in this light,
§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a) must be contrasted with 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which expressly authorizes curative transfers between federal courts precisely in cases where jurisdictionparadigmatically subject-matter jurisdiction-is deficient. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
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jurisdiction; but fourth, that this extension of power appears unjustified

in terms of both the general jurisprudence of inherent power and the
specific jurisprudence of the inherent power to determine jurisdiction. The remainder of this section will develop each of these premises and then assess their collective significance.
1.

Resequencing andJudicialPower

At the outset, it is important to establish that the prerogative of a
court to resequence threshold inquiries is indeed a form of power,

particularly when exercised against a background understanding,
rooted in both precedent and theory, that courts should address subject-matter jurisdiction first. This clarification is necessary largely because the Ruhrgas Court itself refuses to use the term "power" to
describe the prerogative, 2 20 instead repeatedly describing it as an exercise of "discretion. '2 21 As the Seventh Circuit has observed, however, "[d]iscretion is power, a commodity that judges, like other
people, prize. ' 222 Even the dissenters to the Fifth Circuit's en banc
223
Ruhrgas opinion, though seeming to favor the term "discretion,"
nevertheless recognized (at least when dealing with the majority opinion) that the prerogative of a district court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, absent verified subject-matter jurisdiction, is
invariably a kind of power. 224 True, power can be obligatory or discretionary, and in this sense the Court's terminology is not inaccurate.
In the final analysis, however, resequencing should properly be under225
stood as an exercise of judicial power.
220 The Court uses the term "power" several times in its opinion, see Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577, 583, 584 (1999), but not once to describe the prerogative ofjurisdictional sequencing.
221 See, e.g., id. at 577-78, 586, 588; cf. id. at 583 n.7.
222 D'Amico v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); see also
Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and Judicial Power in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1206 (1994)
(noting the "content[ion] that the competition between certainty and discretion is best
understood as a struggle for political power" and that "Ojiudges gain power to the extent
that they can exercise discretion"). Accordingly, "[a] court must have jurisdiction as a
prerequisiteto the exercise of discretion. The question whether a court has abused its discretion necessarily involves the question whether a court has any discretion to abuse."
Eighth Reg'l War Labor Bd.v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 145 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1944)
(emphasis added).
223 See Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 226, 231 & n.7, 232 (5th Cir.
1998) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
224 See, e.g., i. at 229-30 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
225 This characterization is likewise not diminished merely because resequencing may
be classified as a matter of procedure. From a practical standpoint, "procedure is power,
whether in the hands of-lawyers or judges." Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet:
Tradition,Histo, and Limitations on FederalJudicialPower-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAIE L.
REv. 1291, 1292-93 (2000); cf.Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 927
(7th Cir. 2000) ("[C]ourts possess no more authority to issue advisory opinions (or other-
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It is also important to note that merely because each form of jurisdictional dismissal is independently authorized-subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1), personal jurisdiction under Rule
12(b) (2) 2 26-does not mean that the power to choose between them
is invariably authorized as well, or that there are no extrinsic, extratextual limitations on the exercise of that power. District courts, after all,
are also authorized under Rule 12(b) (3) to entertain defensive allegations of improper venue, 227 but it is well-established that resolution of
a 12(b) (3) challenge (at least one resulting in transfer) necessitates a
228 So also,
preliminary determination of subject-matter jurisdiction.
for that matter, with Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss for failure to
9
state a redressable claim:22 despite the absence of limiting language
in Rule 12(b), Steel Co. makes it quite clear that a court cannot resolve
12(b) (1).230
a 12(b) (6) motion without first resolving a motion under
In short, the authority to address any given 12(b) motion in and of
itself does not necessarily entail the power to choose the order in
which to address 12(b) motions. Rather, one must independently determine the existence and substance of this latter power by resort to
considerations extrinsic to the terms of Rule 12(b).231
It is particularly significant, in this regard, that the Ruhrgas Court
was not working against a jurisprudential background indifferent to
the sequence in which courts addressed 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (2) motions. If it were, then one could rightly argue that the analysis here is
skewed. After all, why should the Court have to justify the resequencing of 12(b)(2) prior to 12(b)(1), but not of 12(b)(1) prior to
12(b) (2), given that neither appears to be dictated by Rule 12(b) itself? As illustrated by the previous two subparts, however, both precedent and theory indicate that the baseline or presumptive norm was,
in fact, that courts had to address subject-matter jurisdiction first. Accordingly, the Court should have to justify a resequencing of 12 (b) (2)
prior to 12(b) (1), if only because such resequencing runs contrary to
the doctrine reasonably indicated by its own prior cases, by the pracwise exceed their jurisdiction) in 'procedural matters' than in other matters."), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct 1653 (2001).
226 See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2).
227 See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(3).
228

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

229 See FED R Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
230 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
231 Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit Ruhrgas dissenters decried the en banc majority's
decision as "an exercise in unauthorized judicial rulemaking" insofar as it read into Rules
12(b) (1) and 12(b) (2) a sequencing mandate not expressly found in the text. See Marathon Oil Co. v. AG. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 233 (5th Cir. 1998) (Higginbotham,J., dissenting), rev'd, 526 U.S. 574 (1999). In large measure, the dissenters were absolutely right.
Their mistake, however, was not seeing that either way the issue is decided-that district
courts may choose among grounds for dismissal, or that district courts may not-is a construction of Rule 12(b) and the articulation of a rule based on extratextual considerations.
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tice of the lower courts operating pursuant to these cases, and by several of the jurisdictional principles that these cases articulate.
2.

Resequencing and InherentJudicialPower

Second, it is necessary to determine the specific category of federal judicial power to which the resequencing power belongs, given
that different categories have different norms of legitimacy. Accordingly, a brief overview of these categories, and of federal judicial
23 2
power in general, may prove useful at this juncture.
The federal judiciary, like the federal government as a whole, "is
one of delegated and limited powers." 23 3 What this means for the federal courts is that they "are not courts of general jurisdiction, '23 4 but
rather of limited jurisdiction, and "have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." 23 5 In turn, not only is there "no presumption
of jurisdiction in the federal courts," 23 6 to the contrary they are presumed to lack jurisdiction or power in any given instance unless and
until the existence of lawful jurisdiction is shown.2 37 Moreover, because these limitations are intrinsic and structural, they cannot be
overcome merely by demonstrating that the parties have consented to
a court's exercise of power, 238 or that this exercise would be of mani239
fest utility to society or to the legal system.
With these principles as a backdrop, the federal courts have essentially discerned three categories of power that they may exerciseexpress, implied, and inherent. Express powers are those immediately
evident or directly derived from text. In the Constitution, for example, express powers are those that are individually enumerated, such
as the judicial grants of Article III, § 2. Although the scope of these
powers may necessitate the interpretation of particular terms or
232 The focus being the judicial powers of Article III courts, not addressed are either
the nonjudicial functions of Article III courts, see, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 385-90 (1989), or the judicial powers of non-Article III courts, see, e.g., Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 888-90 (1991).
233 Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
234 Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
235 Id.; accord Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77,
95 (1981); Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir.
1996), amended on denial ofreh'g, No. 95-5120, 1998 WL 117980 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998).
236 ErieNet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 516 (3d Cir. 1998); see alsoJonN C.
ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 8, at 10 (Byron F. Babbitt

ed., Matthew Bender 5th ed. 1938) (1915).
237
See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994);
Turner v. Bank of N.-Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 27-28 (5th ed. 1994).
238
See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951).
239 See, e.g., In re Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986);
accord Musson Theatrical 89 F.3d at 1252.
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phrases, the powers themselves are clearly conferred by the text. Implied powers, by comparison, "are . . .linked to the textually assigned

powers and serve as means to the great ends spelled out in the
text. '240 They are not outrightly conferred as such, but their existence
manifestly corresponds to one or more identifiable enumerated powers. Inherentpowers, in contrast with both express and implied powers,
241
"do not depend on the existence of any textual assignment."
Rather than flowing from the text, they flow from the character or
needs of-that is, they are inherent to-the governmental institution
242

itself.

a. Express Power
As befits a judiciary of limited jurisdiction, and more generally a
government of limited and enumerated powers, the overwhelming
majority of the federal courts' authority is express in nature. These
expressions are located both directly in the Constitution, such as the
enumeration of select "Cases" or "Controversies" to which the judicial
power shall extend, 243 and derivatively in a host of statutes and rules,
provided that such enactments conform to Article III.2 44 The logic
and lure of express powers inhere not only in the specificity with
which the powers may be conferred, but also in the clarity with which
they may be limited. Consistent with the American theory of written
240

PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTrrUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 39 (4th ed.

2000); cf.FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE

5 (1994) ("Implied powers are those that arise out of and are necessary to carry
out the authority expressly granted .. ").

JUDICIARY

241

BREST ET AL., supra note 240, at 39; see also In reTwo Appeals Arising out of SanJuan

Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956, 965 n.15 (Ist Cir. 1993) (distinguishing "an
implied power derived from the Civil Rules" from an analogous "intrinsic" or "inherent"
power).
242 See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); United States v. Hudson
& Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
557, 561-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc); STuMPF, supra note 240, at 5; Daniel J. Meador,
InherentJudicialAuthorityin thw Conduct of Civil Litigation,73 TEx. L. REv. 1805, 1805 (1995).
243 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This delineation provides not only a subject-matter
listing but also a requirement that disputes involving these subjects are sufficiently real and
adversarial that they may be called actual cases or controversies. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 818-19 (1997); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96
(1980).
244
See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922). The nonnegotiability
of such compliance is the holding, though clearly not the singular importance, of Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 65 (1996) (noting the Court's "'unvarying approach to Article III as setting forth
the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court jurisdiction'" (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) ("The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution.").
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constitutionalism, 2 45 the text both empowers and circumscribes, 246
leading to a regime in which the intrinsic limitations on the power of
the judiciary generally derive from the constitutional or statutory au24 7
thorizations themselves.
Statutory law, it turns out, is the principal medium by which federal judicial power is delineated. Such delineations include not only
the general and specific codifications of the Constitution's jurisdictional grants, 2 48 but also, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, 249
a variety of statutory schemes that facilitate or actuate the federal
courts' exercise of their Article III powers. 250 Most prominent are select powers and duties relating to the administration of the judicial
branch and the creation of both general and court-specific federal
rules. 2 51 Under § 2072 (a) of the Judicial Code, for example, Congress
has empowered the Supreme Court "to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
245

See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
See AR.INsrAD M. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERALJURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 14
(1928). Of course, the limitations on federal judicial power are only partly intrinsic. As
with the other branches, there also exist extrinsic constraints, including most prominently
the separation of powers (the prohibition on exercising or impeding legislative or executive power), see Springer v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1928);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); the principle of federalism as reflected
in the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, see Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); and
the guarantees in the Bill of Rights, most notably the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Thus, even where a judicial power is constitutionally or statutorily conferred, its
exercise is ultimately bounded by these extrinsic constraints.
247 David E. Engdahl, IntrinsicLimits of Congress'PowerRegarding theJudicialBranch, 1999
BYU L. REv. 75, 80.
248 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1253-1254, 1257-1259 (1994) (Supreme Court); id.
§§ 1291-1292, 1294-1296 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (Courts of Appeals); id. §§ 1330-1368
(District Courts). As for lower federal courts, such codification (or affirmation) is required. See Kline, 260 U.S. at 233-34; Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867).
The conventional rationale for this requirement is that the lesser power to allocate jurisdiction falls within Congress's greater power "[tio constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; see also id. art. III, § 1 (vesting "[t]he judicial
Power of the United States... in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish"); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("Courts
created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers."). Indeed, "Congress has complete power to determine the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and
to grant, withhold, restrict or withdraw jurisdiction in its discretion." Taylor v. Brown, 137
F.2d 654, 660 (Emer. Ct. App. 1943). This dynamic contrasts starkly with that governing
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, which is "susceptible to neither congressional
expansion nor congressional diminishment [and] is operative even absent statutory affirmation. Whether the Court's appellate jurisdiction is similarly self-executing is a matter of
some debate." Idleman, supra note 14, at 250 n.50 (citation omitted).
249 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
250
See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 472-73 (1965); Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41, 48 (1988).
251
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388-89 (1989); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
246

312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).
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States district courts . . and courts of appeals" 25 2 while under
§ 2071(a) Congress has empowered all federal courts to "prescribe
rules for the conduct of their business" if "consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section
2072. ''253 In turn, Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
empowers each district court to "make and amend rules governing its
practice" (so-called local rules) if "consistent with ... Acts of Congress
and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075,"254 and further
provides that, even absent a controlling statute or rule, "[a] judge may
regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules
adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and local rules of the
255
district."
b.

Implied Power

Despite the logic of a textualist regime, it has long been understood that textual expression does not exhaust the federal judicial
power and that this power may also be nonexpress. 2 56 Of the two
principal categories of nonexpress powers-implied and inherentthe less problematic are implied powers, as there remains for them at
least some textual nexus. Implied powers are those which are not immediately apparent from, but which are nevertheless conferred by,
statutory or constitutional text.25 7 Their implication is virtually always
based on the inferred intent of the drafters, manifested by the law's
overall structure, apparent purposes, and (perhaps) legislative or documentary history.258 Thus, where Congress has granted to the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over a particular area, it has been judicially inferred that Congress has also given to the federal courts "the
252 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994). These include, among others, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
253 Id. § 2071 (a).
254 FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a) (1); see also FED. R. CiRi. P. 57(a)(1) ("Each district court...
may ... make and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule shall be consistent
with-but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072.").
255 FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (b); see also FED. R. CRiM. P. 57 (b) ("Ajudge may regulate practice
in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the district."). On
the rulemaking authority of the district courts, see Stern v. United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, 214 F.3d 4, 13 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1077 (2001);
Franquez v. United States, 604 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1979); 12 WaGrrr ET AL., supra
note 119, § 3155 (2d ed. 1997).
256
It has been said, however, that nonexpress powers are generally disfavored. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 225 (1821).
257
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 565 (1845); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-08 (1819); Steinberg v. Mellon Bank (In re Grabill
Corp.), 132 B.R. 725, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
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implied power to protect that grant."2 59 Among the more distinctive
implied powers are judicial review and federal common law-making.
As Professor Paulsen has noted, for instance, "[t]he courts' power of
'judicial review'-the power to refuse to apply as law statutes that the
courts find unconstitutional-is simply a special instance of the implied judicial power to interpret. (The text of the Constitution, of
course, nowhere mentions the power ofjudicial review.) "260 Likewise,
the power to fashion rules of federal common law,26 1 when invoked

pursuant to perceived but nonexpress statutory or constitutional authorization, is also a species of implied judicial power. 262 After all,
"[f]ederal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law
courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their
'263
own rules of decision.
259 Gonzales v. Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987).
260 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 241 (1994); see alsoJ. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, FourFaces
of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland,84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 455-56 (1990) (describing judicial review as one of the "great implicit power[s] in the Constitution"); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1561, 1566 (1998) (book review)
("[Tihe power ofjudicial review is not specified, but the Framers likely assumed it as implicit in a Constitution of limited powers with an Article III judiciary."). According to
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), this power is implicit in Article III's
grant of power to the federal courts to hear "Cases... arising under th [e] Constitution,"
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, when interpreted in light of the written nature of the Constitution, the limited nature of federal governmental power, and the traditional interpretive
function of the judiciary. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-79.
261
"'[Flederal common law' in the strictest sense . . . [is] a rule of decision that
amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated
administrative rule, but, rather, to the judicial 'creation' of a special federal rule of decision." Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997).
262 See, e.g., Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.
1996), amended on denial ofreh'g, No. 95-5120, 1998 WL 117980 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998).
263
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981); accord Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 1994). Not all federal common
law-making relies upon textual authorization (the lack of which, as discussed later, points
to inherent power); that which does, however, may properly be deemed an exercise of
implied power. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REv. 263, 267
(1992). To the extent, moreover, that implied power to fashion federal common law is
statutorily based, Congress may freely modify or abrogate it. United States ex rel. Green v.
Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir.
1994); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1360. See generally Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314-32 (discussing
Congress's supplantation of federal courts' common law-making power through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972). Constitutionally implied judicial
powers, by comparison, vary in the extent that Congress is able to regulate them. For
example, while Congress cannot meddle with the power ofjudicial review in and of itself,
see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000), there may be circumstances under
which it can be congressionally foreclosed, compare Maldonado v. Fasano, 67 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1174 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that "the presumption favoring judicial review may be
overcome 'by specific language or specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of
congressional intent,' or 'by specific inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme
as a whole'" but also that, "whenever 'fairly possible,' courts will narrowly construe jurisdiction-limiting statutes to avoid constitutional questions and to preserve judicial review over
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The remaining category of power, also nonexpress, is inherent
power. In contrast to implied powers, which derive from text through
the medium of authorial intent, inherent powers derive from the nature or necessities of the institution invoking them. They are, in other
words, inherent to the institution itself. Needless to say, this is a rather
abstract notion-inherent powers have been described as a "formless
...concept"264 -and courts often blur the distinctions among various
265
inherent powers and even between inherent and implied powers.
Nevertheless, the basic framework of inherent judicial powers may
generally be summarized as follows. Although not textual per se, inherent powers are embodied in the very concept of 'Judicial Power"
mentioned in the first two sections of Article III. More than a mere
synonym for jurisdiction, 2 66 the 'judicial Power" encompasses those
prerogatives and obligations that have customarily attended the judicial function, 267 particularly the Anglo-American common law courts
constitutional issues" (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984))),
with Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir.) ("In our view, a statutory provision
precluding alljudicial review of constitutional issues removes from the courts an essential
judicial function under our implied constitutional mandate of separation of powers, and

deprives an individual of an independent forum for the adjudication of a claim of constitutional right."), opinion reinstated, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam).
By contrast, Congress can freely override the implied judicial power to fashion doctrine
under the dormant Commerce Clause. Menion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
154-55 (1982).
264 McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1187 (7th Cir. 1985); see also lnre Tutu Wells
Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 383 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The permissible scope of inherent powers is somewhat unclear; we have earlier observed that 'the notion of inherent
power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds "shadowy."'" (quoting Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc))); NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu
Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 703 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting the "uncertainty in the
very idea of inherent power"), afj'd sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
265 See Eash, 757 F.2d at 562; William F. Ryan, Rush toJudgment: A ConstitutionalAnalysis
of Time Limits on JudicialDecisions, 77 B.U. L. Rxv. 761, 775 (1997); Michael E. Solimine,
Enforcement and Interpretationof Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 295,
315 (1988). For an outstanding recent article on the forms, rationales, and limiting principles of inherent judicial power (substantially congruent with the analysis presented here),
see RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., The InherentPowers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution,
86 IoWA L. REv. 735 (2001).
266 See, e.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity
and Quality ofDecisionmakingRequired ofArticle I7 Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 708 (1998).
267 See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1406
(5th Cir. 1993); Eash, 757 F.2d at 562; Dukes v. Smith, 34 M.J. 803, 805 (N-M. C.M.R. 1991);
Engdahl, supra note 247, at 84-85; Ryan, supra note 265, at 783-84; Solimine, supra note
265, at 315. "In contrast, Articles I and II not only vest legislative and executive power in
the Congress and the President, respectively, but also proceed to enumerate what those
powers are." Ryan, supra note 265, at 783 n.103. Article III also does not provide "procedural signals to identify when this power is being exercised.... This silence contrasts
appreciably with how the Constitution treats the other great constitutional powers-the
political powers-of the government." Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REv. 257, 299 (2000).
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at the time of the framing, 268 whether or not such attributes are elsewhere expressly conferred by the Constitution 2 69 or affirmed by
270
statute.
The most obvious such attribute is the power to adjudicate and
decide disputes-the "power to render judgment"271-by the interpretation and application of existing law or legal principles. 272 As one
268 George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine'sImplicationsfor the
Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REv. 617, 623 (1984); cf. Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2000) (looking to the
legal traditions in England and the American Colonies to define contemporary federal
jurisdiction because "Article III's restriction of the judicial power to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' is properly understood to mean 'cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process'" (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998))); Tyrrell Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of
CourtAffecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 459, 492-93 (1937) (noting that "the American
Revolution was not a fight against the common law of England" and that "[t]he attitude of
the late colonial and early republican judges was one of extreme loyalty, not to say servility,
toward the English judicial system as it existed for the benefit of Englishmen in England").
But cf Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) ("The courts of the United States
are all limited in their nature and constitution, and have not the powers inherent in courts
existing by prescription or by the common law.").
269 But cf Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rv.
1377, 1394-95 (1994) (arguing that, while Article III, § 1 seems to create "potentially enormous"judicial power vested with several implied powers, § 2 undermines this potential by
clarifying that "the federal courts are meant to be courts of constitutionally limited
jurisdiction").
270 While this "judicial Power" theory may resolve the issue of the need for a constitutional grant, it does not automatically resolve the issue of the need for congressional affirmation (at least as to the lower federal courts), unless one also assumes that these powers,
by their nature, need not be statutorily affirmed. The statutory affirmation issue is particularly problematic insofar as Congress, in the All Writs Act, has specifically recognized the
power of the federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law," 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (a) (1994), the implication being that federal courts are not otherwise free to advert
to "the usages and principles of law" in determining their powers. Moreover, this unique
phrasing is not a recent congressional innovation; it can be traced to the original writs
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82
(providing for federal judicial power to issue "all other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law" (emphasis added)), quoted in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433-34 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
271 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.).
272 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995); United States v.
O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647 (1874); Ryan, supra note 265, at 786. This power is so
obviously included within the "judicial Power" that one could just as easily deem it implied
rather than inherent. It is, after all, the quintessential judicial function and often viewed as
the essence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939), superseded by statute as stated in Maybelline Co. v. Noxell
Corp., 813 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1987); Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25
(1913); Elliott v. Peirsol's Lessee, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828); In re Chi., Rock Island &
Pac. R.R., 794 F.2d 1182, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986) ("U]urisdiction is the power to decide."). At
the same time, the recognition of the Article III "judicial Power" as the power to interpret
the law within an adjudicatory context also serves to circumscribe and protect the authority
of the federal courts by distinguishing the nature of their power from the Article I "legislative Powers" (to make law) and the Article II "executive Power" (to execute the law). N.
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moves away from this core power, however, the "inherency" of any
given power can become increasingly less evident. 273 A moderately
conservative reading of the case law indicates that there are essentially
two benchmarks-history and necessity-by which one can measure
the legitimate recognition of inherent powers. Congruent with the
traditional attribute theory, the first criterion is whether a given power
is one that courts, within the Anglo-American judicial tradition, have
historically possessed. Thus, it has been recognized that "[c]ourts of
justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their
presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. '274 As one might
imagine, the richest historical source of inherent powers is found in
the concept and tradition of equity.2 75 The Supreme Court has stated,

for example, that the power "to award attorney's fees to a party whose
litigation efforts directly benefit others"-the "common fund exception" to the American rule against fee shifting-"derives not from a
court's power to control litigants, but from its historic equity jurisdiction."276 In turn, consistent with the nature of equity, exercises of in-

herent power are generally discretionary with the court and subject to
277
abuse-of-discretion appellate review.
The other and arguably more prominent criterion for recognizing inherent powers is that of institutional necessity, described in one
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-59 (1982) (plurality opinion); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-93 (1880); supra note 246 (citing cases
discussing this separation of powers principle). Regarding the difficulty attending "[t]he
distinction between making law and applying or interpreting law," but also the necessity of

retaining the distinction, see Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity, and the Duty to Decide a Case
1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 573, 577 n.17.
273
See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702-03 (5th
Cir. 1990) (noting the difficulty of defining the limits on inherent powers), affd sub nom.
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
274 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); accordExparteBurr,22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824). In turn, the Court has held that the judiciary possesses inherent power "to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before
it," Chambers,501 U.S. at 43; to punish contempt of court, id at 44; "to conduct an independent investigation in order to determine whether it has been the victim of fraud," id; and
"to vacate its own judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court,"
id Chambersfurther noted that its prior cases had also recognized inherent power to "bar
from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial[,] ... [to] dismiss an action
on grounds of forum non conveniens ... [to] act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to
prosecute," id (citations omitted), and to shift or assess attorney's fees, see id at 45-46.
275
See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). See
generally Meador, supra note 242, at 1805-06 (discussing English origins of inherent
authority).
276
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45.
277 See id at 44-45, 55; Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 902
(5th Cir. 1993); Meador, supra note 242, at 1805.
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case as "[t] he ultimate touchstone of inherent powers." 278 According
to the Court:
It has long been understood that "[c]ertain implied powers
must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of
their institution," powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a
Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." ...
These powers are "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
279
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."
For example, the Court has recognized that "[t]here is inherent in
every court a power to supervise the conduct of its officers, and the
execution of its judgments and process," for "[w]ithout this power,
courts would be wholly impotent and useless."280 Likewise, it has
stated that "[c] ourts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the
contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties," 28 1 such as
the appointment of an auditor in aid of ajury trial "when deemed by
[the district court to be] essential."28 2 Not surprisingly, many histori28 3
cal equity powers also happen to satisfy the criterion of necessity.
But this satisfaction is not essential, and some courts in the equity area
have employed necessity in a modified and less rigorous manner, denoting "that such power is necessary only in the sense of being highly
284
useful in the pursuit of a just result."
In addition to those inherent powers justified purely by history or
necessity are certain specialized inherent powers-nonimplied federal
common law-making and supervisory powers-which have somewhat
278 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1412 (5th
Cir. 1993); accord Ray v. Eyster (In re Orthopedic "Bone Screw" Prods. Liab. Litig.), 132
F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997).
279
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31).
280 Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244, 257 (1844).

Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920).
Id.; see also id.at 313-14 (stating that "without the [auditor's] aid .... the trial
judge would be unable to perform his duty"). The Court has recognized other inherent
powers. See In reTutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 383 (3d Cir. 1997) (identifying as inherent powers the power to fine, to disqualify counsel, to preclude claims or
defenses, and to limit a litigant's future access to the court); Timothy G. Pepper, Case
281

282

Comment, Beyond Inherent Powers: A ConstitutionalBasisfor In re Tutu Wells Contamination

Litigation, 59 Omo ST. L.J. 1777, 1784-85 (1998). For a list of inherent powers recognized
by lower federal courts, see id. at 1785.
283
See, e.g., Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30 (dismissal for failure to prosecute); Gumbel v.
Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145-46 (1888) (technical legal standing); Ex parteRobinson, 86 U.S.
(19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873) (contempt power); Griffith v. Oles (In re Hipp, Inc.), 895 F.2d
1503, 1512 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1990) (offering historical origins of the contempt power);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 276-79 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (recall
mandate to prevent injustice).
284
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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tailored modes of justification. The first of these is the creation of
federal common law in the absence of discernible textual authorization, as distinguished from its counterpart under the doctrine of implied powers. 28 5 As the Court has explained, "[w]hen Congress has
not spoken to a particular issue .... and when there exists a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law,' the Court has found it necessary, in a 'few and restricted'
instances, to develop federal common law."28 6 Because of this nontextual basis, however, " [w] hen a federal court creates a federal common
law rule, it risks violating both of the two fundamental limits on the
judicial branch: federalism and the separation of powers." 287 Accordingly, such a rule can only be employed when "necessary to 'protect a
28 8
uniquely federal interest."'
285 For an effort to link federal common law-making to the vestiture of "judicial
Power" in Article III, which is the principal source of authority for inherent judicial powers
generally, see Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HAIuv. L. REv. 1512, 1515-16 (1969).
286
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981) (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
287 Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1996),
amended on denial of reh'g, No. 95-5120, 1998 WL 117980 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998).
288 I& at 1249 (quoting Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640
(1981)). As the Sixth Circuit has stated:
[T]he authority to create a federal common law rule without reference to a
statute or the Constitution exists only "insuch narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate or
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of the States or relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases."
Id.(quoting Smith v. Dearborn Fin. Servs., Inc., 982 F.2d 976, 981 (6th Cir. 1993)). The
"federal common law" designation has also been periodically employed to characterize
doctrines or practices of inherent power seemingly outside of these narrow areas. One
judge, for example, has described the inherent power to award punitive attorney's fees as
"federal common law" even though this sanction, which is otherwise well-recognized as a
form of inherent power, does not appear necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest.
See Reitz v. Dieter, 840 F. Supp. 353, 355 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The Seventh Circuit, moreover, has stated that "' [i]nherent authority' ... is just another name for the power of courts
to make common law when statutes and rules do not address a particular topic." See Soo
Line RR. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R, 840 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1988). Arguably,
however, this conceptualization is overbroad and not sufficiently sensitive to the limited
nature of federal judicial power. Finally, "a few commentators have persuasively argued
that several federal court doctrines limiting jurisdiction (such as abstention, independent
and adequate state grounds, and forum non conveniens) are independent of any specific
constitutional or statutory source, and are examples of a procedural or jurisdictional common law" that can be "defended on the ground that it fills a gap in the enacted law, a
function demanded by the institutional needs of the federal courts." Solimine, supra note
265, at 315; see also Robert M. Parker & LeslieJ. Hagin, Federal Courts at the Crossroads:Adapt
or Lose!, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 211, 238-44 (1994) (arguing that the federal courts must draw
on their own powers to preserve federalism and quality adjudication); Ryan, supra note
265, at 775 (describing a weak strand of inherent power that allows judges to adopt practices where existing statutes and rules are insufficient). The Supreme Court itself has certainly described abstention doctrines in a manner consistent with inherent power rooted in
historic notions of equity. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996).
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The other of these specialized inherent powers are the "supervisory powers." 2 9 Ordinarily associated with the Court's decision in McNabb v. United States,2 90 these powers authorize the creation of
corrective or prophylactic rules of criminal procedure or appellate
criminal review that are constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally or statutorily required. 29' Using these powers, the federal courts
may devise "reasonable" rules-that is, "rules [which] represent reasoned exercises of the courts' authority."29 2 Alternatively, the supervisory powers can refer more generally to the authority of the appellate
courts to delineate hierarchically the practices of the courts below
them, whether criminal or civil, 29 3 although the exercise of supervi2 94
sory powers in the civil context is less common.

289 Unfortunately, this term is sometimes used interchangeably with the term "inherent power." United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1994); supra note 265. The
term may even denote not an inherent power, but rather an express or implied power. See
7A FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDITION § 20:272 (1992 & Supp. 2000). At least one
scholar has argued that "[tihe supervisory power label has been used to describe the exercise of several different forms ofjudicial power," that "[u]se of the term supervisory power
has diverted attention from the nature, source, and limits of the authority being exercised
in each case," and that "the term supervisory power should be abandoned." Sara Sun
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on
the Authority of tie Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1520 (1984).
290 318 U.S. 332 (1943), supersededby statute as stated in United States v. Duncan, 857 F.
Supp. 852 (D. Utah 1994). On the association with McNabb, see Horn, 29 F.3d at 759;
United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985); Emily Wheeler, Note, The
ConstitutionalRight to a Trial Before a NeutralJudge: Federalism Tips the Balance Against State
Habeas Petitioners,51 BROOK. L. REv. 841, 878 (1985).
291
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000); Thomas v. Am, 474
U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985) ("This power rests on the firmest ground when used to establish
rules ofjudicial procedure."). For discussions of the sources and applications of the supervisory power, see Beale, supra note 289; John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations:
The ProperScope of the Supervisory Power of FederalJudges, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 423 (1997);Joseph D.
Grano, ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.
L. REv. 100 (1985); Alfred Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power,69 COLUM.L. REV.
181 (1969); Matthew E. Brady, Note, A Separationof PowersApproach to the Supervisory Powerof
the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REv. 427 (1982); L. Douglas Harris, Note, Supervisory Power in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 642 (1978);Joan Malmud, Comment,
Defending a Sentence: TheJudicialEstablishment of SentencingEntrapment and Sentencing Manipulation Defenses, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1359, 1383-85 (1997); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory
Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO.L.J. 1050 (1965); Note, The Supervisory Powerof the Federal
Courts, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1656 (1963); Wheeler, supra note 290, at 876-84.
292 Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 244 (1993). The federal appellate
courts, in turn, have invoked their supervisory powers "to remedy police misconduct and to
safeguard their own integrity by excluding illegally obtained evidence from trial," Wheeler,
supranote 290, at 879 n. 192, "to order new trials to correctjury selection procedures, .. . to
prohibit certain jury charges.., and to examine claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct," id.
at 879 (footnotes omitted). See also Thomas, 474 U.S. at 147 n.5 (citing other

uses).
293 See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464 (1969), superseded by rule on
other grounds as stated in United States v. Odedo, 154 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1998); Shaw v.
Gwatuey, 795 F.2d 1351, 1353 n.2 (8th Cir. 1986); Wheeler, supra note 290, at 876-77.
294 See Furlong v. Havee (In re Furlong), 885 F.2d 815, 818-19 (11th Cir. 1989); Gary
H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1440 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring in the
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In light of the foregoing synopsis, it should now be evident why
the categorization of a given power, as express, implied, or inherent,
is significant. Each category has its own rules of recognition and limitation, and, generally speaking, these rules can be seen as progressively more demanding for each category: textual conferral for
express powers, actual intent for implied powers, and proof of tradition or necessity for inherent powers. Based on this framework, the
threshold question at this juncture is whether the resequencing power
fits within either of the first two categories, or whether, as the evidence seems to suggest, it is ultimately an inherent power. This Article will explore three alternatives: that Ruhrgas simply recognized a
discretionary power expressly or impliedly permitted by Rule 83; that
Ruhrgasinvolved nothing more than a construction of Rule 12 (b); and
that the resequencing power is an implied power under Article III or
the jurisdictional statutes, perhaps as an instance of federal common
law.
One possibility is that the resequencing rule of Ruhrgas is simply
an application of, and therefore is expressly or impliedly permitted by,
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 83 provides not
only that "[e]ach district court... may, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment, make and amend rules
governing its practice," 295 but also that when there is no controlling
law, "[a] judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with
federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and local rules of the district."296 Initially, it bears mentioning that whether
the resequencing of threshold inquiries is even a "regulat[ion] [of]

result); Lauren Robel, FracturedProcedure: The CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STANh. L.
REv. 1447, 1478 (1994). Under this broader rubric, supervisory powers have been invoked
to vacate lower courtjudgments and remand for dismissal when mootness arises on appeal,
seeASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 621 n.1 (1989); "to ensure that [a district court's)
local rules are consistent with 'the principles of right and justice,'" Frazier v. Heebe, 482
U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) (White, J., concurring in the result)); to require that "each district court in this circuit entering a directed
verdict in a case before it set forth 'an explanation sufficient to permit this court to understand the legal premise for the court's order,'" Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d
289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 903 F.2d 253, 259 (3d Cir.
1990)); and to "direct that before commencing the actual trial of any civil case in which a
magistrate is to preside .... he shall inquire on the record of each party whether he has
filed consent to the magistrate's presiding and shall receive an affirmative answer from
each on the record before proceeding further," Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132, 1137
(5th Cir. 1987). See generally 7A FEDERAL PROCEDURE: LAWYERS EDITION, supra note 289,
§ 20:13 (discussing the supervisory power).
295
FED. K Civ. P. 83(a)(1).
296 FED. R. Crv. P. 83(b); see also FED. R. APP. P. 47(b) ("A court of appeals may regulate
practice in a particular case in any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and
local rules of the circuit.").
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practice" within the meaning of Rule 83 is debatable. 297 There is,
however, a more serious defect in the argument. To the extent that
the power to address personal jurisdiction or other threshold inquiries absent verified subject-matter jurisdiction is itself a form ofjurisdicdon-it is, after all, the power of a court effectively to dispose of the
suit and to preclude relitigation of decided issues-Rule 83 cannot
possibly authorize it. For Rule 82 states quite clearly that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83 included, "shall not be construed to
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."298
In short, neither the authority expressly delineated in Rule 83 nor any
form of authority that might be implied from Rule 83 can support the
299
power recognized in Ruhrgas.
Another possibility is that resequencing rests on a construction of
Rule 12(b), especially since Ruhrgas itself specifically deals with the
relationship between Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). Superficially, of
course, this characterization is difficult to support. The Court made
no pretense of construing Rule 12-an obvious contrast to a case such
as McCarthy v. United States,3 00 in which the Court explicitly stated that
"[t] his decision is based solely upon our construction of Rule 11 and
is made pursuant to our supervisory power over the lower federal
courts.

30° 1

In addition, there are no outward indicia of construc-

tion-no assessment of textual determinacy, no invocation of canons,
and no examination of advisory committee notes, for example-let
alone any actual consideration of interpretive issues, such as whether
there is significance to the Rule's order of enumerated motions (subject-matter jurisdiction in 12(b) (1), before personal jurisdiction in
12(b) (2), before venue in 12(b) (3), and so forth), 30 2 or whether Rule
12(h) (3) might indicate that a 12(b) (1) challenge, once made,
should be accorded priority.30 3 In fact, Ruhrgas does arguably involve
297
Cf Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork OrangeApproach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 473, 526-27 (1995)
(noting disagreement over the meaning of the phrase "rules governing its practice" under
the prior version of Rule 83).
298 FED. R. Crv. P. 82; see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370
(1978); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1959). But cf Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946) (indicating that Rule 82 refers only to subject-matter
jurisdiction).
299 Lower courts can also make rules pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2071, but this rulemaking
is formal and requires "giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment."
28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1994).
300 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
301 Id at 464.
302
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574 (1999) (No. 98-470) (chronicling an exchange between the Court and Clifton
Hutchinson, arguing for the respondent, over whether the numerical ordering of motions
under Rule 12(b) indicates an analytical hierarchy), available at 1999 WL 183813.
303
Cf Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[A~ny statutory tribunal
must ensure that it has jurisdiction over each case before adjudicating the merits, [and] a
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a construction of Rule 12(b) if confined to the precise issue of resequencing personal jurisdiction, and it is curious that the Court did
not conceptualize the issue in this manner. Nevertheless, such a conceptualization still would not answer the question of power, especially
in light of Rule 82. In addition, there is no indication that the Ruhrgas
analysis is limited to challenges under 12(b), let alone under only
12(b) (2). Other threshold inquiries may also qualify for resequencing, and not all such inquiries are decided by means of a 12(b) motion.30 4 Accordingly, it would be inappropriate, even if it were
otherwise legitimate or meaningful, to characterize Ruhrgas exclusively as a construction of Rule 12(b).
Putting the Federal Rules to one side, the final possibility is that
resequencing actually involves the exercise of implied power under
Article III or the jurisdictional statutes. This reading would presumably cure the Rule 82 problem, and it would potentially excuse the
Court's silence regarding the construction of Rule 12(b). However,
this possibility also seems difficult to defend in light of the earlier
overview of implied powers. After all, implied powers, though by definition not express, are still manifestly grounded in text, especially in
textual grants of power, and there is little if anything in Article III or
the jurisdictional statutes from which courts can readily derive the
power to resequence threshold inquiries. More fundamentally, the
potential jurisdictional defect may be raised by the court... sua sponte or by any party, at
any stage in the proceedings, and, once apparent, must be adjudicated" (last emphasis added)); Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Rule 12(h) (3) as indirect authority for the proposition that "when a suit is removed on the basis of diversity of
citizenship, the district court should verify the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at
the outset of the litigation if it appears that complete diversity is lacking"). Rule 12(h) (3)
provides that "[iw]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." FED. R
Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
304
See Gordon v. Nat'l Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Robinson, C.J., concurring) (observing that a 12(b) (1) motion is "by no means ...the
only method" of challenging subject-matterjurisdiction). Illustrative is 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
(1994). It authorizes a district court to:
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under [28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a)] if... (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction .... or (4) in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
Id. Although failure to satisfy the criteria of § 1367(a) should lead to a Rule 12(b) (1)
dismissal, discretionary declination ofjurisdiction-even before a determination of Article
III subject-matterjurisdiction--can apparently proceed directly under § 1367(c). SeeRuhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999). This must, in fact, be the case. As
long as the criteria of § 1367(a) are satisfied, a discretionary declination ofjurisdiction is
not a 12(b) (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Moreover, classifying a discretionary
declination ofjurisdiction under 12(b) (6) would be improper because it is not necessarily
related to the merits and, more importantly, would presumably but unjustifiably be
prejudicial.
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implication of powers is ordinarily based on the inferred intent of the
drafters, and there is no evidence, whether intratextually or extratextually, of any specific intent to confer a power of this sort.30 5 Needless
to say, characterizing the power to resequence as an interstitial rule of
federal common law would not alter this implied power calculus because federal common law of the implied power variety necessitates a
demonstration of congressional or authorial intent that is equally if
not more demanding than that required for any other form of im30 6
plied powers.
By elimination, then, the power to resequence threshold inquiries would appear to be an inherent power, neither expressly nor impliedly conferred by any constitutional provision, statute, or rule,
though necessarily implemented within the framework of Rule 12(b).
One need not resort to elimination to draw this conclusion, however,
for there are several attributes of this power, four of which will be
highlighted here, that arguably confirm its status as inherent. First, it
appears to be nontextual, and inherent powers are by definition
nontextual.3 0 7 Second, it is a judicially crafted, prospective rule of
procedure, which is a mode in which inherent powers are paradigmatically formulated. 30 8 Third, its exercise is discretionary with the trial
court and subject to abuse-of-discretion appellate review, again a traditional characteristic of inherent powers.30 9 Fourth and finally, it is
designed to operate in the absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction, and judicial actions undertaken in the absence of verified sub310
ject-matter jurisdiction, except when congressionally authorized,
tend to be classified as exercises of inherent or supervisory power nec31
essary for the basic functioning of the courts. '

305 This is particularly problematic given that Congress has elsewhere carefully conferred to the federal courts discretionary power over jurisdictional matters. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. §§ 1292(b), 1367(c), 2201(a) (1994). This includes, most famously, the Supreme
Court's own certiorari jurisdiction. See id.§§ 1254(1), 1257(a), 1258, 1259.
306 SeeJeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
541, 557-58 (1998).
307 See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
308 Cf Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 145 (1985) (concluding that the court of appeals
had indeed promulgated a procedural rule in exercise of its supervisory powers, because of
"[t]he nature of the rule and its prospective application."); Whitten, supra note 250, at 57
(noting that "[a]djudication is essentially retrospective, while rulemaking, like legislation,

is prospective").
309 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
310 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1994);
see also W.G. v. Senatore, 18 F.3d 60, 64 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1919,
1447(c) and FED. R. Crv. P. 11 as exceptions to the rule that a district court without jurisdiction has power only to dismiss the suit).
311
See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137-39 (1992) (power to impose Rule
11 sanctions); United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487
U.S. 72, 79 (1988) (power to issue orders necessary to determine jurisdiction); United
States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1950) (power to vacate a lower court
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Resequencing and InherentJudicialPower to Determine
Jurisdiction

In order to fully assess the legitimacy of the resequencing doctrine, it is further necessary to determine the specific subcategory of
inherent power in which the doctrine belongs, given that the criteria
of legitimate recognition differ even among the various forms of inherent power. The contention here is that resequencing, at least
when it implicates jurisdictional inquiries, is actually a facet of the in31 2
herent power of federal courts to determine their own jurisdiction.
Often called 'jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction," this power enables a tribunal to determine whether the elements of its own jurisdiction are sufficiently present to permit the lawful and authoritative
adjudication of the merits. 3 13 Within the world of Article III courts,
this protojurisdictional form of jurisdiction is ordinarily conceptualized as an inherent power, and rightly so given the absence of an empowering constitutional or statutory provision.3 1 4 And while much of
the case law and commentary on this doctrine tends to dwell on its
more technical dimensions, especially the binding and preclusive effects of its exercise, 31 5 the focus here is necessarily on its more rudimentary characteristics, such as the extent of its recognition by the
judgment where mootness arises on appeal); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("power to dismiss with prejudice (as a
sanction for misconduct) even a case over which [a court] lacks jurisdiction"); Terket v.
Lund, 623 F.2d 29, 33 (7th Cir. 1980) ("supervisory power[ ] ...to consider the propriety
of the procedure followed by the district court... in awarding attorneys' fees under [42
U.S.C.] § 1988"); see also infranote 321 (citing cases claiming inherent power to determine
jurisdiction).
312
Interestingly, this was the view of the petitioner in Ruhrgas, whose position otherwise prevailed. See Petitioner's Brief at 12-16, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.
574 (1999) (No. 98-470), available at 1999 WL 23658.
313
See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 274
(1926) ("Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist."). Consider the use of the word "essential" in Texas &
Pacific Railway in light of Ruhrgass conclusion that personal jurisdiction could be resequenced with subject-matter jurisdiction because "[p]ersonal jurisdiction, too, is 'an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district... court,' without which the court is 'powerless
to proceed to an adjudication.'" Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 (emphasis added) (omission in
original) (quoting Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)).
Reading Ruhrgas and Texas & Pacific Railway together, it is clear that the power to address
personal jurisdiction prior to subject-matter jurisdiction is simply a facet of a court's power
to determine its own jurisdiction.
314
Cf Dobbs, supra note 196, at 1010 (noting that the sovereign, through legislature
or constitution, confers on the courts jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction, but
"[n]either statutes nor constitutions actually speak in such terms").
315 SeeWGwrHr, supra note 237, § 16; 13A WRIGHr & MILL R, supranote 119, § 3536 (2d
ed. 1984 & Supp. 2001); Dobbs, supra note 196, at 1027; Dan B. Dobbs, The Validation of
Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle(pt. 2), 53 VA. L. REv. 1241, 1241-43 (1967); Richard
F. Watt, The Divine Right of Government byJudiciary, 14 U. CH. L. REv. 409, 436-48 (1947);
Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARV. L. Riv. 652, 654-60
(1940); John Michael Webb, Case Note, Durfee v. Duke, 18 Sw. LJ. 500, 502-07 (1964).
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federal courts, the basis of this recognition, and the scope of its
application.
a. Subject-MatterJuisdiction
Because the power of a court to determine its own jurisdiction
ordinarily refers to the power to determine subject-matterjurisdiction,
the overview will begin with that focus. A survey of the case law reveals
that the power specifically to determine subject-matter jurisdiction is
defined by several fundamental characteristics. First, it is a power that
is widely recognized by Article III courts. All or virtually all such
courts acknowledge its existence,3 16 variously characterizing it as "axiomatic," 3 17 as a "truism,"3 18 and as a "primordial element of our jurisprudence."3 19 Moreover, appellate courts recognize this power as
encompassing jurisdiction to determine not only their own subjectmatter jurisdiction, but also, within the context of a direct appeal, that
of the lower court. 320 Second, when courts describe in any meaning-

ful detail either the source or the nature of this jurisdiction, they most
often categorize it as an inherent power or as an inherent form of
3 21
jurisdiction.
Third, and in keeping with the logic of inherent power, the stated
rationale for the recognition of the power is virtually always that of
316
See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 n.3 (1970); Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S.
579, 582 (1958); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376
(1940); Des Moines Navigation & R.R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552, 559 (1887);
Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1997); Shannon v. Shannon,
965 F.2d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1992); Home Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Gillam, 952 F.2d 1152, 1157
(9th Cir. 1991); Gaines v. Nelson (In re Gaines), 932 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1991); Sierra
Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine
Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1988); Williams v. Sec'y of Navy, 787 F.2d 552, 557
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Lane v. United States, 727 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1984); Ilan-Gat Eng'rs,
Ltd. v. Antigua Int'l Bank, 659 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Roth v. McAllister Bros.,
Inc., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963).
317 Lopez v. Sullivan, 780 F. Supp. 496, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
318 Rosado, 397 U.S. at 403 n.3.
319 Shannon, 965 F.2d at 545. It is also recognized internationally. See Prosecutor v.
Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72,
16-20 (International Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (deciding appeal challenging the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 40 (1996), available at http:/
/vAw.un.org/icty/ind.e.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2001).
320 See, e.g., Ligurotis v. Whyte, 951 F.2d 818, 819 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992); Screven County v.
Brier Creek Hunting & Fishing Club, Inc., 202 F.2d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 1953). Should it
turn out that a district court erroneously rules in favor ofjurisdiction, the court of appeals,
exercising its inherent power to determine jurisdiction, is thus limited to correcting the
jurisdictional error. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986);
Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999).
321
See, e.g., Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 290; Haines v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 44 F.3d 998, 999
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Gaines,932 F.2d at 731; Lane, 727 F.2d at 21; Lykins v. DOJ, 725 F.2d 1455,
1461 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1984); McGowen v. Harris, 666 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1981).
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necessity.3 22 This necessity can be conceptualized in terms of either

the adjudicatory function of federal courts or the limited nature of
their power. The adjudicatory-function rationale turns on the judiciary's charge to adjudicate select cases and controversies and on the
understanding that, in order to fulfill this charge, it must have the
power to assess whether a particular dispute is, among other things, a
justiciable case or controversy involving proper subject matter.3 23 The
limited-power rationale, by comparison, focuses not on the power that
the federal courts may have, but rather on the power that they do not.
Viewed from this perspective, the power to determine subject-matter
jurisdiction, corresponding as it does with the obligation to make such
determinations, 324 is a necessary means of ensuring that federal courts
act within their limited and enumerated powers, as constitutionally

322 See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938); Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 290;
Greylock Glen Corp. v. Cmty. Sav. Bank, 656 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981). Correspondingly,
the power to determine subject-matterjurisdiction, like all inherent powers, is ultimately a
limited one. Thus, while "the district court has considerable discretion in devising the
procedure to inquire into the existence of jurisdiction," Gould, Inc. v. Dechiney Ugine
Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1988); accordBiase v. Kaplan, 852 F. Supp. 268, 277
(D.N.J. 1994), and relative latitude in deciding issues of jurisdictional fact, see Goul, 853
F.2d at 451; Hatteras of Lauderdale, Inc. v. Gemini Lady, 662 F. Supp. 1525, 1526-27 (S.D.
Fla. 1987), aff, 853 F.2d 848 (1lth Cir. 1988), it must use procedures that are "necessary
to evaluate its jurisdiction," Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990);
accord United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S.
72, 79 (1988). In addition, while "[elach court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction," it generally does not have jurisdiction to determine "the jurisdiction of others."
Chiron Corp. v. Advanced ChemTech, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 800, 801 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Many
of the exceptions to the rule of preclusiveness, moreover, are really just another way of
expressing limits on the original court's authority. Thus, a jurisdictional determination
may be nonpreclusive if the original court plainly usurped jurisdiction, see Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P. v. Peaslee, 88 F.3d 152, 155 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996); Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. United States, 135 F.2d 858, 861
(5th Cir. 1943); if there was no opportunity to litigate jurisdiction, see Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U.S. 343, 350 (1948); Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1052-53 (5th Cir.
1987); or if there is "an allegation of fraud in obtaining the judgment," Stoll 305 U.S. at
172.
323 The Supreme Court has frequently noted "the virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them," Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976), and early in its history proclaimed that it
has "no more right to decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution," Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). In turn, courts have recognized that they
have both an obligation and substantial power to ascertain so-called jurisdictional facts. See
LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1999); Gordon v. Nat'l Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Robinson, C.J., concurring); Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 253 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1958); Shaffer v. Coty, Inc.,
183 F. Supp. 662, 665 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
324 See, e.g., Sonoda v. Cabrera, 189 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999); Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985). Regarding the basis of this obligation, see CarlsbergResources Corp. v. CambriaSavings and Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254, 1256 (3d
Cir. 1977).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1

granted and statutorily affirmed.3 25 The assumption of this inherent
power thus effectively (if paradoxically) serves to limit courts to their
express powers, essentially by preventing the unauthorized adjudication of disputes and the unconstitutional issuance of advisory opinions. Without this inherent power, in other words, the constitutional
limitations on the federal courts would be at constant risk of
3 26
transgression.
Another characteristic of the power to determine subject-matter
jurisdiction is that it is multifaceted, embodying not only jurisdiction
to determine jurisdiction per se, but also a number of ancillary inquiries or powers related to the existence or nonexistence ofjurisdiction.
The Court has noted, for instance, that a court possesses "the inherent
and legitimate authority... to issue process and other binding orders,
including orders of discovery directed to nonparty witnesses, as necessary for the court to determine and rule upon its own jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction over the subject matter."32 7 Likewise, a court
"has the power to resolve any factual dispute regarding the existence
of subject matter jurisdiction" 3 28 and "may hold an evidentiary hear325 The existence and obligatory exercise of this power provide not only the means to
ensure that courts are acting within constitutional and statutory parameters, but also the
means to ensure that the statutory prescriptions are themselves within constitutional limits.
See Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalLimitations
on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17,
26-27 (1981).
326 See RobertJ. Faris, Comment, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee: Justi6ingEstablishment ofJurisdictionas a Discoveiy Sanction, 70 CAL. L. REv.
1446, 1456 (1982). As stated by Judge Keeton:
Inherent in the authoritative prescription of limited jurisdiction... is the
necessity that the court.., be empowered to turn away those litigants who
seek to use its processes for the adjudication of claims beyond its limited
jurisdiction. Absent such jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a particular claim, the purpose of limiting the scope of its judicial
activities would be frustrated. It would function in an anomalous aura of
uncertainty, either pronouncingjudgments almost certain to be overturned
by authoritative determinations in other courts that the matters purportedly determined were beyond its jurisdiction, or else declining to act...
until directed by another court to accept jurisdiction. Indeed, the underlying reasons for recognizing jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction are so
compelling that it is the duty of a court of limited jurisdiction to notice its
lack ofjurisdiction, even when no party raises the issue.
Armor Elevator Co. v. Phoenix Urban Corp., 493 F. Supp. 876, 881 (D. Mass. 1980) (footnote omitted), affd, 655 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1981).
327
United States Catholic Conference, 487 U.S. at 79; see also United States v. Shipp, 203
U.S. 563, 573 (1906) (authority to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the
subject of the position); Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 1421 (power to require agency to supplement administrative record and prepare statement of reasons for its action); Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1987) (power to "supervise
discovery, hold a trial, and order the payment of costs"); Ilan-Gat Eng'rs, Ltd. v. Antigua
Int'l Bank, 659 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (power to compel discovery).
328 Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 1988).
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ing ... necessary to evaluate its jurisdiction. 3 29 Indeed, "[i]n the
absence of statutory direction, the district court has considerable discretion 3 30 in this regard and "may consider affidavits, allow discovery,

hear oral testimony, order an evidentiary hearing, or even postpone
its determination if the question ofjurisdiction is intertwined with the
merits."3 3 1 Nor are these ancillary powers confined to the initial
stages of litigation, where disputes over subject-matter jurisdiction are
most likely to arise. Accordingly, a court "may, as an incident to its
jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction," assess costs and attorney's fees
against a defendant who erroneously admits diversity of citizenship
and only later, by correcting the error, effectuates a dismissal for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 33 2 Even the power of a court to raise
sua sponte a question about its subject-matter jurisdiction, not only
preliminarily but at any stage of the proceedings, has been character333
ized as part of the inherent power to determine jurisdiction.
b.

PersonalJurisdiction

The power to determine jurisdiction can also extend to the ascertainment of personal jurisdiction, which is obviously significant for a
discussion of Ruhrgas. Although the basic power recognized in Ruhr-

gas may be described generally as a facet of jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction, the power actually applied in Ruhrgas is best described as
a facet of jurisdiction to determine personal jurisdiction, and, even
more precisely, as the power to determine personal jurisdiction in the
absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction. As it turns out, the
power of courts to determine personal jurisdiction is neither as developed nor as expansive as their power to determine subject-matter jurisdiction. In particular, it would not be inaccurate to say that, at the
time of Ruhrgas's issuance, the power of a federal court to determine
Sierra Club, 911 F.2d at 1421.
Gould, 853 F.2d at 451.
Id.
Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1976).
333
See, e.g., Neal v. Brown, 980 F.2d 747, 749 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Kruckenberg, 720 F.2d 653, 654 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). "Even after
a case becomes moot,... courts of appeals always have jurisdiction to determine mootness
and recall their mandates." IAL Aircraft Holding, Inc. v. FAA, 216 F.3d 1304, 1306 n.2
(11 th Cir. 2000). There is also support for the notion that a court's allowance of a party to
amend its jurisdictional pleadings, even to change its theory of subj ect-matter jurisdiction,
is an inherent power. See, e.g., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp.,
477 F. Supp. 615, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). However, to the extent that this authority is recognized in 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1994) ("Defective allegations ofjurisdiction may be amended,
upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.") and FED. R. Cirv. P. 15(a) (authorizing the
amendment of pleadings, by right if timely and by leave of court if untimely), its possible
status as an inherent power is somewhat diminished. Then again, the Supreme Court has
held that § 1653 "addresses only incorrect statements about jurisdiction that actually exists,
and not defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves." Newman-Green, Inc. v. AlfonzoLarrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830-31 (1989).
329
330
331
332
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personal jurisdiction in the absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction was not well-established at all, especially in relation to other facets
of the power to determinejurisdiction. 334 In fact, despite the unanimity and brevity of the Court's decision in Ruhrgas, the lower courts
predictably manifested hesitation about the notion of resequencing
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit, in
Ruhrgas itself, divided nine-to-seven prior to being reversed by the Supreme Court.
What the case law does reveal is that federal courts recognized, in
general,their own power to determine personal jurisdiction, often coupled with the power to determine subject-matter jurisdiction. 3 5 One
court even described its availability as "well settled."3 3 6 The case law
also reveals that courts periodically employed the language of necessity to describe orjustify this power although, again, often coupling it
with the power to determine subject-matterjurisdiction. 3 37 Moreover,
as with the power to determine subject-matter jurisdiction, it was also
established that the power to determine personal jurisdiction includes
the attendant authority to maintain the status quo during the pendency of the jurisdictional determination, 338 to order necessary dis-

334 By contrast, it was well-established that a determination of personal jurisdiction,
like subject-matter jurisdiction, can be preclusive even if erroneous. See Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 172 (1938); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1057-59
(9th Cir. 1991). This doctrine is sometimes referred to as jurisdictional bootstrapping. See
Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 1986); supra note 315.
335 See, e.g., Stoll, 305 U.S. at 171; Cargill Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d
1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1993); Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Ancora Transp., N.V., 941 F.2d
1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 1043 (1993); City of Long
Beach v. Exxon Corp. (In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 830 F.2d 198, 202 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987); Waffenschmidt v. MacKay,
763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1985); At. Las Olas, Inc. v.Joyner, 466 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.
1972); LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 979 F. Supp. 142, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aftd, 198 F.3d 353 (2d
Cir. 1999); Lyng Motors & Serv., Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 356, 358 (N.D.N.Y.
1996); Rose v. Granite City Police Dep't, 813 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, No. R-85-3133, 1986 WL 5354 (D. Md. Jan. 10,
1986); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd. (In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.), 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1151 (N.D. I1. 1979).
336
Waffenschmidt, 763 F.2d at 716.
337
See, e.g., Stoll, 305 U.S. at 171; Petroleum Prods., 830 F.2d at 202.
338
See, e.g., Star Creations Inv. Co. v. Alan Amron Dev., Inc., No. CIV. A. 95-4328, 1995
WL 495126, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1995), affid sub nom. Larami Corp. v. Amron, No. 951317, 1996 WL 192966 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1996).
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covery of jurisdictional facts,33 9 and to sanction those who defy this
3 40
jurisdictional discovery process.
That federal courts have the power to determine personal jurisdiction, and that at some level they must have this power, is not, therefore, in dispute. When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction
and the challenge cannot be avoided or deferred, the court, in order
to ensure compliance with the Constitution, the Federal Rules, and by
incorporation the state territorial jurisdiction statutes, must have the
power and procedural resources to resolve the challenge. Moreover,
as Professor Dobbs has observed, even the defendant implicitly recognizes this power:
[W] hen a defendant appears.., and moves to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction of his person, he is surely conceding the court's jurisdiction to determine the issue he has raised. He is not conceding that
there is complete jurisdiction over his person if he makes a special
appearance; but he is conceding that there is jurisdiction to determine the issue ofjurisdiction over his person by his request that the
3 41
court act on that issue.
4. Is Resequencing a Legitimate Extension of InherentJudicial
Power?
In light of the foregoing three analyses, it is now possible to undertake a more refined and conclusive assessment of whether resequencing conforms to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This
assessment can be reduced to the following question: Is the power to
resequence threshold inquiries, in the absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction, justifiable either within the specific jurisprudence of
the inherent power to determine jurisdiction or within the more general jurisprudence of inherent judicial power? This, of course, is a
question that the Court in Ruhrgas should have explicitly addressed
(as the petitioner did at the outset), for, as Professor Dobbs has also
noted, "[a] court does not have power to determine its own jurisdiction merely because the Supreme Court wishes it to be so; it has that
power only if the legislature or constitution 'wishes' it to be so."342
339 See, e.g., Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 773
n.4 (10th Cir. 1997); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24
(9th Cir. 1977); Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F. Supp. 298, 306 (D. Mass. 1995), affd, 135
F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 1998); Beckman Instruments, 1986 WL 5354; UraniumAntitrust Litig., 480 F.
Supp. at 1151.
340
See generally Note, Sanctions to EnforceJurisdictionalDiscovery: Constitutional and Prudential Limitations,68 VA. L. Rxv. 921, 926-33 (1982) (describing circuit court approaches
to sanctioning in this situation).
341
Dobbs, supranote 196, at 1007.
342
Dobbs, supranote 315, at 1247.
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In terms of the power specifically to determine jurisdiction, the
assessment must ultimately be a negative one. As for nonjurisdictional
threshold inquiries, this power is obviously of no relevance at all.
Rather than assisting courts in determining their own jurisdiction, the
resolution of these inquiries, particularly in lieu ofjurisdictional questions, would effectively preclude courts from making such determinations altogether. As for personal jurisdiction, the answer is slightly less
clear, but the cases are not favorable. The case law reveals that courts
do possess, in general, an inherent power to determine personal jurisdiction.343 The case law does not reveal, however, any meaningful understanding of this power as a freestanding inherent power
deployable in the total absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction.
In fact, virtually all of the decisions containing language that could be
construed to support such an understanding ultimately fall short of
the mark.
In several of these decisions, personal jurisdiction was not actually
in dispute, thus rendering any references to the power to determine
personal jurisdiction dicta. 344 In others in which personal jurisdiction
was in dispute, subject-matter jurisdiction was not, thus making it unlikely that these courts were implying anything about the power to
determine personal jurisdiction in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, and likewise rendering such statements dicta insofar as that
may have been their intent. 345 Furthermore, and not unrelatedly,
those few cases that appear to state a holding genuinely comparable to
Ruhrgas do so without meaningful precedential support. The authority that they cite either relates only to the power to determine subjectmatter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction, 34 6 or relates only to the
power to determine personal jurisdiction where subject-matter juris-

See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v.
Ancora Transp., N.V., 941 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1991); City of Long Beach v. Exxon
Corp. (In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 830
F.2d 198, 202 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987); Ad. Las Olas, Inc. v.Joyner, 466 F.2d 496, 498
(5th Cir. 1972); LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 979 F. Supp. 142, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 198
F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1999); Lyng Motors & Serv., Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 356, 358
(N.D.N.Y. 1996).
345 See, e.g., Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 773
(10th Cir. 1997); Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1995); Familia de
Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134,1137 (5th Cir. 1980); Rippergerv. A.C. Allyn
& Co., 113 F.2d 332, 333 (2d Cir. 1940); Noonan v. Winston Co., 902 F. Supp. 298, 306 (D.
Mass. 1995); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, No. R-85-3133, 1986 WL
5354 (D. Md.Jan. 10, 1986); In reUranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (N.D.
Ill. 1979); Bruce v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 914, 916 (W.D. Okla. 1974).
346
See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th
Cir. 1977).
343

344
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diction was not at issue 34 7 or was otherwise verified. 3 48 What is not
evident from the case law, in other words, is any kind of substantial or
unbroken pattern of precedent supporting the notion that a court
possesses the inherent power to determine personal jurisdiction in the
absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction, which further explains
why so many courts, prior to Ruhrgas and in reliance on Leroy, were
under the impression that subject-matter jurisdiction must be deter349
mined first.

What this means is that resequencing, if it is to be justified at all,
must independently satisfy one of the criteria for recognizing inherent powers, namely, historical possession or demonstrable necessity.35 0 In gauging whether resequencing actually satisfies either
criterion, the primary emphasis is the resequencing of personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction, if only because that combination presumably presents the strongest case for resequencing. The question of historical possession, or possession within the tradition of equity, appears
at best to yield an indeterminate answer. Federal case law itself offers

little or no affirmative support for the specific proposition that the
power to resequence personal jurisdiction before subject-matter jurisdiction, or to resequence threshold inquiries at all, is a time-honored
component of the judiciary's equitable powers. 35 ' Indeed, one supposes that such a line of cases, if it existed, would have figured promiSee, e.g., Rose v. Granite City Police Dep't, 813 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
See, e.g., Scherman v. Kan. City Aviation Ctr., Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-2211-GTV, 1993
WL 191369 (D. Kan. May 14, 1993).
347
348

349
Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939), which stated that when "there is no statutory
direction for procedure upon an issue ofjurisdiction, the mode of its determination is left
to the trial court," is not to the contrary. Id. at 71-72; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap:Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-MatterJurisdictionBefore FinalJudgment, 51 MINN. L. Rrv.
491, 520 (1967) ("[Slince the Constitution did not prescribe any particular method by
which jurisdictional issues would be determined, the drafters no doubt intended that
courts would pass on the issues of jurisdiction and ... would do so by ordinary procedures."). Far from having anything to do with the sequencing ofjurisdictional issues, let
alone countenancing the determination of personal before subject-matter jurisdiction,
Gibbs addresses nothing more than the mode of evidentiary proof ofjurisdictional facts for
any given contestedjurisdictional issue. Accordingly, even when lower courts have invoked
the Gibbs rule in the personal jurisdiction context, their invocations have concerned only
the means of determining personal jurisdiction in and of itself, without regard to subjectmatter jurisdiction and, more importantly, when subject-matter jurisdiction was not simultaneously in dispute. See, e.g., Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212,
1213-14 (6th Cir. 1989); Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284-85
(9th Cir. 1977); Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d 143, 149 (10th Cir. 1965); Chandler v. Roy,
985 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (D. Ariz. 1997), affd, No. 98-15139, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29785
(9th Cir. Nov. 19, 1998); Peabody Holding Co. v. Costain Group PLC, 808 F. Supp. 1425,
1431 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
350 See supra notes 274-84 and accompanying text.
351 This includes not only decisions under FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b), which permits the
assertion and consideration of multiple threshold motions within a system premised on the
merger of law and equity, see FED. R- Cm. P. 1-2, but also decisions under former Equity
Rule 29, which similarly permitted the assertion and consideration of multiple threshold
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nently in the Ruhrgas petitioner's brief or in the Court's opinion.
Alternatively, to attempt to analyze the issue at any broader level of
historical generality seems simply to underscore the indeterminacy of
its resolution. This is so for several reasons. For one thing, the historical record concerning the original understanding of federal judicial
power is itself rather complicated and, in turn, proportionately contested. 35 2 For another thing, the nature of jurisdiction and jurisdictional pleading as conceptualized and formulated today often differs
substantially from that of earlier Anglo-American jurisprudence, and
it is difficult to draw precise or meaningful comparisons between earlier and later practices. Finally, the modern codification of comprehensive rules of practice or procedure has, as a practical matter,
marginalized the federal judiciary's inherent powers and thereby obscured their potential scope and function, in some instances making it
difficult to assemble a convincing genealogy of historical or equitable
353
possession.
Because history offers no obvious support, the focus perforce
shifts to institutional necessity. Three considerations give structure to
this undertaking. First, the criterion of necessity is not, and ought not
to be, easily satisfied. Indeed, it would not be excessive to require that
any particular extratextual judicial power be presumed not to exist
and that a court seeking to recognize and exercise it must persuasively
explain why it should.A5 4 Far from a prohibition on inherent powers,
motions for suits in equity. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. McKee, 81 F.2d 508, 509-10
(4th Cir. 1936).
352
Compare William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in DeterminingIncidentalPowers
of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, 40 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102, 116-20 (embracing a relatively

restrictive view of inherent or incidental federal judicial power absent congressional authorization), with Grano, supra note 291, at 137-47 (challenging Van Alstyne's position and
embracing a less restrictive view of inherent federal judicial power, at least in regard to
supervisory rulemaking authority); and compare Ryan, supra note 265 (finding a broad role
for congressional regulation ofjudicial practice and procedure), with Engdahl, supra note
247 (finding a narrow role for congressional regulation of judicial practice and
procedure).
353

See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Metademocratic Interpretation and Separation of Powers, 2

N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'x 1, 28 n.113 (1998-99).
354
See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1010-15 (9th Cir. 2000). As the
Seventh Circuit has remarked, "'[i ] n h erent authority' is not a substitute for good reason,"
and "[a] court needs a good reason to create a new rule... and given the rule, there must
be a good reason for the exercise of the power in a particular case." Soo Line RR. v.
Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R., 840 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1988); cf Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 64 (1991) (KennedyJ., dissenting) ("Inherent powers are the exception,
not the rule, and their assertion requires special justification in each case."). Properly
understood, this principle does not conflict with G. HeilemanBrewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,

871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), in which the Seventh Circuit also stated:
Because the rules form and shape certain aspects of a court's inherent powers, yet allow the continued exercise of that power where discretion should
be available, the mere absence of language in the federal rules specifically
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such a requirement merely acknowledges that inherent powers, particularly nonequitable powers, are essentially a means of last resort that
courts cannot recognize or invoke without some affirmative and persuasive justification, if only the observation that the governing positive
law is inadequate. 355 In large part this principle flows naturally from
the concept of necessity itself.35 6 As the Fifth Circuit has stated, "inherent authority 'is not a broad reservoir of power, ready at an imperial hand, but a limited source; an implied power squeezed from the
need to make the court function.' In short, the inherent power
springs from the well of necessity, and sparingly so."3 57 This require-

ment also reflects the limited and electorally unaccountable nature of
federal judicial power3 5 8 and correlates at a structural level with the
normal case-by-case "presumption against subject matter jurisdiction
authorizing or describing a particular judicial procedure should not, and
does not, give rise to a negative implication of prohibition.
Id at 651-52 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); FED. R. Crv. P. 83).
Whether there is an inherent power at all, and whether an already-recognized inherent
power is affected by positive law (either its absence or presence), are different inquiries.
Furthermore, it would be improper to construe the Seventh Circuit as stating a broader
rule, e.g., that in the absence of prohibitory language courts have inherent power to devise
any procedure they find useful, as opposed to necessary or historically possessed, because
the authorities that the court invokes do not support such a rule. Link merely recognizes
that the absence of a governing rule does not foreclose the recognition of an interstitial
role for inherent power, especially where, as in that case, there was no indication that the
relevant positive law (Rule 41 (b)) was designed to abrogate inherent power, see Link, 370
U.S. at 630-32, and the inherent power in question was both "necessary" and "of ancient
origin," id at 629-30. And Rule 83, subsequently amended, appears to be an express delineation of district court authority to regulate procedure. See supranote 254 and accompanying text. This broader reading of G. Heileman Brewingwould, in fact, appear to render
the relevant portion of Rule 83 superfluous.
355 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (discussing
"the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise power only 'in the last resort, and as a
necessity'" (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892))).
In regard to the supervisory power, in particular, federal appellate courts have cautioned
that it "should not be invoked lightly," Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295
(3d Cir. 1991), and that they should "exercise this power sparingly,... depending on the
specific circumstances at hand," Furlong v. Havee (Inre Furlong), 885 F.2d 815, 819 (11th
Cir. 1989).
356 Recall the Court's own reasoning that inherent powers are those "powers 'which
cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others.'" Chambers,501 U.S. at 43 (quoting United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). This restrictive definition of "necessary" for purposes of inherent
judicial power, effectively equating it with "[in]dispens[able]," contrasts sharply with the
Court's expansive definition of "necessary" for purposes of Congress's power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, where it means "appropriate,"
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415, 421 (1819), and specifically does not
mean "indispensable," see id- at 413, 418-19.
357 Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1406-07
(5th Cir. 1993) (quoting NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696,
702 (5th Cir. 1990)).
358 See Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986);
Ryan, supra note 265, at 781-82; Pepper, supra note 282, at 1784.
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that must be rebutted by the party bringing an action to federal
court."35 9 Just as Congress cannot expand its own power, 60 a federal
court "does not have the power, by judicial fiat, to extend its jurisdiction over matters beyond the scope of the authority granted to it by its
creators." 36 1 Rather, "[f1ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" that "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and
statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree" 3 62 and must
3 63
be "carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation.
Second, the criterion of necessity governs not only the recognition of inherent powers, but also their doctrinal formulation and implementation. Indeed, "[t] o the extent that inherent power is seen as
a product of necessity, it contains its own limits. '364 At the stage of
formulation, adherence to the principle of necessity is particularly important. As the Court has acknowledged, "[t]he extent of these powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching
when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation
or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority." 365 In addition, federal courts, especially in jurisdictional matters,3 66 should "never formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
3 67
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied,"
and the inherent power to determine jurisdictional questions is at
some level almost certainly a rule of constitutional law, presumably an
interpretation of the 'judicial Power" enumerated in Article 111.368 At
the same time, to the extent that "statutes conferring jurisdiction on
federal courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against
federal jurisdiction," 369 one would think that judicial assumptions of
359

360
361
362

Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938).
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations

omitted).
363 Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 (1951); see also In re Pickett, 842 F.2d
993, 995 (8th Cir. 1988) ("[Courts] may not create jurisdiction where it does not exist.");
Williams v. Conseco, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313 (S.D. Ala. 1999) ("The contours of
[Article III] jurisdiction must not, and may not, be expanded by judicial usurpation.").
364 NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702 (5th Cir.
1990), affd sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
365 Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).

See United States v. Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983).
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885);
see also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 690 n.Il (1997) (affirming the rule); Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (describing this as one "of the cardinal
rules governing the federal courts"); Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,
461 (1945) (citing Liverpool).
368
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.
369
F & S Constr. Co. v.Jensen, 337 F.2d 160, 161 (10th Cir. 1964).
366

367
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inherent power ought to be equally, if not more, confined. 370 Necessity also governs the stage of implementation. Even after an inherent
power has been carefully delimited, "[a] court must ...exercise caution in invoking [it],"371 "must ...exercise [ ] [it] with restraint and
discretion," 37 2 "and then only to the extent necessary. '373 As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, "[r] ecognition and applicationof such power is
'grounded first and foremost upon necessity.' Thus, a federal court
may only invoke its inherent power when necessary to protect its ability
to function." 374 More generally, rigor of application reflects the fact
that inherent powers are extratextua 375 and, at least in the first in'37 6
stance, are "not regulated by Congress or the people.
370
As Professor Pushaw notes, "the scope of implicit powers must be narrow, or else
the whole idea of a written Constitution that specifies and limits governmental authority
would be destroyed." RobertJ. Pushaw,Jr., Why the Supreme CourtNever Gets Any "DearJohn"
Letters: Advisory Opinions in HistoricalPerspective, 87 GEo. L.J. 473, 483 n.53 (1998) (book
review).
371
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991).
372
Id.at 44; accord Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996); Ex parteBurr,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824); Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d
1041, 1059 (7th Cir. 1998).
373 United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993); see alsoUnited
States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 760 (Ist Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that "it is inappropriate for
courts to attempt to use the supervisory power... when, short of such heroic measures, the
means are at hand to construct a satisfactory anodyne more narrowly tailored to the objective"). Several courts of appeals, for example, have held that they possess the inherent
power to recall their mandates apart from the temporal or procedural framework established by rule, but that this power is "reserved for special circumstances and 'sparingly
exercised.'" Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (Ist Cir. 1973) (citing
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1971)); see also
Patterson v. Crabb, 904 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing cases applying the supervisory power in "exceptional circumstances"). Congruent with this reasoning, "[w]hile
power to act on its mandate after the term expires survives to protect the integrity of the
court's own processes, it has not been held to survive for the convenience of litigants."
Briggs v. Pa. R.R., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948) (citation omitted).
374
In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1406 (11th Cir. 1991) (first emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701 (1988)).
Needless to say, adherence to this principle is especially important in terms of the inherent
power to impose sanctions, given that such power can be "very poten[t]," Chambers, 501
U.S. at 44, and is typically punitive in nature, see id. at 50; Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 242
(5th Cir. 1998) (GarzaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); ShafferEquip., 11 F.3d
at 462. In the sanctions context, for example, "[t]he threshold for the use of the inherent
power... is high. Such powers may be exercised only if essential to preserve the authority
of the court and the sanction chosen must employ 'the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed."'" Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d
464, 467 (5th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S.
265, 280 (1990) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231 (1821))); see also
Corley, 142 F.3d at 1058-59 (stating that when possible, courts should rely on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than on the inherent power, when sanctioning attorneys).
375 See In re Kliegl Bros. Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., 238 B.R. 531, 554 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1999).
376 ShafferEquip., 11 F.3d at 461; accord In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d
368, 383 (3d Cir. 1997). Of course under no circumstances can inherent power be exer-
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Third and finally, it is important, when gauging necessity, to define the power in question at the proper level of specificity. No one
disputes that the federal courts, as a matter of necessity, possess the
inherent power to determine personal jurisdiction in a broad sense.
The question here is whether they need to possess the power to determine personal jurisdiction, or any other threshold inquiry, in the absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction. Defined at this level of
37 7
specificity, the answer appears to be that they do not.

There is little doubt that allowing district courts to resequence
threshold inquiries such as personal jurisdiction prior to subject-matter jurisdiction, and to avoid difficult subject-matter jurisdictional
questions, may in some instances promote efficiency. Indeed, judicial
economy is one of the explicit discretionary factors that a district
court should consider in its resequencing analysis. But institutional
efficiency is not the same thing as institutional necessity, and there
clearly is no basis for arguing that a resequencing power-to borrow
from the inherent power cases-"cannot be dispensed with . . .be-

cause [it is] necessary to the exercise of all others"; 378 or that "its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the
courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice"; 379 or
that it will "protect the[ ] [federal courts'] proceedings and judg38 0
ments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities"
or "protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability
38 1
to carry out Article III functions."
In fact, the federal judiciary will most certainly not be impairedas it most certainly was not before Ruhrgas-if its district courts are
required to address subject-matter jurisdiction prior to other threshold inquiries, including personal jurisdiction. The rule could even be
a narrow one, requiring only that lower courts address the core Article
III requirements first, leaving to their discretion the potential resequencing of otherjurisdictional issues. This narrow rule would arguacised in violation of the Bill of Rights or comparable constitutional guarantees. See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50; Meador, supra note 242, at 1816.
377 In this regard, consider the phrasing of the power to determine personal jurisdiction in City of Long Beach v. Exxon Corp. (In re CoordinatedPretrialProceedings in Petroleum
ProductsAntitrust Litigation),830 F.2d 198 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1987): "[A] court created
under Article III of the United States Constitution always has the necessary jurisdiction to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of a case or
controversy." Id. at 202. This language suggests that not all power to determine personal
jurisdiction is necessary, and that courts do not always have that which is not.
378 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1813).
379 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
380
Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996).
381
Martin-Trigona v. Lavien (In re Martin-Trigona), 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir.
1984).
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bly be more consistent with the Ruhrgas Court's own reasoning that
courts may at the outset address personal jurisdiction because subjectmatter jurisdiction does not always directly involve a constitutional
(Article III) question. Furthermore, such a formulation would presumably have permitted the Court to reach the same outcome in Ruhrgas without "formulat[ing] a rule of constitutional law broader than is
38 2
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
It is true, of course, that within some precincts of inherent judicial power, the standard for recognition is less than strict necessity.
Informal rules of practice or procedure in the criminal justice context, for example, devised pursuant to supervisory powers, need only
be "reasonable,"3 8 3 while informal rules of practice and procedure in
the civil context based on the judiciary's traditional equitable powers
need only be "useful."3 8 4 However, the resequencing authority announced in Ruhrgasfits within neither of these subclassifications. It is
also true that the supervisory power has periodically been exercised in
the civil context, and when so exercised has sometimes rested in part
on the "efficient allocation of judicial resources. 3 8 5 But the "objective behind... [the] use" of supervisory powers is the "fashioning [of]
procedures and remedies that ensure that the judicial process remains
a fair one," 38 6 and there is no indication that procedural fairness, or
the preservation of "the institutional integrity of the federal judicial
system," 38 7 is either the underlying objective or the likely consequence
of the resequencing rule.
This is not to deny categorically a role for judicial efficiency or
other pragmatic concerns in determining the precise contours of federaljudicial power. Such considerations do from time to time explicitly inform the construction of jurisdictional grants or the
interpretation of jurisdictional doctrines,3 88 and may even reinforce
prior determinations of inherent power that have already been
382

Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).

See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
See supra note 284 and accompanying text
385
Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Thomas
v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985) (noting that an appellate filing-of-objections rule was
.supported by sound considerations of judicial economy").
386 Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1146 (11th Cir. 1985).
387 Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1440 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson,J., concurring in the result).
388 See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04 (1992); Corlew v. Denny's
Rest., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 878, 879 (E.D. Mo. 1997); ERWIN CHEMEINSKY, FEDERALJuRusDICTION § 2.1, at 45 (3d ed. 1999). But see Salei v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 913 F. Supp. 993,
1009 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (noting that "[s]uch salutary effects asjudicial economy or convenience cannot save a statutory provision that defies the jurisdictional limits set forth in
Article III, § 2" and that "courts are not free to ignore the restraints imposed upon them by
the Constitution simply because a statute serves judicial efficiency").
383

384
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More generally, the Court has counseled that "practical at-

tention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III."390 At issue here,
however, is no ordinary exercise of federal judicial power, but rather
of inherent judicial power, and the fact remains that "[a] federal
court... may not take action under the guise of its inherent power
391
when that action . . . unnecessarily enlarges the court's authority.

Within the limited and somewhat anomalous realm of inherent
power, and especially when contemplating a power to be exercised in
the absence of verified subject-matter jurisdiction, 39 2 an expectation
of efficiency cannot compensate for a lack of actual necessity, lest this
realm would be dispossessed of any meaningful limits. 3 93 And a fed-

eral power-whether judicial, legislative, or executive-that lacks an
identifiable and enforceable line of demarcation is by definition a
394
power inconsistent with the Constitution.
389 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d
Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
390 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985).
391 In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1406 n.17 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
392 See, e.g., Chemiakin v. Yefimov, 932 F.2d 124, 126-28 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding
Rule 11 sanctions despite a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, but only after thoroughly
addressing the issue).
393 As one author has observed, "an appeal in general terms to such interests as cost
and time savings to the proponent, and especially to concerns for judicial economy and
avoidance of inconsistent results, . . . can be made in virtually any case." Note, Collateral
Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1485, 1501 (1974).
394 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564-68 (1995). As ChiefJustice Marshall asked: "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
Not only does the power to resequence threshold inquiries appear unjustified by the
jurisprudence of inherent powers, but its articulation by the Court (or by any federal court,
for that matter) may run afoul of the congressionally established scheme for the promulgation of procedural rules for the judicial branch. After all, the powers of the lower federal
courts are presumptively a matter of congressional authority in the first instance, see Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656
(1835), insofar as "Congress has the power to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal
courts, and has from the earliest days exercised that power," Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343, 353 n. 11 (1959). Even as to inherent powers, the general rule is that legislative
authority is paramount and the separation of powers imposes limits, not on Congress, but
on the courts. See United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985); Eash v.
Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). The possible exception concerns those powers genuinely necessary to the adjudicative task, in which case the
separation of powers might very well limit Congress. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel
Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); Eash, 757 F.2d at
562-63; Martin-Trigona v. Lavien (In re Martin-Trigona), 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir.
1984). Apart from these core inherent powers, however, there appears to be little dispute
that Congress, relative to the judiciary, possesses anterior and superior authority to dictate
federal judicial procedure or, alternatively, to dictate the framework in which the judiciary
by delegation may establish its own procedure. See Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1046; Robel, supra
note 294, at 1480; LindaJ. Rusch, Separationof Powers Analysis as a MethodforDeterminingthe
Validiy of FederalDistrict Courts' Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules
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The final measure of doctrinal legitimacy is the extent of adherence to various norms of methodology that govern the judicial formulation of doctrine. Rooted in the rule of law and mutually reinforcing,
such norms include overall intelligibility, internal coherence, and predictability of application and scope.3 95 Doctrines formulated in adherence to these norms generally foster the values of certainty and
stability,3 9 6 thereby facilitating and justifying legal compliance3 97 while
MandatingAlternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 488-89 (1991); Ryan, supra

note 265, at 765-67.
This congressional superiority is not merely a constitutional abstraction, but rather
yields a number of definite, albeit qualified, constraints on the judiciary's exercise of its
non-core inherent powers. It is widely accepted, for example, that "[i]n many instances
the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule."
Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996); accord Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 437 (2000); Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 434 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). In particular, "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be
limited by statute and rule, for '[t]hese courts were created by act of Congress.'" Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (quoting ExparteRobinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505, 511 (1874)). Similarly, it is well-established that the courts cannot exercise their inherent powers in a manner that directly conflicts with a federal statute or rule, let alone a
constitutional provision, or that indirectly conflicts with a statute or rule when Congress
has otherwise manifested its intent to displace the exercise of inherent power. See Carlisle,
517 U.S. at 425-26; Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 2 F.3d 1397, 1407-08 (5th Cir. 1993); Novak, 932 F.2d at
1406 n.17; G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989)
(en banc); Michael Stokes Paulsen, AbrogatingStare Decisisby Statute: May CongressRemove the
PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE LJ. 1535, 1565 n.90 (2000).
Of particular relevance is the simple fact that Congress has delegated to the Court
"the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure.., for cases in the United
States district courts," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1994), but that this delegation is expressly accompanied by a detailed and obligatory mode of promulgation, see id. §§ 2073-2074. To
the extent that the resequencing rule is more than just a recognition of a necessary or
longstanding discretionary prerogative and instead is effectively a modification of practice
or procedure under Rule 12(b), if not an expansion ofjurisdictional authority, its articulation should arguably have been by formal promulgation within this congressionally established framework, not by unaccountable judicial declaration in the context of adjudication.
395 See Quinn, supra note 107, at 689; Robert S. Summers, The Principlesof the Rule of
Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1691, 1693 (1999); William C. Whitford, The Rule of Law, 2000
Wis. L. REV. 723, 725-26. Such norms may have particular force with regard to the delineation of jurisdictional doctrines. See Long v. Sasser, 91 F.3d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 1996).
396 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175,
1179 (1989). It is generally accepted that a doctrine's proper scope should be discerned
not only by examining the formulation itself and the holding of the decision that announced it, but also by the reasoning behind that formulation and holding. See County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1969); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 758-59,
764-65 (1988). In turn, doctrinal formulations that are ambiguous and that lack meaningful reasoning cannot very well serve the values of certainty and stability.
397 See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970); Bldg. Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 734 (1st Cir. 1980); Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of te Government to Ma/ke the Law Known, 51 FoRDHANit L. REv. 255, 262-65
(1982). When clarity and coherence are so lacking that persons cannot reasonably assess

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:1

reducing the likelihood of arbitrary governmental conduct, 398 including the decisionmaking of judges in later cases.39 9 Conversely, doctrines that employ ill-conceived or ill-defined elements, or that have
an unpredictable scope of application, are likely to be castigated if not
deemed illegitimate by the legal community that must abide by them.
The focus here is largely on the resequencing doctrine's initial
inquiry into equivalence, consisting of the two elements of essentiality
and constitutionality. As noted, and as is discussed in Part III, the
applicability of the equivalence analysis to threshold issues other than
personal jurisdiction remains substantially uncertain. However, this
uncertainty is neither random nor unavoidable, but rather a natural
consequence of the doctrine's ad hoc formulation.
Consider again the element of essentiality. Because personal ju40 0
risdiction itself is not truly as essential as subject-matter jurisdiction,
a threshold issue's essentiality must inhere in neither its
nonwaivability, its absolute necessity, nor its internally delimiting character, but rather (and somewhat redundantly) in its status as a threshold issue-that is, as an issue which must be demonstrated before a
federal court can adjudicate a dispute. Under so broad a standard,
however, there arguably exist many jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdic40 1
tional matters that are necessary for or "essential" to adjudication,
including the prudential standing and ripeness requirements, exhaustion of administrative remedies, 40 2 waiver of sovereign immunity, 40 3 or
proof of idiosyncratic statutory elements such as interstate comthe legality of their conduct, especially when constitutional liberties are at stake, the law
may be deemed void for vagueness. See Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 458-59 (7th Cir.
1999); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 197 (6th Cir. 1997).
398 See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984); Summers, supra note
395, at 1706.
399 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 396, at 1179-80.
400 See supra Part II.B.
401
Cf Noble v. Union River Logging R.R1, 147 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1893) (offering
lengthy list of examples, including diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy,
among others); United States v. Lawuary, 211 F.3d 372, 378-79 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
"'Uilurisdictional' problems" have "many shadings"), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 907 (2000).
402 See, e.g., Gass v. United States Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 99-1179, 98-B-75, 2000 WL
743671, at *2 n.1 (10th Cir. June 9, 2000) (noting that several courts consider the exhaustion requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7433(b) to be jurisdictional and treating it as such for
purposes of Steel Co. and Ruhrgas); Sanders v. United States, 760 F.2d 869, 872 (8th Cir.
1985) (addressing exhaustion under the Federal Tort Claims Act). The treatment of administrative exhaustion as ajurisdictional prerequisite appears frequently in the Social Security context. See, e.g., Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1997); Paul v.
Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled by Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000);
Pohlmeyer v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 939 F.2d 318, 320 (6th Cir. 1991). However,
such an exhaustion requirement would only be jurisdictional when mandated by statute.
Sims, 530 U.S. at 106 n.1; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975).
403
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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merciality,40 4 the presence of state action, 40 5 the existence of federal

40 7
securities, 40 6 or the sufficiency of allegations of unlawful conduct.

Even the most procedural or minor elements of personal jurisdiction
would seem, for that matter, to qualify for resequencing under such a
generous standard. As the Third Circuit has noted, "[t] he issuance of
a summons signed by the Clerk, with the seal of the Court, and the
time designated within which defendant is required to appear and attend, are essential elements of the court's personal jurisdiction over
'408
the defendant.
Even more problematic is the element of constitutionality. It is
not clear, first of all, whether this element was truly necessary to the
conclusion that personal jurisdiction is equivalent to subject-matterjurisdiction, or was simply a supplemental consideration, possibly included to accommodate those in the Steel Co. majority.40 9 Would the

Ruhrgas Court, in other words, have reached the same conclusion had
the dispute over personal jurisdiction been of a nonconstitutional, or
a lesser constitutional, magnitude? In turn, it is not clear whether future courts performing an equivalence analysis should deem this element necessary. Likewise, it is not clear whether the subject-matter
jurisdictional issue must be nonconstitutional, or whether that, too,
4 10
was simply a convenient contrast drawn by the Court in that case.
As with essentiality, moreover, there is necessarily a concern about
breadth or unwieldiness given that many if not all jurisdictional or
quasijurisdictional questions, at some level, implicate constitutional
considerations. By nature of the judiciary's limited jurisdiction, and
404 See, e.g., United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 62 F. Supp. 2d 173, 192 (D.
Mass. 1999).
405
See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Yablick, No. 00-15825, 2000 WL 1881448, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec.
4, 2000) (per curiam); Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d 241, 248 n.3 (lst Cir. 1997); cf.
Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 953 (7th Cir. 2000) (characterizing as potentiallyjurisdictional the dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a state because "states are not
persons' within the meaning of [the statute]").
406 See, e.g., SEC v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 186-87 & n.7 (3d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1228 (2001).
407 See, e.g., McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, Ltd., 68 F. Supp. 2d 759, 762 (E.D. Tex.
1999).
408 Ayres v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A, 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis
added).
409 See Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 266.
410 After all, it is normally of no functional significance that a subject-matter jurisdictional requirement is imposed by constitutional or statutory command. The amount-incontroversy requirement, for one, is plainly statutory, see Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d
1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001), but that quality alone does not render it any less a threshold
jurisdictional issue than, say, constitutional standing or ripeness, see, e.g., Iglesias v. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 156 F.3d 237, 242-43 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (noting that both "[tihe statutory and (especially)
constitutional elements ofjurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining
them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects").
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especially in light of Congress's undisputed authority over lower court
jurisdiction, every potential exercise or nonexercise of federal judicial
power manifests a constitutional dimension. This would include not
only doctrines such as state or federal sovereign immunity, but also
certain nonjurisdictional doctrines such as abstention. 4 11 Even the
prevailing party in Ruhrgasacknowledged that the subject-matter jurisdiction questions in that case "raised issues largely statutory in nature,
though perhaps with constitutional overtones" 412 and, in particular,
although the federal common law question related "in the first instance to the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, ... the scope of the constitutional grant of 'arising under' jurisdiction would be in the
'4 13
background.
This last concern also raises the more fundamental question of
whether the element of constitutionality is even logically relevant to
the task of resequencing, especially given that the constitutional dimension (as with due process and personal jurisdiction) need not be
structural in nature. It was, after all, exclusively for structural constitutional reasons, and no others, that Steel Co. reaffirmed the necessity of
addressing subject-matter jurisdiction prior to the merits, 4 14 and it
seems rather odd that this primacy should now be displaced or diluted
for reasons having little or nothing to do with constitutional structure.
Indeed, regardless of whether Steel Co.'s bar on hypothetical jurisdiction is limited to Article III questions or whether it also extends to
statutory questions (a matter of some disagreement at present),415 it is
undisputed that the rationale for the bar is fundamentally structural,
most notably the separation of powers. 41 6 Yet Ruhrgas basically ignores the special nature of structural considerations and appears to
treat all constitutional dimensions alike, initially by declining to recognize subject-matter jurisdiction as special because of its structural constitutional dimension, and then by equating personal to subjectmatter jurisdiction because of the former's nonstructural constitutional dimension.
411
The abstention doctrines frequently incorporate norms of constitutional interpretation, see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996), are traditionally
conceived as devices of constitutional federalism, see Waldron v. McAtee, 723 F.2d 1348,
1351 (7th Cir. 1983), and certainly raise constitutional separation of powers questions, see
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of theJudicialFunction, 94
YALE

L.J. 71 (1984).

Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999)
(No. 98-470), available at 1999 "NL 133932.
412

413

Id. at 6 n.2.

See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
416
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998); 4 WIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 119, § 1063 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 2001).
414
415
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In so doing, not only does the Court open a potentially wide
door, it also prompts one to ask why it should even matter whether a
particular threshold issue, for purposes of equivalence and in turn
resequencing, does or does not have a constitutional dimension. Is
constitutionality an indicator that the issue is somehow fundamental
or fundamentally preliminary, or is it a proxy for the issue's institutional or societal importance? If so, then why not simply use a criterion of fundamentality or importance? Alternatively, does the Court
employ constitutionality as a formalistic means of distinguishing personal jurisdiction from, say, venue or other threshold questions that it
does not want to be deemed equivalent? If so, then why not simply
state in the opinion that personal jurisdiction, and only personal jurisdiction, can satisfy the test of equivalence? Why even purport to devise a neutral means of determining equivalence if one's true
objective is to foreclose the subsequent equation of other threshold
issues?
Unfortunately, the consequences of substandard doctrinal formulation-of not adhering to methodological norms-can extend well
beyond inconsistency of application. In the jurisdictional realm, in
particular, poor doctrinal formulation can have grave conceptual consequences for the judiciary as an institution. Without a coherent doctrinal basis, for example, the judicial power to resequence other
threshold inquiries before subject-matter jurisdiction carries with it a
risk of diluting or diminishing the perceived importance of subjectmatter jurisdiction. One can certainly imagine, several years from
now, a court, seeking for whatever reason to diminish the importance
of subject-matterjurisdiction, readily invoking Ruhrgasand its progeny
for the "well-established" notion that subject-matter jurisdiction is actually not a fundamental, nonnegotiable delimitation of federal judicial power, but is simply one of several threshold inquiries. 4 17 Already
there has emerged in the lower courts the position that, for resequencing purposes, subject-matter jurisdiction may potentially be exchanged with "an array of non-merits questions." 4 18 This is a
trajectory that Ruhrgas dearly does not mandate, but, as will be discussed shortly, is also one that by the same token it clearly does not
disaffirm.
III
THE IMPLICATIONS OF

THE

DoanTNE

Questions of legitimacy notwithstanding, there remains the very
real task of discerning the potential implications and reach of the
resequencing power. Addressing that task, accordingly, is the objec417
418

See Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 269-75 (exploring this latent potential).
Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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tive of this final Part of the Article. Subpart A considers in depth the
doctrine's application not only to personal jurisdiction, but also to
state and federal sovereign immunity and, more cursorily, to a variety
of other jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional issues. Subpart B then
considers the interplay between the resequencing power announced
in Ruhrgas and the related prohibition on hypothetical jurisdiction announced in Steel Co.
A.

The Future Application of Resequencing

To summarize briefly, the full Ruhrgas analysis consists of two
stages. The first stage asks whether a particular threshold inquiry is an
essential and constitutional component of a court's power to adjudicate, such that it can be deemed equivalent to subject-matter jurisdiction. 4 19 If not, then the court can never reach it prior to subjectmatter jurisdiction. 4 20 If so, then, circumstances permitting, it can be
resequenced and addressed before subject-matterjurisdiction. 42 1 The
second stage asks whether the circumstances do, in fact, permit resequencing. 422 The district court must assess both the relative difficulty
of each inquiry and the institutional interests of judicial economy, judicial restraint, and judicial federalism. 42 3 If the assessment favors
resequencing, then the court in its discretion may reach the other
inquiry prior to subject-matterjurisdiction. 4 24 If the assessment is unfavorable, however, then the court should address subject-matterjurisdiction first, and its failure to do so may be reversed on appeal for
425
abuse of discretion.
Given this analysis, the next step is to forecast the application of
the resequencing doctrine to various threshold inquiries. The operative premise, of course, is that there are other such inquiries (besides
personal jurisdiction) that may be deemed equivalent and thus qualify
for resequencing. This premise is defensible, and is invoked here, for
two reasons. The first, noted earlier, is that the elements comprising
the equivalence formula, essentiality and constitutionality, are not especially unique, and the consequent breadth of the formula would
seem to permit the equation of additional inquiries, at least those of a
jurisdictional nature. 426 The second is that several courts to date have
419 See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
420 See discussion supra Part I.B.
421
See discussion supra Part I.B.
422 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
423 See discussion supra Part I.B.2(b).
424 See discussion supra Part I.B.2(b).
425 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
426 If the resequencing power is truly a facet of the inherent power to determine jurisdiction, see supra Part II.C.3, then it must be limited to the determination ofjurisdictional
inquiries.
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described the holding of Ruhrgas in a manner that seems to contemplate the resequencing of inquiries other than personal jurisdiction. 427 The D.C. Circuit, for one, has gone so far as to propose that

"implicit in Steel Co." and clarified by later cases such as Ruhrgasis the
notion that "[tihere is an array of non-merits questions that [federal
428
courts] may decide in any order."
Accordingly, this subpart examines the application of the Ruhrgas
analysis not only to personal jurisdiction, but also to Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity, although the focus necessarily
varies between these two areas of inquiry. In addressing personal jurisdiction, the analysis focuses on the discretionary question of resequencing, given that the first stage, the equivalence of personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction, is addressed by Ruhrgas itself. With regard
to state and federal sovereign immunity, by contrast, it is the first stage
of the analysis that merits greater attention, given that the relevance
of the second stage is wholly contingent on whether resequencing is
permissible under any circumstances.
1. PersonalJurisdiction
Forecasting the application of the discretionary resequencing
analysis to personal jurisdiction requires consideration of both the parameters of the analysis, as defined in Ruhrgas, and the manner in
which lower courts have applied it to date. According to Ruhrgas, this
analysis requires a district court faced with subject-matter and personal jurisdiction challenges to address the subject-matter jurisdiction
issue first, unless the court "has before it a straightfonvard personal
jurisdiction issue presenting no complex question of state law, and the
alleged defect in subject-matter jurisdiction raises a difficult and novel
427 See United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 87-90 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2001); Young v. Ill.
State Bd.of Elections, No. 00-3713, 2000 WL 1611115, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000) (per
curiam); Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999); O'Brien v.
Vermont (In re O'Brien), 184 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Faulk v. Owens-

Coming Fiberglass Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 n.5 (E.D. Tex. 1999); see also Perez v.
Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Ruhrgas-albeitwith a "cf."for the principle that "[w]hen there are multiple grounds for dismissing a suit (as opposed
to deciding it on the merits) courts may select from among them"). But see Fujitsu-ICL Sys.,
Inc. v. Efmark Serv. Co. of Ill., No. 00-CV-0777 W(LSP), 2000 WL 1409760, at *7 n.4 (S.D.
Cal. June 29, 2000) (interpreting Ruhrgas as "holding that [a] determination of [a] court's
personal or subject matter jurisdiction should precede other inquiries").
428
Galvan, 199 F.3d at 463; accord United States v. Johnson, 254 F.3d 279, 287 n.11
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Ruhrgasfor the proposition that the court "may... resolve issues
that are 'jurisdictional or have jurisdictional overtones' in any order" (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1998))); Young, 2000 WL 1611115, at l (citing Ruhrgas
for the proposition that "there is no necessary priority among reasons for dismissing a
federal suit without decision on the merits").
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question." 429 Although the court's discretion clearly attaches to the
decisional portion of the analysis (whether, in light of the empirical
factors, personal jurisdiction should be addressed and subject-matter
jurisdiction should be deferred or ignored), it is not clear whether it
also attaches to the antecedent determination of these empirical elements (whether personal jurisdiction is "straightforward," whether
subject-matter jurisdiction "raises a difficult and novel question," and
whether economy, restraint, and federalism favor or disfavor resequencing). If not, then presumably this determination, like factual
determinations generally, would be subject to appellate review not for
430
abuse of discretion, but rather for clear error.
To date, both the interpretation and the application of Ruhrgas to
the resequencing of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction have
been somewhat disuniform. On the positive side, several district
courts appear to have correctly stated and applied the analysis, either
reaching the personal jurisdiction issue first 431 or, finding the empirical elements unsatisfied, declining to do so. 43 2 Likewise, the Tenth
Circuit implicitly found an abuse of discretion in one case when it
vacated a lower court dismissal that rested on statute-of-limitations
and personal jurisdiction grounds, and ordered dismissal instead for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because "the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction [wa]s not unusually difficult" and therefore did not warrant resequencing under Ruhrga. 433 At least one court has also correctly noted that Ruhrgas effectively embraces a presumption in favor
of addressing subject-matter jurisdiction first, and that this presumption may very well influence the interpretation of prior cases. In particular, when a prior decision addresses both subject-matter and
personal jurisdiction, and finds both lacking, the personal jurisdiction
43 4
analysis may presumptively be considered dictum.
429 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999); accord Gadlin v. Sybron
Int'l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000).
430 See FED. 1. Civ. P. 52(a); United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 162 F.3d 1027, 1030
(9th Cir. 1998); McCarthy v. Navistar Fin. Corp. (In reVogel Van & Storage, Inc.), 59 F.3d
9, 11 (2d Cir. 1995); United States ex rel Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548,
551 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992).
431 See, e.g., Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898-99
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Union Pac. R.R v. Pratt & Tobin, P.C., No. CIV. A. 99-2030-KHV, 1999
WL 760417, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 1999). The Foslip case is discussed supra at notes 81-82
and accompanying text.
432 See, e.g., Re-Con Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Guardian Ins. Co. of Can., No. C-00-0327-VRW,
2000 WL 432830, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2000); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Am. Alternative Ins.
Corp., No. Civ. A. 99-3347, 2000 WL 28177, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2000); cf Morris v.
Brandeis Univ., No. CIV.A. 99-2642, 1999 WL 817723, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1999) (correctly stating one formulation of the rule).
433 See Gadlin, 222 F.3d at 799.
434 See Hall v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. Civ. 94-951, 1999 WL 956311, at *7 (W.D. Pa.
July 16, 1999) (citing Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 587-88).
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On the less positive side, some courts appear to be either misconstruing or misapplying the analysis. One circuit court, for example,
described Ruhrgas as "holding that there is no hierarchy in the order
435
of decision of issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction."
Ruhrgas,however, stated that "there is no unyieldingjurisdictional hierarchy" and that "[c]ustomarily, a federal court first resolves doubts
about its jurisdiction over the subject matter."43 6 Another circuit
court went even further, proposing that "later cases [such as Ruhrgas]
make clear what was implicit in Steel Co.: There is an array of non43 7
merits questions that [federal courts] may decide in any order."
In fact, Steel Co. and Ruhrgas are at best ambiguous about the
number or types of non-merits questions that might qualify for resequencing, and they certainly do not hold that any non-merits question
may be decided "in any order." Such overstatements would not be so
troubling were it not for the fact that at least one lower court, apparently operating on this type of misinterpretation, simply invoked Ruhrgas and reached the issue of personal jurisdiction without even noting,
let alone applying, the required analysis. 43 8 Similarly, as discussed earlier, the Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in a district court's
resequencing decision even though that court's analysis apparently included no assessment of relative difficulty and no consideration of ei43 9
ther judicial restraint or judicial federalism.
2.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Resequencing may also apply to threshold issues of Eleventh
Amendment immunity, which in general shields a state against private
damages actions in federal court absent the state's consent or waiver
435
United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasis
added); see also Agapov v. Negodaeva, 93 F. Supp. 2d 481, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing

Ruhrgasas "holding that consideration ofjurisdictional issues need not be 'sequenc~edl,'
and that a federal court may therefore 'choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case'" (alteration in original) (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584-85)).
436 Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).
437 Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also
United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 87-90 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (addressing a variety of
threshold inquiries-including the collateral order doctrine, timeliness of the appeal, a
dispute over "the contents of the record," and constitutional mootness-and commenting
that, "[t]here being no 'unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy,' we approach these preliminary and jurisdictional inquiries in no particular order" (citation omitted) (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 577)).
438 See Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Geko-Mayo, GmbH, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 562
(E.D. Pa. 1999); cf Doney v. CMI Corp., No. 99-1124-CV-W-6-ECF, 2000 WL 554125, at *2
(W.D. Mo. May 4, 2000) (seemingly permitting the consideration of service of process issues prior to subject-matter jurisdiction, without attendant consideration of relative difficulty or institutional interests, so long as subject-matter jurisdiction is not superficially
absent).
439 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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or absent a valid abrogation of the immunity by Congress. 440 The key
question, of course, is whether such issues can satisfy the elements of
essentiality and constitutionality (and hence the criterion of equivalence), a question that is somewhat complicated by the fact that currently there are at least two competing judicial views of the nature and
function of state sovereign immunity.4 41 These views, which as rendered here are essentially composite sketches, can be labeled the juris44 2
dictional conception and the quasi-jurisdictionalconception.

Under the jurisdictional conception, Eleventh Amendment im44 3
munity is seen as a bona fide subject-matter jurisdictional doctrine.
Accordingly, even though it is subject to waiver, 44 4 like subject-matter
jurisdiction it "can be raised at any stage of the proceedings"; 44 5 may
440 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 388, §§ 7.4-7.7, at 402-46 (summarizing current
doctrine).
441
"The Supreme Court . . . has explicitly recognized that it has not yet decided
whether Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject matterjurisdiction." United
States ex rel Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1202 (2000); see also NewJersey v. Chen (In re Chen), 227 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1998) ("The Supreme Court has not addressed, and the lower federal courts cannot
agree, whether sovereign immunity is a question of subject matter jurisdiction."). There
also is a division within the Supreme Court over the categorical reach of the immunity. See
CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 388, § 7.3, at 396. Chemerinsky states:
One theory-supported by a majority comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist, andJustices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-sees the Eleventh Amendment as a restriction on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts that bars all suits against state governments. The competing
theory-supported by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerviews the Eleventh Amendment as restricting the federal courts' subject
matter jurisdiction only in precluding cases brought against states that are
founded sole[1]y on diversity jurisdiction.
Id. In short, "[t]he body of jurisprudence which has developed analyzing the sovereign
immunity conferred upon the States by the Eleventh Amendment is a shifting morass of
confusion." Chen, 227 B.R. at 621.
442
The composites reflect doctrines drawn from several cases, and cases from several
courts, and are not the comprehensive or internally consistent conceptions employed by
any particular court. That said, there clearly are judicial tendencies towards one composite
or the other.
443
See, e.g., Foulds, 171 F.3d at 285 & n.9; Smith v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1139-40 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S.
740, 745 n.2 (1998) (describing the Eleventh Amendment as "jurisdictional in the sense
that it is a limitation on the federal court's judicial power"); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati,
219 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 2000).
444
See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Litman v. George
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); Parella v.
Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1999); Smith, 23 F.3d at
1140.
445
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 745 n.2; accord Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19
(1982); Fromm v. Comm'n of Veterans Affairs, 220 F.3d 887, 890 (8th Cir. 2000); Suarez
Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 683 n.12 (4th Cir. 2000);J.B. exreL Hart v. Valdez,
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be addressed by a court sua sponte 44 6 (and perhaps must be addressed
sua sponte);447 may need to be addressed before proceeding to the
merits;448 and, if successfully interposed, should result in a dismissal
449 Under the quasiunder Rule 12(b) (1) rather than Rule 12(b) (6).
jurisdictional conception, by contrast, Eleventh Amendment immunity "does not implicate a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction in
any ordinary sense" 450 and "is not a true limitation upon the court's
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather a personal privilege"4 51 or a
"common law immunity." 45 2 Accordingly, it must be demonstrated by
the party opposing jurisdiction, rather than the party asserting jurisdiction;453 can be waived if not timely asserted; 454 need not be addressed by a court sua sponte4 55 (and perhaps should not be
addressed sua sponte); can be congressionally abrogated; 45 6 can, if
186 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999); Parella,173 F.3d at 54; Seaborn v. Fla. Dep't of Corr.,
143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998).
446
See, e.g., Long v. Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, 236 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.
2001); Reese v. Michigan, No. 99-1173, 2000 WL 1647923, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2000)
(per curiam); Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 954 (7th Cir. 2000); Parella, 173 F.3d at
54; Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 179 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd on othergroundssub nom. Am.
Mffrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (10th Cir. 1997); Ad. Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins,
2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993); Whiting v.Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 127 n.8 (5th Cir.
1980).
447
See, e.g., Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997); Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 873 n.2 (9th Cir.
1987); Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 702 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
see Michelle Lawner, Comment, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to ConsiderState Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte 66 U. CE!. L. REv. 1261, 1282-88 (1999).
448
See infra notes 526, 528, 530 and accompanying text.
449
See, e.g., Warnock v. Pecos County, 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996); Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); Union Pac. R.R. v. Burton,
949 F. Supp. 1546, 1550-52 (D. Wyo. 1996); Radeschi v. Pennsylvania, 846 F. Supp. 416,
418 (W.D. Pa. 1993). In turn, the dismissal should be without prejudice. See Freeman v.
Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999).
450
ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Agric. Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[S] overeign immunity
is an element of state sovereignty, not a categorical limitation on the federal judicial
power."), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000); Mitchell v. Comm'n on Adult Entm't Establishments, 12 F.3d 406, 409 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that "[the eleventh amendment is quasijurisdictional").
451
Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999), amended on denial of
reh'g by 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).
452 Smith v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir.
1994); accord Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998); Parella v. Ret. Bd. of
R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1999).
453 See, e.g., Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1005 (1999); ITSI TVProds., 3 F.3d at 1291.
454 See, e.g., HiI 179 F.3d at 756-58, 760-63.
455 See, e.g., Schach 524 U.S. at 389; Floyd v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir.
2000); United States ex reL Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), cert. denieA, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000); Parella, 173 F.3d at 55.
456 See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999).
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found to be lacking, give rise to an immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine; 45 7 can potentially be bypassed en route to the
merits458 (let alone in favor of other substantive defenses) ;459 and, if

successfully interposed, should result in a dismissal under Rule
12(b) (6) rather than Rule 12(b) (1).460
Whether or not Eleventh Amendment immunity can be resequenced with subject-matter jurisdiction may depend, therefore, on
which conception is embraced. The jurisdictional conception, of
course, presents the stronger case. To the extent that courts already
have the power to address non-Article III subject-matter jurisdictional
questions before Article IIIjurisdictional questions, 46 1 let alone before
other non-Article III subject-matter jurisdictional questions, 4 62 then
there is arguably no need to subject Eleventh Amendment immunity
to the equivalence analysis at all.463 To the extent that one does undertake this analysis, moreover, the elements of essentiality and constitutionality appear to be satisfied. Insofar as Eleventh Amendment
immunity is a restriction on a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, a
valid waiver or abrogation of it is arguably an essential element of, and
certainly a prerequisite to, the court's adjudicatory power. 464 Likewise, while the Eleventh Amendment is "not co-extensive with the lim-

457 See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-47
(1993); Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334 (l1th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000); Smith, 23 F.3d at 1140.
458 See infra notes 527, 529-30 and accompanying text.
459 See, e.g., Brindley v. Best, 192 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1999); Benning v. Bd. of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d 775, 777-78 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1991).
460 See, e.g., Scott v. O'Grady, 975 F.2d 366, 369-72 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Andrews v.
Daw, 201 F.3d 521, 524 n.2 (4th Cir. 2000) (professing that case law is unclear as to
whether 12(b) (1) or 12(b) (6) is the proper ground for dismissal).
461
Compare Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (noting that "statutory
standing ... may properly be treated before Article III standing"), and Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Guthrie, 233 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2000) (same), and Grand Council of the Crees v.
FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same), with Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker StateSlick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1998), as holding that a "question of Art. III standing is
[a] threshold issue that should be addressed before issues of prudential and statutory
standing").
462
See, e.g., Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 626 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998).
463
Compare Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 2000) (addressing
"the jurisdictional issues of standing, mootness, state sovereign immunity, and class certification... in no particular order"), and Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 1998)
(effectively resequencing Eleventh Amendment immunity before standing), with Cox v.
City of Dallas, Tex., 256 F.3d 281, 303-04 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding categorically that
"standing must be examined before the Eleventh Amendment").
464
Under this conception, the Eleventh Amendment is a "withdrawal of jurisdiction
[that] effectively confers an immunity from suit." P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). In turn, its waiver or abrogation can be seen as a
reinstatement of this jurisdiction.
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itations on judicial power in Article llI,"465 it is clearly a constitutional
doctrine in every other respect

466

and, for purposes of issue sequenc-

46 7
ing, is treated as such by the courts.
As for the quasi-jurisdictional conception, the two-element analysis is basically the same, although the prima facie case for essentiality
may appear weaker. After all, Eleventh Amendment immunity, especially under this latter conception, "is in many ways unlike a jurisdictional bar."4 68 As noted, the burden of its demonstration falls on the
defendant, it can be waived or abandoned, it need not be raised sua
sponte, it can be congressionally abrogated, it can (according to some
courts) be bypassed en route to the merits, and its denial can be immediately appealed. 4 69 However, while there may be significance to
the sum of these characteristics, it cannot be said that any of them
alone is legally or logically sufficient to render an inquiry nonresequencible. That the defendant should carry the burden of demonstration, for example, also characterizes mootness, a core Article III
subject-matterjurisdiction doctrine, 470 and in any event does not obviously render an inquiry "nonessential." Waivability and
abandonability are common to personal jurisdiction, 471 the very inquiry held resequencible in Ruhrgas, and may also describe the pru4 72
dential counterparts to the case-or-controversy requirements.
Similarly, the principle that it need not or should not be raised by a
court sua sponte is found as well, if not more strongly, in the jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction, and is simply a logical corollary to the
doctrine of voluntary waiver. 473 Congressional abrogability also characterizes the prudential and statutory requirements of subject-matter

Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998). But cf Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the
465
R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that "Eleventh Amendment issues are clearly linked to the question of Article III jurisdiction"); United States ex
reL Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir. 1999) (same), cert. denied, 530
U.S. 1202-03 (2000).
466 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
467 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Nat'lJuvenile Det. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000); Parella, 173 F.3d at 56.
468 Smith v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir.
1994); accord United States ex reL Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890,
892 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000); Parella,173 F.3d at 54-55.
469
See supra notes 453-60 and accompanying text.
470 See, e.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993); Motor &
Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
471
See Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
472
See, e.g., Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d
895, 899 (9th Cir. 2000); Bd.of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 824 (2000).
473
See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992);
Pilgrim Badge & Label Corp. v. Barrios, 857 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam);
Anger v. Revco Drug Co., 791 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
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jurisdiction, 4 7 4 and, like the placement of the evidentiary burden,
bears no obvious relation to the issue of essentiality.
As for the final two characteristics-bypassability en route to the
merits, and immediate appealability under the collateral order doctrine-the challenge to essentiality is possibly stronger. As is discussed
in subpart B, some cases have held that a court, consistent with Steel
Co., can bypass an assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity and
dispose of a suit on the merits, something it clearly could not do with
regard to Article III jurisdiction. The relevance of this is that bypassability and resequencibility may be inversely correlated, such that
bypassability indicates nonessentiality, which in turn indicates nonequivalence, which in turn indicates nonresequencibility. 475 However,
there is currently a split over whether such bypassability is truly consistent with Steel Co. 476 Because this split might be resolved against bypassability, further analysis at this point, which would effectively entail
assuming the correctness of bypassability, is arguably neither appropriate nor necessary.
Immediate appealability, by contrast, merits closer examination.
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, interlocutory orders denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter or personal jurisdiction are
not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, while
interlocutory orders denying a motion to dismiss for Eleventh Amendment immunity are. 4 7 7 From this doctrinal difference, one could infer, as does the Seventh Circuit, that Eleventh Amendment immunity
ought not to be treated like subject-matter or personal jurisdiction,
which if transposed to the Ruhrgas context could indicate that Eleventh Amendment immunity ought not to be resequencible with these
jurisdictional inquiries.
Although this is an interesting line of reasoning, it arguably reads
too much into the collateral order doctrine and the law of immediate
appealability. The collateral order doctrine is designed to permit immediate appeals from a select class of orders that, being interlocutory,
would otherwise not qualify as "final decisions" under the principal
appellate jurisdictional statute. 4 78 To qualify as immediately appealable, an order "must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
474

See, e.g., Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 227 (3d

Cir.

1998).
475
476

See infra note 521 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 528-30 and accompanying text.

477
See Smith v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade & Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th
Cir. 1994); accord Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 18Q F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000).
478
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
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action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
479
judgment.
To employ immediate appealability as a gauge of equivalence or
resequencibility, however, one must assume that these requirements
are designed or able to function outside of the collateral order context, and specifically that they are designed or able to serve double
duty in the alternative context of resequencing. But there is no basis
for this assumption. A more defensible approach is simply to conclude that interlocutory rulings on Eleventh Amendment immunity
are immediately appealable because they satisfy the collateral order
requirements, 4 s0 and involve uniquely important federalism interests, 48 ' while interlocutory rulings on core jurisdictional doctrines

such as standing are not immediately appealable because they do
not. 4 82 In other words, that Eleventh Amendment immunity is imme-

diately appealable, while subject-matter and personal jurisdiction are
not, is not a statement about its nonequivalence to subject-matter or
personal jurisdiction for resequencing purposes, any more than the
lack of immediate appealability of all sorts of other orders is a statement about their equivalence to subject-matter or personal jurisdiction
for resequencing purposes (which it dearly is not).483
3.

Federal Sovereign Immunity

Analytically, the resequencibility of federal sovereign immunity
appears to be similar to that of Eleventh Amendment immunity, including a debate over whether or to what degree they are true jurisdictional doctrines. The predominant view is that federal sovereign
immunity poses a genuine restriction on subject-matterjurisdiction, 48 4
pursuant to which jurisdiction is effectively withheld or withdrawn and
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
See id.at 146.
482
See, e.g., Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988) (right not to be
subject to a binding judgment); Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1334 (justiciability); Chil479
480
481

dren's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deiers, 92 F.3d 1412, 1417-18 (6th Cir. 1996)
(Batchelder, J., concurring) (standing).
483 Indeed, many orders having little or no bearing on jurisdiction have been denied
immediate appealability. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S.
863, 884 (1994) (a "refusal to enforce a settlement agreement claimed to shelter a party
from suit altogether"); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375-79 (1981)
(an order refusing to disqualify counsel); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468-70 (an order
denying class certification); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 210 (1st Cir.
1998) (a "district court's refusal to abstain under doctrines like Pullman or Burford); Holt
v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 853-54 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (an order denying a motion for
appointed counsel); Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1566 (lth Cir. 1987) (an
order denying a civil jury trial).
484 See, e.g., Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2001); Harmon Indus.,
Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir. 1999); Blue v. Widnall, 162 F.3d 541, 544 (9th
Cir. 1998); 14 WRiGrr ET AL., supra note 119, § 3654 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001).
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may be instituted or reinstituted only by the immunity's consensual
and unequivocal waiver. 48 5 Accordingly, federal sovereign immunity
can be invoked at any time, 4 6 should be raised sua sponte by a
court, 48 7 is presumed to exist and must be overcome by the party as-

serting jurisdiction, 48 8 and, if not overcome, will lead to a dismissal
under Rule 12(b) (1).489 The competing view, by contrast, is that federal sovereign immunity is "'a less than pure jurisdictional question"' 490 or a "non-merits decision[ ]"491 possessing a "'quasijurisdictional or "hybrid" status,"'
493

492

which essentially is treated like an

affirmative defense.
To the extent that federal sovereign immunity is truly a subjectmatter jurisdictional inquiry, and further that subject-matter jurisdictional inquiries are inherently resequencible, then its resequencibility
494
ought to be available even apart from the strictures of Ruhrgas.
However, to the extent that this immunity is not truly a doctrine of
subject-matter jurisdiction-either because it is only quasi-jurisdictional or because its waiver "is a prerequisite to ...but.., nonetheless
'wholly distinct[ ] "495 from subject-matter jurisdiction-then resequencibility must be determined by the equivalence analysis.
As with Eleventh Amendment immunity, federal sovereign immunity appears to have little difficulty satisfying the elements of essentiality and constitutionality. First, even when courts have analytically
severed the federal sovereign immunity question from the question of
subject-matter jurisdiction, they have nevertheless made clear that a
485 See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S.
834, 841 (1986); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
486 See, e.g., Harmon Indus., 191 F.3d at 903; Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Taylor, 970 F.2d
16, 34 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.Johnson, 853 F.2d 619, 622 n.7 (8th Cir. 1988); 14
WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 119, § 3654 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2001).
487 See, e.g., Hogan v. United States, No. Civ.A. 99-868, 1999 WL 1138529, at *2 (E.D.
La. Dec. 7, 1999).
488 See, e.g., Blue, 162 F.3d at 544; Warminster Township Mun. Auth. v. United States,
903 F. Supp. 847, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
489 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 151 F.3d 800, 803-04 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1)); P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. HUD, 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 320 (D.P.R.
1999).
490 In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(quoting United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 894
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
491 Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
492 Sealed Case, 192 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Long, 173 F.3d at 893).
493 See Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc. v. Ind. Dep't of Revenue (In re Burlington Motor Holdings, Inc.), 242 B.R. 156, 160-61 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
494
Cf., e.g., Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1994) (bypassing
federal sovereign immunity and holding that the suit was barred by the political question
doctrine).
495 Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States ex reL Sec'y of HUD, 175 F.3d 132, 139
(2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786-87 n.4
(1991)).
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demonstrated waiver of federal sovereign immunity is essential to the
exercise of that jurisdiction, 49 6 without which "there may be no consideration of the subject matter. '497 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
described the importance of waiver in terms that capture the very idea
of essentiality: "Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a
sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial
power is void. '49 8 Regarding constitutionality, there is greater latitude
for debate,49 9 but most courts and commentators hold that its basis is
ultimately constitutional,5 0 0 a position that is arguably reinforced by
the Court's recent recognition of state sovereign immunity as a constitutional doctrine entirely apart from its expression through the Elev50 1
enth Amendment.
4. Additional Threshold Inquiries
Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity are not
the only potential candidates for jurisdictional resequencing, although they are two of the most likely. There are, after all, several
other threshold inquiries that either are sufficiently related to subjectmatter jurisdiction that they may be resequenced on that basis alone
or are sufficiently essential and constitutional components of a court's
adjudicatory power that they satisfy Ruhrgas's equivalence standard.
To the extent that subject-matter jurisdictional inquiries are categorically resequencible, this would presumably include the political question doctrine; 50 2 the prudential doctrines of standing, ripeness, and
496

See, e.g., id; J.C. Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383, 385 n.4 (4th Cir. 1990).

J.C. Driskill, 901 F.2d at 385 n.4.
United States v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940).
499
See In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam).
500 ComparePullman Constr. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir.
1994) (referencing U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 9, cl. 7), and Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824
F.2d 1240, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (referencing U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2), andJaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1251 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Gibbons,J,
dissenting) (referencing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7), and Daniel E. O'Toole, Regulation of
Nary Ship DischargesUnder the Clean WaterAct: Have Too Many Chefs Spoiled the Broth?, 19 WM.
& Mrev ENvrL. L. & POL'y REv. 1, 25 & n.136 (1994) (referencing U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl.
2), with Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed to Be the "Seabird,"
19 F.3d 1136, 1142 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing federal sovereign immunity as a common
law doctrine), and Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 343 (1995) (describing it as "purely a creature of common law, with no
statutory or constitutional basis"). See also Alaska v. United States, 64 F.3d 1352, 1354 n.3
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating that federal sovereign immunity "derives from public law, but it is
not explicit in either the Constitution or statutes").
501
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-30 (1999).
502 See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160,
162 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994); O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680, 684 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982); Kurtz v.
Baker, 644 F. Supp. 613, 620 (D.D.C. 1986).
497
498
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mootness; 50 3 and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 50 4 Sufficiently related
threshold inquiries may also include certain statutory limits such as
administrative exhaustion 50 5 or preclusion of judicial review, 50 6 and
50 7
even certain appellate procedural requirements such as timeliness
or the proper designation of issues or parties. 50 8 Likewise, and espe503
Compare Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(interpreting Ruhrgas as holding that "it is entirely proper to consider whether there is
prudential standing while leaving the question of constitutional standing in doubt, as there
is no mandated 'sequencing ofjurisdictional issues'" (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999))), with Conte Bros. Auto. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165
F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (interpreting Steel Co. as holding that a "question of Art. III
standing is [a] threshold issue that should be addressed before issues of prudential and
statutory standing").
504
See, e.g., Young v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 00-3713, 2000 WL 1611115, at *1
(7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2000) (per curiam). Compare Nationscredit Home Equity Servs. Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908-09 (N.D. 111. 2001) (applying Steel Co. to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine), and Newell v. Rolling Hills Apartments, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1026,
1031-33 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (same), and Nollet v. Justices of the Trial Court of Mass., 83 F.
Supp. 2d 204, 208 (D. Mass. 2000) (same), affd, No. 00-1242, 2000 WL 1803320 (1st Cir.
Dec. 7, 2000) (per curiam), with Lefebvre v. Barnsley, No. 97-297-B, 1999 WL 813923, at *5
(D.N.H. Sept. 22, 1999) (bypassing ajurisdictional challenge under Rooker-Feldmanbecause
it is merely a statutory limitation, not subject to Steel Co.).
505
See, e.g., Gass v. United States Dep't of Treasury, Nos. 99-1179, 98-B-75, 2000 WL
743671, at *2 n.1 (10th Cir. June 9, 2000) (holding that the administrative exhaustion
requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7433(b) is jurisdictional and, as such, under Steel Co. must be
decided before the merits but under Ruhrgas could be resequenced with any otherjurisdictional issue); see also supra note 402 (listing cases describing exhaustion requirements as
jurisdictional). But cf Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 181-83 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
the exhaustion requirement under the Rehabilitation Act's implementing regulations is
not jurisdictional and can be bypassed, and so doing "nostra sponte, in the interest of judicial economy"); Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a court cannot hear a suit, let alone decide the merits, where the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) has not been satisfied, but stating
that while § 1997e(a) "affects the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts" its nonsatisfaction "does not deprive a court ofjurisdiction").
506
See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379,
1381 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a claim under § 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 7274h, "is barred by [5 U.S.C.] § 701 (a) (2) of
the Administrative Procedure Act"; that this "preclusion is jurisdictional"; and that consequently, under Ruhrgas, the court "may affirm dismissal of the claim without reaching the
other jurisdictional defenses-such as [the defendant's] mootness contention"); see also
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 353 n.4 (1984) ("Since congressional preclusion ofjudicial review is in effect jurisdictional, we need not address the standing issues
507
See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (stating that
"the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional"); Arnold v. Wood, 238 F.3d 992, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Steel Co. to the timeliness
requirement of FED. R. APP. P. 4(a) (1) (A) because it "is jurisdictional in character");
United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199-1200 (lth Cir. 2000) (same); Oliver v.
Oklahoma, No. 99-6141, 2000 WL 531661, at *2 (10th Cir. May 3, 2000) (same); United
States v. Rapoport, 159 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1998) (same). But cf Carlisle v. United States,
517 U.S. 416, 434 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("It is anomalous to classify time prescriptions ... under the heading 'subject matter jurisdiction.'").
508
See, e.g., United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 756-57 (6th
Cir. 1999) (holding that FED. R. App. P. 3(c) (1) (B), which "requires the designation of the
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cially in light of the foregoing analyses of Eleventh Amendment and
federal sovereign immunity, there may also be an argument for the
resequencibility of tribal sovereign immunity50 9 and perhaps even absolute immunity.5 10 Finally, there are the issues that the Court itself

has indicated are resequencible. In Ruhrgas, for example, it cited the
discretionary dismissal of a potential supplemental claim5 1 ' as well as
the dismissal of a claim under Younger abstention, 512 even though the
latter seems neither to pose a subject-matter jurisdictional question

judgment or order from which an appeal is taken[,] . . . is jurisdictional and may not be

'waived' by this court" and, under Steel Co., must be "consider[ed] .. . first"), cert. denied,
530 U.S. 1274 (2000); Persyn v. United States, 935 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
compliance with FED. R. App. P. 3 is ajurisdictional matter which the court "ha[s] an independent duty to determine" and that, under Tortes v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,
318 (1988), a court "lack[s] appellate jurisdiction over parties other than those properly
identified in the notice of appeal"). However, the Supreme Court recently held that the
failure to sign a notice of appeal, required by FED. R. Crv. P. 11(a) as incorporated through
FED. R Apip. P. 3-4, is not jurisdictional and does not divest the appellate court ofjurisdiction. SeeBecker v. Montgomery, 121 S. Ct. 1801, 1806-08 (2001).
509
Compare Florida v. Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d 1237, 1240 n.4 (lth Cir. 1999) (noting "the fundamentally jurisdictional nature of a claim of sovereign immunity" and holding that, "[b]ecause of its jurisdictional nature, we must consider the Tribe's claim of
sovereign immunity before reaching the issue of failure to state a claim"), and Hagen v.
Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2000) (treating tribal sovereign immunity as jurisdictional), with Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[A]lthough tribal sovereign
immunity is jurisdictional in nature, consideration of that issue always must await resolution of the antecedent issue of federal subject-matter jurisdiction."), and Kreig v. Prairie
Island Dakota Sioux (In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux), 21 F.3d 302, 304-05 (8th Cir.
1994) (per curiam) (observing that, while "sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature"
it "is not of the same character as subject matterjurisdiction" and holding that "the district
court did not abuse its discretion in first determining it lacked federal question jurisdiction
and then remanding this action").
510 Compare Nollet v.Justices of the Trial Courts, 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208-10 (D. Mass.
2000) (treating an assertion of statutory judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a
subject-matter jurisdictional challenge that, under Steel Co., must be addressed "[b)efore
deciding any other issue," and ultimately dismissing on the basis of this challenge for lack
ofjurisdiction), aff, No. 00-1242, 2000 WL 1803320 (1st Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (per curiam),
with Jordan v. Brazil, No. 00-3024, 2000 WL 1479835, at *1-*2 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2000)
(holding pursuant to Steel Co. that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine precluded consideration of absolute immunity), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1971 (2001).
511
See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999); cf Gold v. Local 7
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307, 1309-11 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that under Steel Co. a court must verify its supplemental jurisdiction before assessing the merits of supplemental state law claims).
512 See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585; accordZaharia v. Cross, No. 99-1515, 2000 WL 702405,
at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. May 26, 2000); AG. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, Ill.,
921 F.2d 118, 120 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); cf. Nollet, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 208-09 (treating an
assertion of the Younger abstention doctrine as a subject-matter jurisdictional challenge
that must be addressed before any other issue). But see supranotes 141-46 and accompany.
ing text (explaining that Ruhrgas misreads the Ellis case in support of the resequencibility
of Younger abstention).
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nor to satisfy the element of essentiality. 5 13

Finally, in Ortiz v.

FibreboardCorp.,5 14 decided the same term as Ruhrgas,the Court explicitly countenanced the resequencing of Rule 23 class certification issues before Article III standing. 515
B.

The Convergence of Resequencing and the Prohibition on
Hypothetical Jurisdiction

As noted in Part I, Ruhrgas does not stand in isolation, but is the
second of two decisions (the first being Steel Co.) concerning the analytical placement of jurisdictional inquiries. Accordingly, not only
must the Ruhrgas analysis be resolved on its own terms, it must also be
interpreted in combination with the doctrinal framework etched out
in Steel Co., a task that is hampered by the fact that Steel Co., like Ruhrgas, also articulated a doctrine of uncertain scope. The central question posed by the combination of these cases is whether there is a
relationship between, on the one hand, a determination under Ruhrgas that a given inquiry is resequencible with subject-matter jurisdiction and, on the other hand, the holding of Steel Co. that subjectmatter jurisdiction generally must first be verified before the merits
can be addressed. 5 16 More precisely, does a finding of resequencibility-which itself rests on a finding that an inquiry, being an
essential and constitutional component of adjudicatory power, is
equivalent to subject-matter jurisdiction-indicate that the inquiry,
like subject-matter jurisdiction, must also be verified before the merits
are addressed? Alternatively, to conceptualize the matter from the op513
See supra note 154 and accompanying text. Cf Falanga v. State Bar, 150 F.3d 1333,
1335 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that Younger abstentionis bypassable-i.e., "assum[ing]
without deciding" that the district court's abstention decision was proper-'"[blecause it

appears that 'Younger abstention is not jurisdictional'" (quoting Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d
825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994))); Carter v. Doyle, 95 F. Supp. 2d 851, 855 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(noting that "a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on abstention does not fit neatly into either of the two types ofjurisdictional attacks generally raised
under Rule 12(b) (1)" and that, as a result, "courts have allowed a Younger abstention challenge to be raised in a 12(b)(6) motion, or a 12(b)(1) motion, or both" (citations
omitted)).
514
527 U.S. 815 (1999).
515
516

See id. at 831.

This is stated as a general rule because subject-matter jurisdiction is occasionally
tied to the merits, in which case a court may hold the jurisdictional issue in abeyance and
proceed to the merits. See Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1986);
Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1979);
Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d 143, 149 (10th Cir. 1965); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (providing for deferred determination of 12(b) motions). For examples, see United States v.
Story, 891 F.2d 988, 990-91 (2d Cir. 1989) (jurisdiction linked to timing of events under a
recently enacted statute); Maczko v. Joyce, 814 F.2d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1987) (mandamus
action); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) (jurisdiction linked
to merits issue of timing); and Beur&Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42, 52-53 (Cl. Ct. 1988)
(ripeness linked to just compensation).
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posite direction, does a finding that an inquiry must be so verified
(that it is not bypassable) indicate that it, like personal jurisdiction,
can also be resequenced before subject-matter jurisdiction?
Whether the Ruhrgas and Steel Co. analyses can or should be doctrinally linked in this fashion is itself a question that the Court did not
answer. It is also a question that is greatly complicated by many of the
deficiencies noted earlier, including the lack of clarity and completeness in the articulation of doctrines in both Ruhrgas and Steel Co., the
absence of a meaningful precedential basis from which to extrapolate,
and the corresponding lack of theoretical grounding to which one
might consequently refer. As for Ruhrgas, perhaps the most obvious
doctrinal problems concern the two criteria of equivalence, essentiality and constitutionality-the former because its imprecise formulation leaves unanswered whether it should encompass many or simply a
few threshold issues, and the latter because its equally imprecise formulation coupled with the lack of obvious basis for its inclusion may
lead some courts to apply it strictly while leading others to ignore it
altogether. As for Steel Co., the doctrinal ambiguity likewise concerns
questions of definition and breadth. If, as some courts have held, the
bar on hypothetical jurisdiction mandates only that core Article III
subject-matter jurisdictional requirements be verified prior to reaching the merits, and that non-Article III requirements such as prudential or statutory standing can be bypassed, 51 7 then all other
jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional questions, including personal jurisdiction or Eleventh Amendment immunity, are presumably
bypassable as well. If, by comparison, Steel Co.'s prohibition is interpreted more broadly, reflecting larger concerns about the separation
of powers, then many of these other jurisdictional or quasijurisdictional inquiries may also need to be verified prior to reaching the
merits.5 1 8 But the breadth of the prohibition is only one problem.
Even if courts could settle on the broader reading, for example, they
may still encounter difficulty to the extent that they have long struggled generally with the definition of jurisdiction 519 and specifically
520
with whether certain issues warrant a jurisdictional label.

517
See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70,74 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000); Boos v. Runyon,
201 F.3d 178, 182 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000); Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement
Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 100 n.9 (1st Cir. 1999); Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d
1261, 1274 n.10 (lth Cir. 1999).
518 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); Jones v. Am.
Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Universal Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 756-57 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000); McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 158 F.3d 1294, 1298-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
519 See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90; Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir.
1999); Collins v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 978 F.2d 675, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
520 See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90; United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 259-62 (3d
Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 861 (2001); Prou, 199 F.3d at 45; United States
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Notwithstanding these potential interpretive variations, the reality is that there is an unavoidable logical relationship between the notion of resequencibility under Ruhrgas and the notion of
nonbypassability under Steel Co. Resequencibility, after all, indicates
that an inquiry is essential to a court's adjudicatory power, while
nonbypassability indicates that an inquiry is indispensable to the exercise of this power over the merits. The challenge, then, is to discern
the nature and strength of this relationship. In terms of likely positive
correlations, there are, in fact, four different variations on the relationship. The first two begin with Ruhrgas and end with Steel Co.-(1)
does resequencibility indicate nonbypassability?, and (2) does
nonresequencibility indicate bypassability?-while the second two begin with Steel Co. and end with Ruhrgas-(3) does nonbypassability indicate resequencibility?, and (4) does bypassability indicate
nonresequencibility?
Of these variations, the first arguably presents the most determinate, if not also the strongest, correlation. If a given inquiry is as essential as subject-matter jurisdiction to a court's adjudicatory power
that it can be resequenced prior to subject-matter jurisdiction, then it
is almost certainly as indispensable (nonbypassable) as subject-matter
jurisdiction when the court exercises this adjudicatory power in reaching the merits.5 21 As for the other three variations, the nature and
strength of their correlations are largely contingent on the reach of
Steel Co.'s bar on hypothetical jurisdiction. If the bar exclusively prohibits bypassing Article III requirements, then the second and fourth
variations become meaningless, because bypassability is neither determined by, nor indicative of, nonresequencibility, while the third variation becomes unnecessary because Article III requirements are
inherently resequencible. By comparison, if the Steel Co. bar reaches
other jurisdictional or quasijurisdictional inquiries, from Eleventh
Amendment immunity to (conceivably) any non-merits issue, then
v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-33 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 623-24 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Hogan v. United States, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. Civ. A. 99-868, 1999 WL
1138529, at *3-*4 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 1999).
521 United States v. Saro, 252 F.3d 449, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (suggesting in regard
to the certificate-of-appealability (COA) requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) that (1) under

Steel Co., "[i]f a COA is required, it is a prerequisite to our consideration of [the movant's]
appeal" and "we may not simply assume that a COA is not required and proceed to the
merits of [the movant's] claim," but that (2) under Ruhrgas, a determination of whether
the movant satisfies the requirements for issuance of a COA is a threshold inquiry that can
be resequenced, at least with other components of § 2253(c) (citing Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at
584-85; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-94)); see, e.g., Gass v. United States Dep't of Treasury, Nos.
99-1179, 98-B-75, 2000 WrL 743671, at *2 n.1 (10th Cir. June 9, 2000) (holding that the
administrative exhaustion requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7433(b), being jurisdictional, must
under Steel Co. be addressed before the merits but can, under Ruhrgas,be resequenced with
any other jurisdictional issue).
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these variations would acquire a greater correlative, if not predictive,
quality.
Given this contingency, the most sensible task at this juncture
may simply be to proceed through the case law of bypassability as it
currently stands. The natural starting point for this task is with personal jurisdiction, the issue that Ruhrgas itself addressed. Does Steel
Co.'s holding that a court cannot bypass subject-matter jurisdiction,
combined with Ruhrgas's holding that personal and subject-matter jurisdiction are equivalent, mean that the court must similarly verify personal jurisdiction before it can address the merits? 5 22 According to
those courts that have addressed this question since Ruhrgas, the answer should be in the affirmative: personal jurisdiction must be veri523
fied, and cannot be bypassed, if a court is to reach the merits.
Following Steel Co. and Ruhrgas,in other words, there is no "hypothetical personal jurisdiction." Unfortunately, the case law prior to Ruhrgas is less uniform. In fact, a circuit split apparently developed over
the permissibility of bypassing personal jurisdiction, thereby render525
5 24
and unlawful within others.
ing it lawful within some circuits

Given the silence of the Court in Ruhrgas and Steel Co. on the issue,
this split presumably still remains.
Even more uncertain is the permissibility of bypassing an issue of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. As with personal jurisdiction, the
courts were divided prior to Steel Co., with some holding that it could
not be bypassed 52 6 and others holding that it could. 52 7 Unlike per522 As with subject-matter jurisdiction, see supra note 516, this too is stated as a general
rule because personal jurisdiction may also be tied to the merits, see Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.

Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977); Schramm v. Oakes, 352 F.2d
143, 149 (10th Cir. 1965), leading some courts to use intermediate standards of scrutiny to
evaluate 12(b) (2) motions, see, e.g., Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d
138, 147-49 (1st Cir. 1995); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 677 (1st Cir. 1992).
See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 1999); Guidry v.
523
United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 n.2 (5th Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 199 F.3d
441 (5th Cir. 1999). But cf. Sanderson v. Spectrum Labs, Inc., No. 00-1872, 2000 WL
1909678, at *3 n.3 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 2000) (per curiam) (implying the contrary).
524 See, e.g, Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1993); Feinstein v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 &
n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (bypassing the issue of whether or not a party is proper when service of
process is not effectuated, deeming the failure "excusable" and "not an exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction of the sort disapproved of by the Supreme Court in Steel Co.").
525 See, e.g., OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th
Cir. 1998); Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1990); Falkirk Mining Co. v.
Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 1990); Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v.
Global Moving & Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir. 1976); Arrowsmith v. United
Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc).
526 See United States ex rel Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285 n.9 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing pre-Steel Co. circuit cases), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202-03 (2000).
527 See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.
1999); Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 166 (3d Cir. 1998); Ayes v. Shah, No. 96-3063, 1997
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sonal jurisdiction, however, this split has only intensified in the wake
of Steel Co., with the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits ruling that
Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be bypassed en route to the
merits,

528

the First, Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits ruling that it

can, 529

and the Second and Tenth Circuits apparently ruling both
5
8
0
ways.
For those holding against bypassability, the analysis is
straightforward and formalistic (assuming certain premises): Steel Co.
prohibits reaching the merits without first addressing subject-matter
jurisdiction (the broader reading of Steel Co.), Eleventh Amendment
immunity is a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction (the jurisdictional
conception), therefore Steel Co. prohibits reaching the merits without
first addressing Eleventh Amendment immunity. 53 1 For those holding
in favor of bypassability, the analysis tends to be more complicated
and pragmatic. It is more complicated, because it attempts to categorize the immunity as only quasijurisdictional 53 2 or, relatedly, to emphasize the potential overlap between the immunity and other issues,
particularly the existence of a cause of action. 53 3 It is pragmatic, as
bypassability holdings tend to be, because it invokes the values ofjudiWL 589177, at *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997); Sioux Falls Cable Television v. South Dakota,
838 F.2d 249, 252 n.3 (8th Cir. 1988); see also United States ex reL Long v. SCS Bus. &
Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting Supreme Court cases
implying both positions), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1202 (2000).
528 See, e.g., Cal. Franchise Tax Bd. v.Jackson (In reJackson), 184 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th
Cir. 1999); Foulds, 171 F.3d at 285-88; Seaborn v. Fla., Dep't of Corr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407
& n.2 (11th Cir. 1998). But cf McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252,
1258-59 (11th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Seaborn and holding that Eleventh Amendment
immunity can be bypassed if the government requests that the merits be addressed first).
529 See, e.g., Brindley v. Best, 192 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1999); Kennedy v. Nat'lJuvenile Det. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000); Long,
173 F.3d at 896-97; Parella, 173 F.3d at 53-57.
530 Compare Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding against bypassability of Eleventh Amendment immunity), with Sanghvi v. Frendel, No. 00-7538, 2000 WL
1804506, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (per curiam) (bypassing an Eleventh Amendment
issue and affirming on a procedural, merits-related ground), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2523
(2001); and compare Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
against bypassability of Eleventh Amendment immunity), and Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d
1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001) (same), and Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir.
1999) (same), withJohnson v. Oklahoma ex reL Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, Nos. 99-6322,
99-6427, 2000 WL 1114194, at *1 n.1 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 2000) (bypassing Eleventh Amendment immunity), and Grimes v. Boone, No. 98-7182, 1999 WL 454361, at *1 (10th Cir. July
6, 1999) (same).
531 See, e.g., Long, 173 F.3d at 891 (summarizing the logic of Foulds, 171 F.3d at 286).
532 See, e.g., id. at 893; see also Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 498 n.15 (D.NJ.
1998) (dismissing "for failure to state a claim without reaching the [Eleventh Amendment]
immunity question").
533
See, e.g., Long, 173 F.3d at 894-96. The Supreme Court recently ratified the view of
the D.C. Circuit in Long. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex reL Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 778 (2000). Still left open, however, is whether a merits issue can precede Eleventh Amendment immunity when coincidence in scope and logical antecedence are
lacking.
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cial restraint ("avoiding a difficult constitutional question"), 534 judicial economy ("permit[ting] courts to avoid squandering judicial
resources"), 535 and even litigant economy ("avoid[ing] forcing defendants to expend their resources on Eleventh Amendment questions in situations in which they would rather not do so").536
Lastly, there is the issue of bypassing federal sovereign immunity,
the analysis of which resembles that of Eleventh Amendment immunity, as is the case with resequencing in general. If Steel Co. is limited
to core Article IlI inquiries, then federal sovereign immunity is obviously beyond its reach and may be bypassed. If, by contrast, Steel Co.
applies to other jurisdictional inquiries, or even just to other constitutional jurisdictional inquiries, then the bypassability of federal sovereign immunity becomes more contested.5 3 7 Prior to Steel Co., courts
appeared to consider it bypassable. 53 8 Following Steel Co., courts have
been more divided, or more cognizant of their division, a pattern similar to the treatment of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Since Steel
Co., in fact, most courts have held that federal sovereign immunity
cannot be bypassed.5 3 9 At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has held not
only that it can be bypassed, because it is "'a less than pure jurisdictional question,' 540 but also that it can be resequenced because it is a
'jurisdictional" "non-merits question[ ] " 5 4 1 -two holdings which, if
not irreconcilable, certainly seem to push Steel Co. and Ruhrgas to the
limits of their doctrinal and theoretical integrity.
CONCLUSION

The emerging power of federal courts to resequence threshold
inquiries equips these tribunals with a relatively novel and potentially
useful means of dispatching ill-fated lawsuits without becoming entangled in difficult jurisdictional questions, thereby promising a facilitated and more efficient use of judicial resources. In theory, the
Long, 173 F.3d at 898; acordParella, 173 F.3d at 56.
Parella, 173 F.3d at 56.
Id.
537
See, e.g., Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 182 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000).
538
See, e.g., Clow v. HUD, 948 F.2d 614, 616 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), abrogated by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Scheidegg v. Dep't of Air
534

535
536

Force, No. 90-1127, 1990 WL 151390, at *2 (1st Cir. Sept. 28, 1990) (per curiam).
539 See, e.g., Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Treglowne v. United States, No. 99-CV-70323, 2000 WL 264677, at *1-*.*2 (E.D.
Mich.Jan. 21, 2000); Hogan v. United States, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, No. Civ.A. 99-868,
1999 , L 1138529, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 1999); Jones v. Newman, No. 98 Civ.
7460(MBM), 1999 WL 493429, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999).

540

In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(citation omitted). Like its pre-Steel Co. predecessors (as well as those justifying the bypas-

sability of Eleventh Amendment immunity post-Steel Co.), the D.C. Circuit buttressed its
holding of bypassability by adverting to the principle ofjudicial restraint. See id. at 1001.

541

See Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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resequencing option may apply to any threshold inquiry that satisfies
the initial condition of equivalence with subject-matter jurisdiction,
based on a finding that the inquiry is both an essential and a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power. If a court finds
equivalence, then the final resequencing decision is largely within its
discretion, contingent on the relative difficulty of the resequencible
issues and informed by the values of economy, restraint, and
federalism.
To embrace this doctrine at face value, however, would be to ignore the fact that the resequencing power itself raises many serious
questions about the sources, nature, and limits of federal jurisdictional authority. To litigants embroiled in the heat of actual litigation,
of course, the significance of these questions will likely be measured
by the practical consequences of their resolution, largely detached
from underlying issues of structure and legitimacy. To judges and
scholars, however, their significance is very much tied to these issues,
and their resolution must ultimately arise from the forum of reasoned
analysis and legal principle. But the demands of this forum are not
easily satisfied, particularly when an effective expansion of the judiciary's inherent powers apparently hangs in the balance.
If the resequencing power is to be considered legitimate in anything but the most positivistic sense, therefore, its proponents and expositors must confront the contention, advanced in this Article, that it
fails virtually every traditional criterion of doctrinal validity, including
precedential fidelity, theoretical congruence, jurisdictional conformity, and methodological adherence. Correspondingly, if the resequencing power is to be considered functionally adequate in anything
but the most expedient sense, its proponents and expositors must
forthrightly discern with greater precision its parameters and reach,
and constrain its use accordingly. At the present time, with courts
omitting its requirements and forecasting its application to all manner
of threshold issues-and doing so on the basis of a decision that itself
lacks the force of legitimate persuasion-the resequencing power
comes perilously close to the line that separates valid authority from
unprincipled usurpation. The irony, of course, is that these developments come at a time when the courts have been vigorously instructing the other branches to stay within their constitutional limits
and to speak with greater clarity so that these limits may better be
preserved. These are worthy endeavors indeed, but they are endeavors that must begin, and not end, with the judicial branch.

